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**POLITICA EXTERNĂ A TURCIEI:
TRANSFORMĂRILE DIN RELAȚIILE
INTERNAȚIONALE ÎN URMA
EVENIMENTELOR DIN 2016**
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Introducere

Într-o eră marcată de dinamism și reziliență, politica externă a unui stat nu mai poate fi privită doar prin prisma deciziilor luate pe termen scurt sau prin apartenența în alianțe tradiționale. Începând cu anul 2016, Turcia a traversat o perioadă tumultoasă, marcată de numeroase schimbări atât interne, cât și externe. Evenimentele politice asociate cu tentativa loviturii de stat au avut un impact profund asupra evoluției sale geopolitice recente, încurajând încrederea Turciei în poziția sa geostrategică particulară, dezvoltarea capabilităților proprii de apărare, precum și metamorfoza la nivel de *soft power* prin adoptarea imaginii de mediator, pod între Est și Vest, o parte terță dornică să ofere un spațiu pentru negocieri etc.

În cadrul acestui studiu, am urmărit fluctuațiile din politica externă a statului între anii 2016 și 2024, un interval temporal care, deși provocator, s-a dovedit fi esențial pentru înțelegerea evoluției acestui stat. Această axă temporală mi-a fost familiară încă din primii ani ai parcursului meu academic, fiind strâns legată de un proces de aprofundare continuă în cadrul cursurilor și lucrărilor de final de an, îndeosebi prin abordarea relațiilor dintre Turcia și Grecia în cadrul tezei de dizertație.

Având o poziție strategică deosebită și o prezență extrem de activă pe plan internațional în numeroase formate bilaterale, trilaterale și nu numai, Turcia a demonstrat o îndemânare aparte în a sesiza și răspunde primelor vibrații ale schimbărilor pe plan regional și global. În competiția acerbă a marilor puteri pentru suprematie, Ankara se confruntă cu dilema de a rămâne loială și puternic ancorată în menținerea status quo-ului actual sau de a-l contesta alături de actori revizionisti. În acest cadru, Turcia a investit în dezvoltarea unei abordări strategice duale, cu scopul de a-și menține garanțiile politice, militare și economice cu statele vestice, în paralel cu extinderea treptată a influenței în regiuni precum Africa, Asia Centrală și America Latină.

Importanța acestui studiu este strâns legată de contextul extrem de volatil al regiunii Mării Negre, anterior începerii războiului din Ucraina. Odată cu reluarea relațiilor cu Rusia, precum și cu deschiderea precaută către China, Turcia a semnalat că își dorește să câștige de pe urma unei politici multivectoriale, pragmatice, axate pe balansarea intereselor pe termen scurt și lung. Ankara și-a dorit o împrospătare a imaginii sale pe plan internațional, căutând să se desăvârșească în rolul de mediator.

I. Întrebări de cercetare și metodologie

Această lucrare s-a axat pe două întrebări de cercetare:

1. Cum au modelat presiunile sistemiche și factorii interni deciziile din politica externă turcă după tentativa de lovitură de stat din 2016?
2. Începând cu anul 2016, cum poate fi interpretată strategia Turciei în formarea alianțelor, având drept cadru teoretic principiile realismului defensiv?

Prima întrebare își propune să ofere o explorare detaliată a relațiilor Turciei cu actori cheie precum Statele Unite ale Americii, Rusia, China, Uniunea Europeană și Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord, prin utilizarea unor studii de caz care analizează interacțiunea juxtapunerea între schimbările interne ale statului și diverse contexte externe. A doua întrebare de cercetare completează teza, abordând aplicarea realismului defensiv și rolul dinamicii interne în evaluarea comportamentului strategic al Turciei.

Prin examinarea modului în care Ankara navighează menținerea și tatonarea alianțelor tradiționale, precum și eforturile de extindere a influenței sale, acest studiu se pronunță asupra implicațiilor teoretice ale realismului defensiv în analiza strategiilor de politică externă adoptate de puterile mijlocii.

Două surse valoroase de inspirație pentru dimensiunea teoretică a lucrării au fost lucrarea *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, scrisă de Jack Snyder în 1991, și recenzia acestei cărți, elaborată de Fareed Zakaria. Snyder introduce un model bazat pe realismul defensiv, în care expansiunea statelor rezultă din presiunile interne exercitate de coaliții politice și economice. Acest model are în centru o narativă indispensabilă (mitul imperial), conform căreia securitatea poate fi garantată doar prin extindere, adesea conducând numeroase state spre supraexpansiune și eșec. Zakaria critică argumentele prezentate de Snyder, susținând că acesta supraestimează rolul factorilor interni, neglijeză echilibrul de putere și dinamica internațională care influențează constant deciziile de politică externă.

Juxtapunerea celor doi autori aduce contribuții semnificative studiului realismului defensiv: Snyder oferă o importanță semnificativă factorilor interni în explicarea supraexpansiunii statelor, modelul său atrage atenția asupra elitelor politice și economice în manipularea discursurilor naționaliste pentru a justifica politici expansioniste, chiar și atunci când acestea sunt contraproductive; Zakaria, pe de altă parte, susține că puterea militară și poziția sa în sistemul

internațional rămân factori cheie în definirea comportamentului strategic al statului. Zakaria admite avansul studiului lui Snyder, încurajând, conform acestuia, separarea politicilor determinate de factori sistemici de cele determinante de factori interni, însă precizează că statele își ajustează strategiile în funcție de echilibrul de putere global.

Acest studiu este ancorat în cercetarea calitativă, prin intermediul metodei interviului cu experți. Mai precis, studiul a fost gândit drept o abordare mixtă, combinând interviurile experților cu un chestionar destinat societății civile din Turcia. În ceea ce privește cea de-a doua componentă, aceasta a fost eliminată datorită rezultatului inconclusiv. Au rămas interviurile susținute cu nouă experți din diplomație, învățământ superior, think tank-uri, consiliere parlamentară. Participanților li s-a oferit o declarație de consimțământ, conform căreia răspunsurile vor fi anonimizate, precum și structura interviului înainte de susținerea acestuia pentru a evita potențiale riscuri aferente unui conflict de interes sau temeri privind sensibilitatea subiectului.

Au fost întâmpinate dificultăți în cadrul acestei etape deoarece experții aparțin unor medii de lucru extrem de solicitante, având o disponibilitate redusă de a participa. S-au primit numeroase refuzuri din partea experților turci contactați pentru a participa la acest studiu, ceea ce subliniază sensibilitatea subiectului.

S-a urmărit elaborarea unui interviu sistematizat cu experți, deoarece acesta oferă un nivel înalt de colectare structurată și detaliată a cunoștințelor experților, conducând astfel la construirea unor baze de date comparabile. Răspunsurile participanților au fost reprezentate vizual folosind Tableau și integrate în lucrare.

În cadrul acestei lucrări, sursele primare au fost interviurile cu experți, documente oficiale, declarații ale oficialilor, opinii publice prezentate de aceștia etc. Sursele secundare au fost numeroase cărți pe tema politicii externe a Turciei, manuale de analiză a politicii externe, metode de cercetare, articole din jurnale, publicații online, etc.

II. Structura lucrării

Teza este structurată astfel: introducere, cinci capitole tematice și concluzii. În cadrul primului capitol, se urmărește o scurtă trecere în revistă a schimbărilor interne din Turcia generate de tentativa de lovitură de stat. Al doilea capitol urmărește transformările relațiilor Turciei cu Statele Unite ale Americii, Rusia, China, Uniunea Europeană și Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord. Al treilea capitol vizează transformările din politica externă a Ankarei față de Oriental

Mijlociu, Asia Centrală, Africa și America Latină. În cadrul penultimului capitol este introdus termenul de ambidexteritate strategică și se elaborează o analiză a rolului Turciei în războiul din Ucraina. În capitolul final sunt interpretate datele rezultate în urma interviului.

III. Concluziile lucrării

Perioada 2016 – 2024 reflectă adaptabilitatea și reziliența politicii externe a Turciei, definită printr-o îmbinare calculată a instrumentelor de *hard* și *soft power*, menită să reducă influența occidentală asupra Ankarei, să consolideze statutul său de putere regională indispensabilă marilor puteri și să proiecteze o imagine favorabilă de mediator internațional.

Deși metodele Ankarei au fost adesea contestate, eficiența lor în atingerea obiectivelor naționale esențiale este incontestabilă. Însă, noile reconfigurări geopolitice: un posibil armistițiu în Ucraina, revenirea lui Donald Trump la Casa Albă, preluarea puterii în Siria de către HTS – amplifică incertitudinile legate de traectoria Turciei, care, sub conducerea lui Erdogan, pare tot mai angrenată în rândul statelor ce contestă ordinea internațională stabilită după încheierea războiului rece.

Distanțarea Americii sub conducerea lui Trump de formatul tradițional al cooperării transatlantice, dublată de preferință pentru o abordare tranzacțională agresivă, exercită o putere sporită asupra statelor fidele formatelor multilaterale cu nucleu democratic și liberal. În acest context, Erdogan își intensifică eforturile de a atrage sprijinul președintelui american, demonstrând încă o dată prioritatea acordată relației cu America în detrimentul Uniunii Europene, un aspect vital prezentat în cadrul acestei lucrări.

Totuși, lentila teoretică aleasă, realismul defensiv, implică o asumată vulnerabilitate interpretativă, întrucât conceptualizează securitatea preponderent prin prisma amenințărilor externe și a reacțiilor statelor în fața acestora, ceea ce corespunde logicii oficiale promovate de Ankara: protejarea frontierelor, menținerea suveranității, diversificarea parteneriatelor pentru diminuarea dependenței de o mare putere sau un grup ideologic și recalibrarea echilibrului de putere.

Această abordare teoretică a oferit numeroase oportunități de observare a dinamismului politicii externe turce în regiuni precum Africa, Asia Centrală și America Latină, prin remodelarea imaginii Ankarei pe plan internațional drept un mediator demn de luat în seamă, căreia î se atribuie succesul Acordului Grânelor.

Conceptul de ambidexteritate strategică, explorat în cadrul lucrării, aduce pe lângă o notă de originalitate textului, o extindere a opinilor divizate privind abordarea multivectorială adoptată de Turcia. Spre deosebire de alți termeni precum *hedging*, liminalitate sau ambiguitate strategică, ambidexteritatea strategică implică o adaptare proactivă, calculată și oportunistă a politicii externe turce, prin care relațiile anterioare bilaterale sau multilaterale puternic ancorate sunt exploatare, lăsând loc liber extinderii subtile, predominat prin mijloace de putere soft către regiuni sau state neangajate până în acel punct, cu intenția de a diversifica oportunitățile de cooperare politică, economică sau militară ale statului turc.

Sub îndemnul unui gând final, Turcia se află într-un punct în care ambidexteritatea sa strategică riscă să devină o vulnerabilitate, pe măsură ce ordinea internațională intră într-o fază de reconfigurare accelerată. Dinamica actuală nu mai permite subterfugii rafinate fără pierderi, iar echilibristică între centre de putere divergente devine tot mai dificilă. În acest context, viitorul Ankarei nu va fi definit de capacitatea să de a explora ambiguități, strategii multivectoriale, ci de măsura în care își va asuma o direcție coerentă, recunoscându-și prietenii, cât și inamicii pe plan internațional, concomitent cu menținerea luptei pentru împlinirea intereselor sale strategice.

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