

**BABEȘ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY, CLUJ-NAPOCA**  
**FACULTY OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY**  
**DOCTORAL SCHOOL IN PHILOSOPHY**

**DOCTORAL THESIS**

**Abstract**

**The Mirror Structure of the Image**

*Hermeneutic Approaches to the Artistic Experience of Reflection*

**Supervisor:**

**Prof. univ. dr. Carol Veress**

**Doctoral Candidate:**

**Rancz Mónika**

**Cluj-Napoca**

**2025**

## Keywords

image, model, image as copy, reflection, mirror, structure, knowledge, experience, artwork, word, sign, language, metaphor, paradox, symbol, artistic image, mimesis, play, perspective, appearance, manifestation, speculativity, difference, structure of belonging, beauty, understanding, truth, image interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, *Truth and Method*

## Table of Contents

### Introduction

- Research Topic
- Preliminary Research Results
- Research Objectives and Hypothesis
- Research Methods and Procedures
- Structure of the Dissertation

### Chapter 1. Preliminary Structures of the Mirror Problem

- 1.1. The Personal Components of Knowledge and Their Hermeneutic Relevance
  - 1.1.1. Defining Personal Knowledge
  - 1.1.2. Faith, Passion, Heuristic, Discovery
  - 1.1.3. Linguisticity, Learning, Experience, Knowledge
- 1.2. Paradox, Metaphor, and Art in the Focus of Understanding
  - 1.2.1. Hermeneutic Paradoxes
  - 1.2.2. The Role of the Metaphor
  - 1.2.3. The Interconnections of Art of Image and Word – Preparing the Question of Truth

### Chapter 2. Mimetic Truth

- 2.1. The Concept of Truth in Hermeneutics
  - 2.1.1. The Debate on Truth
  - 2.1.2. The Hermeneutical Relevance of the *Symposium*
  - 2.1.3. The Hermeneutical approaches to truth
  - 2.1.4. The Hermeneutical Tradition – from the Perspective of the Question of Truth
  - 2.1.5. The Hermeneutical Place of Truth
- 2.2. The Mimetic Character of the Artwork
  - 2.2.1. The Polysemy of Mimesis
  - 2.2.2. The Mimetical Fundamental Relationship
  - 2.2.3. Mimetic Play
  - 2.2.4. The Ludic Character of the Image

### Chapter 3. The Problem of View

- 3.1. Introduction to the Concept of View

- 3.2. Kant and Gadamer's "Dialogue" on View
  - 3.2.1. The Problem of View in Kant's *Critiques*
  - 3.2.2. Gadamer – Following the Kantian Path
  - 3.2.3. The Critical Overcoming of the Kantian Concept in Gadamer
- 3.3. The Concept of View in the Hermeneutical Horizon
  - 3.3.1. View in the Experience of the Image
  - 3.3.2. Appearing, Shining, Manifesting
  - 3.3.3. The Perspective of Beauty

## **Chapter 4. The Hermeneutic Experience of Reflection**

- 4.1. The Mirror as Image – the Image as Mirror
  - 4.1.1. The Mirror as Image
  - 4.1.2. The Image as Mirror
- 4.2. The Mirror Structure of the Artistic Image
  - 4.2.1. The Difference Between Image and Image as Copy
  - 4.2.2. Sign – Symbol – Image
  - 4.2.3. The Speculative Nature of the Artistic Image
- 4.3. The Significance and Limits of the Mirror Metaphor

## **Chapter 5. What Are Images For?**

- 3.1. Introduction to Image Interpretations
- 3.2. Three Image Interpretations
  - 3.2.1. Belonging to Place – Cola di Petruccioli's Ceiling Fresco Cycle from the Palazzo Isodoro
  - 3.2.2. Belonging to Time – Nicolaes Maes: *Jacob Trip (1575-1661), Portrait of a Merchant from Dordrecht*
  - 3.2.3. Belonging to Repetition – Vera Molnár: *My Mother's Letters*

## **Conclusions**

- Summary of the Examined Issues
- Validity of the Hypothesis and Methods
- Individual Contribution
- Final Conclusions and Emerging Horizons of Questions

## **Image Appendix**

## **Bibliográfia**

## **Abstract of the Dissertation**

In his philosophical reflections on art in *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer highlights the example of the mirror as an illustrative model in explaining the phenomenon of the image. Later, in the third part of his main work, additional perspectives on the

phenomenon of the mirror can be found: the structural movement of speculativity, which specifically refers to the moment of reflection, will serve as the principle explaining the mode of being of language. In my research, I address the **problem** of connecting these two concepts, which have so far not been analyzed in depth in the literature, and in doing so, I aim to reveal the hermeneutic meaning and significance arising from the mirror metaphor. The novelty of my approach lies in the fact that, in this dissertation, I examine the chosen problem from the perspective of the image, starting with the question of the image, as opposed to the hermeneutic theory, which primarily emphasizes the primacy of language, and according to which the philosophy of the word typically provides the guiding perspective. In my dissertation, I undertake the novel task of exploring the relationship between these regions.

My interpretation focuses on the mode of existence of the artistic image, with the **research question** being what constitutes the supposed mirror nature of the image, and if it is confirmed that the image reflects in a hermeneutic sense, then what the image shows and how it does so. The central **thesis** of my **hypothesis** is that, in the case of the image, the problem of reflection proves to be fundamental and significant, as it can be revealed as an ontologically defining, essential structural moment.

Several interpreters of Gadamer have dealt with the broad topics of hermeneutic aesthetics. Although within this field, there are no specific propositions that focus on the mirror nature of the image, I was able to rely on a rather rich body of **secondary literature** during my research. Researchers such as Jean Grondin, Gottfried Boehm, Paul Ricoeur, Georgia Warnke, and in the Hungarian-speaking region, Béla Bacsó, István M. Fehér, Balázs Görföl, János Loboczky, Miklós Nyíró, Csaba Olay, and Károly Veress all provided crucial sources for the development of hermeneutic thinking and/or the Gadamerian perspective. At the same time, throughout the research, I found numerous points of connection that relate my topic to concepts beyond hermeneutics. In many cases, the goal of the discussion was to uncover these intellectual affinities and connections, while also opening a dialogue with the works of theorists such as Hans Belting, Hans Blumenberg, Johan Huizinga, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Mihály Polányi, or Umberto Eco.

As for the **research methods and procedures**, in examining the mirror-nature of the image, I primarily employ **analytical and interpretive approaches**. The research requires a close reading of Gadamer's writings, and in connection with this, the application of *hermeneutic perspectives* to the emerging questions. Alongside the dominant application of hermeneutic interpretation, certain aspects of the research lead to *interdisciplinary*

approaches. In elaborating these, I focus on fostering dialogue between disciplines and emphasizing the validation of a *common* perspective.

In addition to the textual analysis that ensures the analytical approach, I also incorporate interpretative methods and practices into the research. In the text, paintings, graphics, poems, philosophical images, and other artworks occasionally appear, which do not serve an illustrative or decorative role in the argumentation, but instead act as carriers of specific problems to be elaborated upon. The interpretations related to them broaden and deepen the scope of the issue under investigation. In this regard, the art interpretations presented in the concluding, applicative section provide an opportunity for critical reflection: in this way, this section offers validating feedback for the theoretical findings. The specific interpretations of the images aim to create a novel, constructive approach in relation to artworks, particularly artistic images.

The **structure of the dissertation**: the argument is divided into five chapters. The first chapter contains the foundational discussions, while the second, third, and fourth chapters focus on the elaboration of the topic at hand. The fifth chapter, with the aim of applying the analyzed approach to images, includes three art interpretations. The text is composed of sequential, interdependent segments, and while the topics are clearly delineated, they ultimately converge within a single line of reasoning.

In the first chapter (*Preliminary Structures of the Mirror Problem*), during the foundational phase of the research, I found it important to clarify certain preliminary structures that are part of the assumptions underlying the problem being discussed. If the question of the mirror structure is considered within the context of art and the hermeneutical concept of truth, I deem it necessary to examine the antecedents and conditions that lead to the theses. With this aim, in the first subsection (*The Personal Components of Knowledge and Their Hermeneutic Relevance*), I discuss the possibility of a concept of knowledge that can support Gadamer's notion of truth. For, in order to assert, as Gadamer does, that the real possibility of art is the unfolding of truth, we need a foundational conception of the nature of knowledge. To illuminate this issue, I choose a dialogical approach, through which I aim to explore the Gadamerian understanding from its preliminary conditions by putting it into dialogue with a concept that is not directly related but shows a deep resonance with it: the paradigm of personal knowledge. I believe that the conception attributed to Michael Polanyi offers us an answer to why it is worth extending the problem of truth in the direction suggested by Gadamer.

The concept of personal knowledge seems relevant to me because it carries the potential for an epistemology and conception of knowledge that is also open to the humanities, something that traditional positivist scientific theory excludes. The positivist slogans of objectivism and formalizability, as well as elevating empiricism to an exclusive principle, are all criteria based on which the validity of those sciences that deal with human culture, society, and history can be called into question. It is Polanyi who significantly opens up this narrow perspective. He argues that knowledge is always dependent on personal and tacit components. According to the concept of personal knowledge, beyond the realm of explicit knowledge that comes into focus, the acquisition, retention, and communication of knowledge are made possible by content that is obtained through non-reflective intuition, experience, practical sense, and skills. Tacit knowledge thus forms the very precondition for expressing knowledge, which cannot be disregarded or straightforwardly excluded as a perspective. The personal aspect characterizes the researcher's perspective, guided by their intuition, sense of vocation, and convictions, which shape their viewpoint and, in turn, the direction of the research itself. We must arrive at the surprising conclusion that the relevant aspect of knowledge is the agent's belief and commitment to the truth of a proposition, without which a statement – even if it articulates factual accuracy and conformity with facts – cannot be included among the known, the things that are known, or the truths. At the same time, knowledge is not merely an individual matter. Knowledge is community- and tradition-based, inherited, and shaped by how *shared* questions steer it. From this, it follows that the historical, unique, interpretive approach, and the elevated role of subjectivity are aspects that do not hinder the foundation of knowledge, but rather, on the contrary, facilitate it. If we think in this way, we can take Gadamer's suggestion seriously, which pertains to the possibility of truth in the arts. For, from this perspective, at least it seems that art is the possibility of the manifestation and reflection of the human perspective.

In the remaining subsection of the first part (*Paradox, Metaphor, and Art in the Focus of Understanding*), I continue to develop the preliminary framework of the research by analyzing the phenomena of *paradox* and *metaphor*. This appears necessary because we encounter these intellectual constructs at both the beginning and the conclusion of the thesis: a metaphor forms the starting point, and then, at the closure of the argument, we arrive at a paradox, which enables us to articulate our conclusion. However, in order to evaluate these cornerstones of the argument in their own right, an openness of perspective is required. After all, if we define metaphor merely as a rhetorical flourish and a linguistic ornament, or view paradox as the failure and dead-end of thought, we will not be inclined to make these figures

fruitful in philosophical thinking. Fortunately, we can rely on exceptionally rich precedents if, on the contrary, we see that the phenomena of metaphor and paradox can be incorporated into the discussion.

It is important to note that we cannot proceed through the argument of this thesis without considering certain paradoxes. These are not inventions of this work, but can already be identified in some of Gadamer's descriptions, and can also be aligned with the epistemological insights examined in the previous chapter. If knowledge is not a perfect description of a logically consistent world, then it can be suggested that understanding embraces contradictions as complex formations, allowing for layered and multi-perspective analysis. In this section, I trace how the paradox of interpretation manifests itself within the dimensions of the artwork, text, and language. We then add to this Gadamer's insights regarding the ambivalent character of art, along with several ideas from Gottfried Boehm, Hans Belting, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Through these perspectives, it is demonstrated that the paradox, understood as an irresolvable self-contradiction, significantly contributes to the hermeneutic interpretation of these phenomena. This also serves as a preparatory step for defining the criteria by which I approach the nature of art and the practice of interpretation in this thesis.

In the next subsection, I draw on the analyses of Hans Blumenberg, Umberto Eco, and Paul Ricoeur to support the thesis that the metaphor represents a linguistic innovation which, through its unusual combinations, renews conceptually fixed cognitive constraints. The metaphor thus functions like a well-directed question that opens up a field of inquiry. To understand this, we need the conclusions formulated in the previous section, which establish a conceptual community between Polanyi and Gadamer. This concerns the elevated role of language, which can be understood as the manifestation of the human endeavor that assigns meaning and value to the world of language. If language is the place of understanding, then the metaphor, as a cognitive formation, comes to the foreground.

Thirdly, the question of art arises, and I examine its two branches, the art of word and the art of image, which Gadamer has also analyzed extensively, in order to reach the realization of why it is necessary to think about the problem of truth in relation to them. Regarding their relationship, it should be emphasized that, in Gadamer's work, the art of the word takes center stage, with poetry being the paradigm-setting artistic form. However, he often relates this to the problem of the image. Since the example of the mirror appears in the main work in both the visual mode of being and the hermeneutical conception of language, it is an inevitable question that runs throughout the argument: how can we understand the

relationship between word and image? This question can arise precisely because our initial discussions have opened the way to recognizing the truth of both word and image. Here, we can begin from what is common in the arts of word and image: both partake in human efforts aimed at understanding, and their challenge is to provide an *experience of truth*, distinct from the goals of purely knowledge-oriented rational thought.

Building on this thread, I continue to develop the argument in the second chapter of the thesis (*Mimetic Truth*). Here, I treat the question of *mimetic truth* as a central issue, a key concept in hermeneutics. It is natural to divide the problem into two stages: in one subsection, I examine the concept of truth (*The Concept of Truth in Hermeneutics*), and in another subsection (*The Mimetic Character of the Artwork*), I explore the hermeneutic significance of mimesis. My aim is to articulate both within the specific framework established by Gadamer's analysis.

I have already begun clarifying and establishing the place of the question of truth in the earlier theoretical introduction on epistemology, which I now supplement in this chapter with a more precise definition of the hermeneutic concept of truth. When examined from its preliminary perspective, it has been demonstrated that this concept is related to a Platonic ideal, which I reveal in the interpretation of the *Symposium*. Further connections can be drawn between Gadamer's analysis and the ideas of representatives of classical hermeneutics, and by presenting these, I aim to understand the standpoint of philosophical hermeneutics in a historical perspective. It is confirmed that the problem of truth in this endeavor does not emerge as a subject-independent process of collecting objective facts, but rather as a practice that reinterprets the Platonic concept of *methexis*: in short, to paraphrase H.-G. Gadamer, hermeneutic truth is "participation in the common meaning". The truth is formed in a conversation that spans across time, passing through creative moments, which I will identify as belonging to mimetic practices in the following subchapter.

*Mimesis*, like the problem of truth, can be traced back to ancient Greek roots and has since traversed a long historical path. However, today it seems as though the concept has become somewhat outdated, experiencing its twilight as a fundamental term in the philosophy of art. Nonetheless, Gadamer restores the significance of *mimesis* by re-contextualizing it and revealing its new relevance. For him, the mimetic function, which can only be understood in conjunction with the phenomenon of play, appears as one aspect of human activities, and for Gadamer, it becomes indispensable especially in defining the mode of existence of art. The essence of the mimetic practice is that it involves presentation, or play, in which something exists and becomes present without accounting for its specific



physical absence. *Mimesis* signifies bringing something into the present, creating a presence through a model-structure (they present it *as something*). Thus, art, as a mimetic experience, does not represent a pre-existing reproduction, but rather the creative moment of imitation. The artwork is the place of sense-making, through which the observer can engage in the co-creation of truth in a shared conversation, contributing to the unfolding of meaning over time

In the next chapter (*The Problem of View*), the position of the observer comes into focus. This third theme, which follows the discussion of the artwork's truth, emphasizes the perspective of the recipient. In this chapter, I embark on an exploration, in dialogue with Kant's concept of intuition, to unfold Gadamer's notion of view, which he particularly emphasizes. According to Gadamer, the artwork primarily carries a worldview. In the discussion, I return to the starting point outlined by Gadamer's analysis: I examine the Kantian *Critiques* in light of their hermeneutic emphasis, primarily activating the concepts of view and imagination. Starting from Kant's analysis, Gadamer defines a concept of perspective that characterizes the mode of existence of art as manifestation. The artwork creates a perspective, meaning that it brings to validity and truth what emerges within the space of the play. The artwork carries intuition, and it is this moment that elevates it into truth. It becomes clear that the concept of perspective is no longer understood in terms of the pure spirituality of the word, but from the perspective of the image's elevation, manifestation, appearance, and its realization *as an image*. In this regard, it becomes evident that hermeneutics is not limited to the analysis of the art of the word. Therefore, I can now address the problem of perspective, as well as the experience of presentation and truth emerging within it, examining it in terms of the image. In presenting the visual perspective and the visual experience of seeing that arises in this context, I draw attention to the phenomena of appearance and manifestation, as well as the metaphysics of beauty deeply interconnected with these in Gadamer's thinking.

Following the questions of presentation and truth-experience in the image, I arrive at the central question of the dissertation in the chapter titled *The Hermeneutic Experience of Reflection*, where I analyze the problematics of the mirror and reflection. In this process, the argument of the dissertation is fully developed, leading to the final reflections that close the thought process. The goal of this chapter is to examine in depth whether the structure of reflection can be identified in the experience of truth within a work of art, and what consequences this has for the nature of art, understanding, and truth.

As the first step (*The Mirror as Image – the Image as Mirror*), I conduct an analysis of two passages from *Truth and Method*, focusing on the problem of the mirror. I aim to uncover

the nature and characteristics of the mirror structure, so that it can later be applied to works of art. In the first passage, the mirror example illuminates an essential aspect of the mode of existence of images: the dual relationship to the archetype. The mirror example refers to a reciprocal dependency: the image created on the surface of the mirror is a manifestation of the original; the manifestation becomes understandable only in relation to the original, yet its ontological status is not inferior to it. When I look into the mirror, I focus on what appears within it, because – this is the key point of the argument – only within it does the reflected object appear as an image. The image belongs to the archetype, confirming its presence, while in turn, the archetype enriches itself when it is shown as an image. This defining aspect of the mode of the image is revealed precisely through the mirror example.

In the second passage of the chapter (*The Mirror Structure of the Artistic Image*), the mirror is no longer simply an example but is defined as a structural moment of the operation of language. However, my aim is to demonstrate that the moment discussed within the context of language is related to the earlier mirror example. In the same way that the archetype and the image belong together, we must conceive of the relationship, which H.-G. Gadamer calls *speculative*, saying: “speculative here means the relation of reflection”. The speculative in language is a relation irreducible to predication, one that connects the domains of language, thought, and the thing itself. We must conceive of the relation between word and thought, as well as their relation to the thing, in the same way that an image relates to its archetype. There is no simple representational correspondence between these elements; thus, the word does not merely follow the thing, nor does thought merely follow the word. Rather, speech constitutes a unique event in which what appears within it attains its image, stepping forward as something understandable for the human being. The wonder of the word lies in its capacity to reflect the human world, allowing us to see the thing itself within it. The close relation between word and thing, thought and word—already characterized as speculative – is further articulated by Gadamer through the concept of belonging. The speculative structure of belonging implies that the entities within such a relation are mutually dependent and intrinsically connected, yet they remain autonomous and do not dissolve into one another. Here, we arrive at our paradox: the differentiated unity of the two, through which the mirror structure is ultimately defined.

Expanding the conclusions of the chapter on mirroring to the domain of art, I illuminate how the speculative model of belonging – structured through the mirror – can help us understand the artistic image’s relation to truth and the world. To substantiate this claim, I propose distinguishing the phenomenon of the image from the mere copy, as well as from the

sign and the symbol. The analysis reveals that speculativity can serve as a valid distinguishing feature of the image phenomenon, provided that we examine it in its artistic manifestations. The artistic image is not bound to its model through a resemblance akin to a mere copy but through a mimetic, creative act. What appears as an artistic image does not preexist as a clearer or more primary vision; rather, it comes into being precisely through and as this manifestation—as an image. It is the speculative force within the artistic image that enables us not merely to perceive a secondary imitation or incidental duplication but to see the revealed as it takes form as an image. Only in this way can that which is, in its truth, manifest itself through the artistic image.

After all these considerations, we must ask to what extent the mirror structure exhaustively describes the mode of being of the image (*The Significance and Limits of the Mirror Metaphor*). Gadamer's analysis makes it clear that certain boundaries must be set for this structure, and a crucial step in its interpretation is assessing which aspects of the image cannot be exemplified by the mirror structure. Our definition reaches completion when we recognize both what falls within its scope and what remains beyond its limits.

While the aim of the theoretical inquiry was to clarify conceptual frameworks, fundamental principles, and interrelations, the third and final part of the doctoral dissertation (*What Are Images For?*) takes on an applicative approach. In this section, I conduct an empirical investigation grounded in concrete experiences of artworks, addressing the question of how the mirror structure of images manifests in specific works.

In the introductory section of the applicative part (*Introduction to Image Interpretations*), I found it necessary to elaborate on the embeddedness of visual works and their belonging to their respective worlds. This serves as a preliminary discussion to help us perceive the speculative relation of mirroring from the perspective of concrete instances. Within this prepared framework, I present three image interpretations: Cola di Petruccioli's ceiling fresco cycle, Nicolaes Maes's *Portrait of Jacob Trip*, and Vera Molnár's *My Mother's Letters*. In analyzing these works, I examine the structure of belonging as it manifests through their relation to place, time, and repetition.

The contributions of this dissertation lie in the **conclusions** reached through the analytical reasoning developed in the study and made tangible through the image interpretations. My research has elaborated a hermeneutic approach to the mirror structure of the artistic image. I have connected the mirror structure to the speculative belonging-together of being and appearance, framing it as a central ontological determination of the image. In this sense, reflection, as an ontological concept, designates the interweaving that takes place

between being and appearance: being attains manifestation through the image, while the image belongs to being as its model. Following Gadamer, I have described this relationship as speculative – that is, mirroring in nature – where the two moments emerge as the unity of distinct elements; the mirror duplicates something, yet ultimately affirms the existence of one.

The outcome of my dissertation is the interpretation of the hermeneutic relationship between word and image based on this metaphysical conception. This approach offers a novel perspective on Gadamer's predominantly language-centered theory by initiating the inquiry from the mirror-like nature of imagery. This is consistent with the fact that in *Truth and Method*, reflection first appears as a problem of the image – a choice I have demonstrated to be non-arbitrary, since the speculative structure manifests paradigmatically in this domain. In connection with this, I have also interpreted the meaning of linguistic speculativity. Through this comparative investigation, I have concluded that while language retains its eminent role in hermeneutics, certain aspects of the word can be best understood through the image. Thus, the speculative nature of the word itself can be interpreted as a pictorial relation.

The most significant consequence of this line of thought concerns the problem of the artistic image. In my dissertation, I have connected the ontologically interpreted phenomenon of the image with the question of truth, relying on the hermeneutic premise that art is a possibility for truth. In Gadamer's interpretation, truth is understood as the continuous process of bringing to the surface shared questions of meaning, significance, value, and relevance – an unfolding that takes place within the medium of hermeneutic conversation. I have demonstrated that the artistic image can be part of this conversation because, through its speculative structure, it enables being to manifest in its appearance. In the image, truth can attain visibility and appear as such – it can reflect itself in a way that, through the close connection of belonging, truth gains visibility by means of the movement of differentiating identification. Thus, the image and truth are linked in a speculative relationship, forming a unity that differentiates even as it unites.

However, we can go even further. In the hermeneutic interpretation of truth, I concluded that its mode of existence involves speculativity. Truth manifests, it projects itself outward, and in art, it manifests through beauty in the ontological sense. Beauty, in this context, is radiance, shining, which is not visible in itself but makes visible what it illuminates. The mirror can be described in the same way: the image of the mirror itself does not come to the foreground, but it only makes possible the manifestation of something as an image.

At the same time, my investigation has also uncovered the limits of the mirror metaphor: while truth can be associated with reflection, it does not exhaust its essence within it. This boundary, already indicated by Gadamer, shows that the spectacle created in the mirror is not of a demonstrative nature. The artistic image, however, possesses an autonomy, a force of its own through which it represents its model image, thereby contributing to the enrichment of its existence. While this moment is prepared within the mirror metaphor, inasmuch as it expresses the close connection between being and appearance, as well as truth and spectacle in the image, it cannot, beyond this indication, describe the aspect of the enrichment of being.

Gadamer asserts that all interpretation is speculative, meaning that each interpretation is a manifestation of the original, to whose existence it belongs to reveal itself in this manner. In the final chapter, I have conducted the interpretation of the three artworks in alignment with this idea. Each of the three interpretations aims to present the chosen artwork in such a way that its close relationship to a world or phenomenon becomes visible – a relationship that is speculative, as it is reflective in nature, meaning that its manifestation is of an existence that is formed precisely through this revelation. I have demonstrated that the selected artistic images stand in speculative relation to a world, highlighting its historical, spatial, and temporal aspects.

### Selective Bibliography

- BACSO Béla: A mimészis paradoxona. In Idem: Tapasztalat és esztétika. *Filozófiai és művészetelméleti írások*. Kijarat Kiadó, Budapest, 2016, p. 15-33.
- BELTING, Hans: Test-kép-médium. (Trans. Kelemen Pál) In Idem: *Kép-antropológia. Képtudományi vázlatok*. Kijarat Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, p. 13-67.
- BLUMENBERG, Hans: Paradigmák egy metaforológiához. (Trans. Király Edit) In Idem: *Hajótörés nézővel. Metaforológiai tanulmányok*. Atlantisz Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2006, p. 199-388.
- BOEHM, Gottfried: A kép hermeneutikájához. (Trans. Eifert Anna) *Athenaeum*. I/4 (1993), p. 87-111.
- ECO, Umberto: A metafora szemantikája. (Trans. Berényi Gábor) In Idem: *A nyitott mű*. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1976, p. 320-365.
- FEHÉR M. István: „Az eszme érzéki ragyogása”: Esztétika, metafizika, hermeneutika. In Idem: *Filozófia, történet, értelmezés. Hermeneutikai tanulmányok (2000–2020)*. II. L'Harmattan Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2021, p. 317-370.
- GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *Igazság és módszer. Egy filozófiai hermeneutika vázlata*. (Trans. Bonyhai Gábor) Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1984.

- GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *The relevance of the beautiful and other essays*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986.
- GADAMER, Hans-Georg: *A szép aktualitása*. (Trans. Bonyhai Gábor, Hegessy Mária, Loboczky János, Orosz Magdolna, Poprády Judit, Schein Gábor, Tallár Ferenc) T-Twins Kiadó, Budapest, 1994.
- GADAMER: A kép és a szó művészete. (Trans. Németh Andrea) In Bacsó Béla (ed.): *Kép, fenomén, valóság*. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest, 1997, p. 274-299.
- GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Szemlélet és szemléletesség. (Trans. Kukla Krisztián) In Bacsó Béla (ed.): *Fenomén és mű. Fenomenológia és esztétika*. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest, 2003, p. 123-136.
- GADAMER, Hans-Georg: Szöveg és interpretáció. (Trans. Hévízi Ottó) In Bacsó Béla (ed.): *Szöveg és interpretáció*. Cserépfalvi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1991, p. 17-43.
- GÖRFÖL Balázs: *Hans-Georg Gadamer művészet- és költészetfelfogása*. Ballassi Kiadó, Budapest, 2016.
- GRONDIN, Jean: A hermeneutikai igazságfogalom kibontakozása. (Trans. Mezei György Iván) *Athenaeum* II (1993) 1, p. 221-233.
- GRONDIN, Jean: *Bevezetés a hermeneutikába*. (Trans. Nyíró Miklós) Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002.
- KANT, Immanuel: *Az ítélőerő kritikája*. (Trans. Papp Zoltán) Ictus Kiadó, Szeged, 1997.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin: *A műalkotás eredete*. (Trans. Bacsó Béla) Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988.
- MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: A szem és a szellem. (Trans. Vajdovich Györgyi, Moldvay Tamás) In Bacsó Béla (ed.): *Fenomén és mű. Fenomenológia és esztétika*. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest, 2002, p. 54-79.
- NYÍRÓ Miklós: *Nyelviség és nyelvfeledtség*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2006.
- PETERS, Francis E.: *Termeni filozofiei grecești*. (Trans. Dragan Stoianovici) Humanitas, București, 1997.
- POLÁNYI Mihály: *Személyes tudás I*. (Trans. Papp Mária) Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest, 1994.
- POLÁNYI Mihály: *Személyes tudás II*. (Trans. Papp Mária) Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest, 1994.
- PLATÓN: *A lakoma. Platón összes művei kommentárokkal*. (Trans. Telegdi Zsigmond) Atlantisz Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2005.
- RICOEUR, Paul: *Az élő metafora*. (Trans. Földes Györgyi) Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2006.
- VERESS Károly: A hozzátartozás mint alapstruktúra. In Idem (ed.): *A hozzátartozás struktúrái. Hermeneutikai és alkalmazott filozófiai kutatások*. Egyetemi Műhely Kiadó, Kolozsvár, 2010, p. 41-71.