

**BABEȘ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY, CLUJ-NAPOCA  
FACULTY OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY  
DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND  
SECURITY STUDIES**

# **DOCTORAL THESIS**

## **SUMMARY**

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# **FROM THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP TO INTERMARIUM**

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## Contents

<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1. The genesis of the <i>Intermarium</i> concept in the interwar period .....</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1. Intermarium - project of collective security solutions between the two world wars, envisioned by France in Central and Eastern Europe, alongside the Little Entente and the Balkan PAct .....	11
1.2. Premises for the Intermarium – Poland's bilateral treaties with other states in the region .....	11
1.3. Intermarium aspires to be an integrative solution of the entire space between the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea and the BalticSea.....	12
<b>2. The Eastern Partnership – a half (economic) Intermarium? .....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1. The genesis of the Eastern Partnership.....	13
2.2. Actors of the Eastern Partnership .....	14
2.3. The Eastern Partnership and the Ukrainian crisis.....	15
2.4. The Eastern Partnership between crisis and deadlock (2014-2015).....	15
2.5. Attempts to revitalize the Eastern Partnership and its future trends .....	16
2.6. Why is the Eastern Partnership a half Intermarium?.....	16
<b>3. The new Intermarium – the complementary security formula of the Eastern Partnership? .....</b>	<b>17</b>
3.1. The context in which the New Intermarium is launched.....	17
3.2. The developments of the New Intermarium - the meetings that occurred .....	18
3.3. From the Intermarium to the Three Seas .....	19
3.4. The new Intermarium and the crisis in Ukraine .....	19
3.4.1. War and identity: the case of Donbas in Ukraine.....	20
3.5. The New Intermarium versus the Old Intermarium .....	21
3.6. The new Intermarium - the attitude of the actors on the international scene .....	21
3.7. The new Intermarium – a regional security structure at the EU border? .....	22
3.8. The new Intermarium – is it an enlarged Visegrad Group? .....	22
3.9. Political-economic aspects of the Intermarium concept.....	25
3.10. Intermarium: The security pact of the countries between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea .....	25
3.11. The Trimarium (Three Seas Initiative) is not the old Intermarium .....	26
<b>Conclusions .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>28</b>

## Introduction

The present work approaches **the broad theme of the evolution of the Eastern European states**, i.e. those enclosed between the Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Baltic Sea, from the perspective of strengthening economic, political and social relations, with the view of creating both a politically and economically stable area and a zone of security between the three Seas.

**The research hypothesis** of the paper starts from the idea that Eastern Europe has its own specificity due to its proximity to Russia, which involves tense relations and struggles for power supremacy between Russia and certain states such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia. A solution to overcome such dissensions is the one proposed by General Josef Pilsudski, namely the building of a regional defence coalition that could be resisted by a possible revival of Russian and German imperialism. This idea arose after the First World War and was called Intermarium. The project created by Poland started from the idea, that in order to isolate Russia, it was indispensable to build an extended regional bloc that would include both the pro-status-quo states and regional revisionist states (Hungary) based on an agenda set predominantly on the usefulness of creating a "zone buffer" between Germany and Russia. In the conceptualization of Polish thought, the sustainability of such a regional coalition formula required the close connection of the states on the western periphery of Russia, namely the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine, the latter constituting an important strategic stake in the calculations of the decision-makers in Warsaw. Being part of this plan, Poland imagined the outline of the "Catholic bloc", following that this formula would include Romania, Poland, Hungary and, last but not least, Slovakia (separated from the Czech Republic)<sup>1</sup>, considered as a possible foundation centre for building of the Intermarium.

The failure of the mentioned projects was caused by circumstances such as: territorial differences between the possible member states (Hungary versus Romania and Yugoslavia, Poland versus Czechoslovakia), regional competitions (Czechoslovakia versus Poland), distinct geopolitical agendas (Romania viewed with reluctance the involvement in the geopolitics of the eastern space as conceived by Poland in the direction of the Baltic States and Ukraine)<sup>2</sup>. In the new post-"pivot" example, the idea of Intermarium was not similar with that of replacing the alliance system focused on NATO and the relationship with the USA, to which all the states in the region were closely linked, but it represented their more and more solid aspiration to create alternatives, through which the member countries might secure a zone of protection against Russia and an additional guarantee of regional security, even in a context in which the US did not show more involvement. It should be pointed out here that a construct in the logic of a revised Intermarium did not exclude, according to analytical predictions, the idea that it would act both within the existing system of alliances and outside it.

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<sup>1</sup>Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului "Cordon sanitaire". Relațiile romano-polone 1919-1926* (Targoviste: Cetatea de Scaun, 2008), 117-118

<sup>2</sup>Romania rejected the initiatives proposed by Poland between 1919-1920, aimed at the division of Ukraine and the establishment of a common Romanian-Polish protectorate over Ukraine, Florin Anghel, *Sistemul 'Cordon sanitaire'*, 73; Nicolae Mares, *Józef Pilsudski. Monografie* (Bucharest: ePublishers, 2015), 154-155

The following questions lie at the basis of the present research:

**1. *Do Eastern European countries need partnerships distinct from European partnerships?***

The result of the research will take into account the problem that we propose, which is justified by the need to evaluate and perceive the way of establishing security across the territory of Central Europe<sup>3</sup> in the difficult conditions of systemic prognosis. Regionalization is a relatively new notion, and the initial period of regionalization started at the beginning of the 20th century in the context of extensive global metamorphoses, following the end of the First World War. Being located in a region of "collision", dominated by the two authoritarian hyper-powers, Germany and the USSR, Central Europe constituted, throughout its interwar period, a space of authoritarian competition and duality on the geostrategic and political scene, a region where the interests of the powers of Europe met, each experiencing the expansion of the closed security framework that existed in the heart of the European continent by subsuming or rallying this area to the Nazi plan of individual hegemony.

Towards the end of the Second World War, the establishment of the systemic-bipolar configuration completely neutralized any initiative within the area of the countries located between Germany and Russia by subjecting them to Soviet Russia, which determined their annexation in the existing political-military conformation under the strict supremacy of Russia. If we reflect a little on what happened throughout history, the paradigm of the dominant forces in the region during the interwar period was replaced by the presence of the Russian Soviet hegemony.

Starting with the conclusions of the 2000 period, a recession of Atlanticism began against the backdrop of America's decision to check priorities with strategic impact, which was, at the same time, counterbalanced by Russia's assertion in the inter-ethnic conflict in Georgia.

Once the USA disengaged from European affairs after the "Asian pivot" and the "reset" with Russia, a period of insecurity began for the regional states, largely induced by the fear of losing the hegemon's protection. The recession degenerated by the actions that Russia carried out after the annexation of Crimea and the uncertainty of Ukraine have drastically changed the strategic geographical space within Central Europe. Along with the return to the military threat, there has been a revival of Atlanticism based on the imperious military power of the United States and the maintenance of NATO's role as a middle pawn in guaranteeing the defence of the eastern border and neutralizing the threat arising from Russia.

**2. *The Eastern Partnership: can it be considered a semi-economic Intermarium?***

As pointed out by Kahraman, the European Neighbourhood Policy is characterized by a kind of association essentially based on "*the notion of common values, economic benefits, cooperation against security challenges*"<sup>4</sup>, giving the countries in the proximity of the states that are part of Europe "*a closer relationship that is compatible with increased interdependence*"<sup>5</sup>.

The course of actions witnessed by the countries of Eastern Europe during the period of the five years, along with the rebuilding of Ukraine's borders, has changed the situation in the region. The rally to the proximity of the eastern part of Europe in a land, which, due to the development, is sufficiently susceptible, has given rise to intense debates, directed against the

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<sup>3</sup>In this paper, the abbreviation CE will be used for Central Europe.

<sup>4</sup>Kahraman Sevilay – "*The European Neighbourhood Policy: A critical Assessment*", Ankara Review of European Studies, vol 5, no3, 2012, p.13

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem

influences of the two decisive actors, the countries that are part of the European Union on the one hand and the Russian state on the other hand. This research will also look at the way the actions of the European Union and those of the Russian state will generate specific consequences on the neighbouring states. Even if the needs and hopes that the countries in the area nourish are to going be acknowledged, the tendency is to transform these states in the area (regional actors) into unchanged, devoted teammates, who belong strictly economically but also politically to the two poles of influence.

However, we shall try to analyse the relations that exist between the countries that are part of the European Union, the Russian state and the states in the Eastern part of the neighbourhood of the European Union, through the doctrine of interdependence, taking into account the collaboration of the states, throughout the narrative, as strengthening the foundation necessary for the analysis of various aspects.

The unfolding of the events in Eastern Europe after the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy, hastened the engagement of the organizations that are part of Europe, in the implementation of a new tool, the Eastern Partnership, the beginning of which meant the starting point of a new chapter of the relations with the neighbourhood of the European Union at east<sup>6</sup> and thus resulted in multiple objections coming from the Russians, who appreciated this partnership as a replacement for NATO expansion towards the eastern side.

Possessing singularly performed levers, actions focused on a project with two directions or even more, this Eastern Partnership is succeeded in a similar period of time by the Black Sea Strategy and then by the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, the collaboration instruments of each including countries that benefited from the Neighbourhood Policy, managing to create a surplus of effectiveness in the territory, thus being unable to contribute to the high scores of the Neighbourhood Policy.

At the same time, I considered it appropriate to study the external relations of the countries on the border of the Eastern part of the EU, in order to realize the possibility of the greatest possible growth in the economy, which would guarantee them security and internal consistency by mediating several advantageous relations with allies from outside; these states were forced to take advantage of the opportunities that arose from their relations with Russia but also with the European Union, their internal political and socio-economic conditions being for the moment incompatible with reducing the influence of one of the two parties.

### **3. *Is Intermarium a complementary security formula of the Eastern Partnership?***

The issue of security regionalization is nowadays a subject of discussions and detailed strategic deliberations. Recently, we participate in diverse predictions and initiatives designed to recognize possible regional defence constructions, or in more extensive formulas, such as the reaffirmation of the older concept of the *Intermarium*, or through smaller mergers, concepts that operate in an unstable and additional anthropogeography.

The innovative level of the analysis initiative exists mainly in the perspective expected to set right the uncertainty of regionalization. However, the construction in the research is based on the two median assumptions for examination. Considering all this, the regionalization action, as a solution for the management of strategic instability, can only act under the condition of protecting the Atlanticist conception. The alliance with the American state and the connection with the North Atlantic Alliance, i.e. the globalized Euro-Atlantic environment, represent the only sustainable solution for ensuring security and defence in Central Europe.

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<sup>6</sup>European Commission – Press release - Brussels, December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008, [www.ec.europa.eu](http://www.ec.europa.eu), last accessed in March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017

Regarding the expansion of several regional security enhancement schemes, it will possibly become an option, acting as a strategic insurance. In this way, the influence of America will be important to preserve the coherence of action and will counterbalance the consequences of systemic rotation, which could form weak regions in remote, isolated areas.

In 1920, the leader of the Polish state, Marshal Józef Piłsudski, drafted his own idea of organizing the region, which had as a guideline the utility of creating a federation, which would include all the countries that were between Germany and Russia along the strategic Baltic Sea corridor - The Black Sea - the *Intermarium* concept.

The impediment to the introduction of such extensive projects catalysed the rethinking of regional security and defence formulas by guiding the formation of smaller alliances, which would act in a complementary and variable geography. The system of alliances built in Central Europe was part of a much wider strategy imagined by France, the purpose of which was to ensure the new post-Versailles systemic status-quo and, of course, the new French hegemonic order. The construction of regional alliances included three central pillars. In 1921, the Little Entente formed by Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom was signed. The purpose of this alliance was the annihilation of Hungarian-Bulgarian revisionism and the danger of Habsburg restoration. In this sense, the countries that have signed have committed to give each other mutual help, including through the involvement of occasional joint plans and the establishment of operational plans, which can be intensified in the event of an aggression against one or all of the signatory states. A second pillar of the system of regional alliances was the conclusion, on March 21, 1921, of the military coalition between Romania and Poland. This ensured their mutual support in case of an attack on the eastern borders.

This security system of Eastern Europe was completed by the signing, in April 1934, of the Balkan Pact formed by Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey.

The **general objective** of the thesis is to explore the evolutionary nature of the Eastern Partnership concept, from the old Intermarium to the new Intermarium (Three Seas Initiative) and to identify the roles assumed by this security system in the central area of Europe and the one in the South - East. We are referring to the system of delimitation of political communities, but also to the exchanges and relations established within the borders, as a result of the establishment of the system in question.

Thus, this thesis will explore the ways in which Eastern European countries oppose the power of Russia, thus forming a buffer zone, a bridgehead. It will also look at the impact these borders have had from the perspective of the separation or convergence of the states involved, in areas such as politics, economy and/or security.

The main objective of the research is to elaborate an in-depth analysis on the decision-making process in the EU and NATO, referring to foreign and defence policies, paying distinct attention to the policies devoted to Eastern Europe.

Starting from the very definition of the theory, which is demonstrated in the form of a logical set of ideas and arguments, which provides a good perception of the social aspect, it is as clear as possible that we cannot access the final conclusions of the research, without a framework specific theory based on theories of international relations.

Theoretically, we shall refer to the use of the concept of national preferences applied by Andrew Moravcsik<sup>7</sup>. As part of our personal contribution, we shall add a political-strategic format to the concept, in order to better demonstrate the dynamics in Eastern Europe and the approaches of the two organizations in the region. Therefore, although the theoretical treatment put forward by Andrew Moravcsik was primarily constituted to explain the

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<sup>7</sup>Andrew Moravcsik "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, vol. 31, pp. 497-498

economic dynamics inside the EU, given the political-strategic nature that I will add to the concept of national preferences, I will apply it to the foreign policy of the EU and NATO in Eastern Europe.

In the course of our research, we have not identified a complete study that deals with the construct of regionalization in Central Europe since the 1990s. From the sources consulted, the geopolitical situation of the states in that area, characterized by instability, can be deduced. The insecurity in the defence of the central European area was seen as a perspective of the relations between the states. These involved American policy, the North Atlantic Organization, and appealed to the mechanisms of relations established between Russia-NATO-America. The studies that had these states as their object were mainly oriented towards the cause of the transition of the ex-Bolshevik states in Central Europe towards the new forms of government. Another subject of the studies is the relations between the USA and the countries of Central Europe, as well as the instability of the Visegrád Group, which represented part of the Central European countries.

A subject discussed in specialized studies, which the present work intends to deepen, is that of the *Intermarium*, which was later named the Three Seas Initiative.

The association of states within the *Intermarium* can be interpreted from the perspective of institutional neo-liberalism. The theoreticians who are part of this current focused their documentation on analysing the elements related to political economy. The states within the Intermarium have identified a common economic source - *the sea* - to support these peoples at least economically in the instability caused by the political transition. For specialists of institutional neo-liberalism, the international system is of an anarchic type, countries are rational actors, as in the case of realism or neo-realism, but the gains are understood in complex and not approximate terms, as in the case of neo-realists. This distinction is very important, because it influences the behaviour of states. If State X does not generally resemble State Y and does not perceive its development as a threat to its own security and does not have to compare its gains with others, and its power does not decrease or increase depending on the development of others<sup>8</sup>, the chances that security dilemmas<sup>9</sup> might arise are quite small.

However, the nature of the gains makes it possible for states to cooperate repetitively, given that they do not perceive each other in terms of competition. Moreover, through this lack of distinction in zero-sum game terms<sup>10</sup>, the standard of trust between states can rise. By offering this chance for cooperation, institutional neo-liberalism promotes the role of institutions that have the power to raise the level of cooperation between member countries<sup>11</sup>.

This perspective of institutionalist neoliberalism can also be found in the Intermarium association, respectively in the Three Seas Initiative, which identified common points of cooperation to overcome crisis situations.

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<sup>8</sup>Quotation from Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Third Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 [http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv\\_1/file1.pdf](http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf) , last accessed on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017. p.65

<sup>9</sup>The concept defines a situation in which state A tries to ensure or enhance its national security. Its actions are perceived by State B as threatening, therefore it begins to increase its level of national security, creating a spiral of mistrust that leads to an accumulation of common insecurity. The concept was mainly developed by realist and neo-realist theorists. For Jervis, for example, "the unintended and unintended consequences of actions intended to be defensive constitute the security dilemma", in Robert Jervis, "Perception and Misperception in International Politics", Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey, 1976.p.66

<sup>10</sup> Zero-sum games are extreme situations where the winnings of one side are represented by the loss of the other side. The opposition between the parties is absolute. Adrian Miroiu, *Fundamentele politicii. Vol II: Raționalitate și acțiune colectivă*, (Iași: Polirom, 2007), p.27

<sup>11</sup>Robert Jervis, *Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate*, <http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C632.pdf> , last accessed on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017, p.44-45.



### **Ontological and epistemological premises**

The introductory part of the paper deals with the genesis of the *Intermarium* concept and its presentation as a collective security factor alongside the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact. This was done from two perspectives: ontological and epistemological.

a) **The ontological perspective** considers the analysis of the reality of the organization of Central and Eastern Europe from a political point of view, after the Second World War and also after 1990. The division will be corroborated with the definition of the Eastern Partnership and the concept of *Intermarium*, a first step in the understanding of phenomena, which arise from an ideological point of view.

b) **The epistemological perspective** considers the analysis of the concept of space and the geographical limits of this concept (*Intermarium*), the study of which as a process and structure is in permanent modification.

### **The structure of the thesis and the research methods**

The introductory part will address **transversal research methods (diachronic analysis)** of the premises of the *Intermarium* concept between the two World Wars. At the same time, the **qualitative research**, through the interpretive approach, will aim to lead to the ordering and understanding of the term *Intermarium* alongside the bilateral treaties of Poland concluded with states such as Romania in 1926, Czechoslovakia in 1924, thus creating the general framework, contained in the first chapter.

The next chapter focuses on the trends of the European Union and the powers belonging to Central and Eastern Europe, the states that are not part of the EU, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The following aspects will be approached: the political dimension of the EU, the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, the scores recorded by Moldova and Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership, the relationship between the EU and Russia in the context of Russia's change in strategy, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.

If we talk about the case of the EU, the foreign policy is guided especially by the member countries, the security configurations in particular, in the relationship with the countries beyond the Eastern border of the EU. The deviation from the rule can be the Third Energy Package, an instrument that is the result of the supranational capacities of the EU institutions, which have the power to control the states' reactions regarding energy security, especially the Russian energy monopoly. Only in this way can the decision-making process of the EU be justified by the model presented by Moravcsik, but with a few exceptions such as the one already mentioned. The presumption that the preferences of the organization represent the sum of the strategies of the member states is not confirmed. States associate according to common interests, hence resulting in various possibilities of associations.

As a result, the countries associated with the European Union and the countries of the Eastern Partnership coexist in Europe. This represents a particular variant compared to the variant in which Eastern Europe can constitute a policy that can be perceived as the minimum common denominator in which the states on the eastern border of the EU wanted a high level of involvement of the organization in the region, and the western states had other tendencies directed to other areas. The solution came in the form of a strategy that offers association prospects for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

The next chapter addresses the complementary security formula of the Eastern Partnership, by means of the *Intermarium*. It has been demonstrated that the idea of a regional mini-alliance is the consequence of the accentuation of the feeling of weakness induced by the distrust in the defence commitments of the partners. The instability that referred to Germany's security agenda, the incoherence of the EU highlighted in the context of the deepening euro crisis, and the neo-imperial return of Russia signalled the start of a period of strategic movements that could push the EC space into an extended security vacuum.

Based on these indications, the dynamics of the V4 group<sup>12</sup> determined a return to discussions on the possibility of reactivating the geopolitical construction imagined by Poland in the interwar period, conceptualized under the name of *Intermarium*.

Therefore, there could be a coalition of states located between Russia and Germany, with the main goal of preserving the strategic status quo and preventing Russia's revisionist advance. In the new post-"pivot" paradigm, the Intermarium concept was not identical to a change in the alliance system focused on NATO and the relationship with the USA. It reflected an increasingly strong tendency of the states to identify solutions that allowed the states to create a zone of protection against Russia and an additional guarantee of regional defence, even without the involvement of America.

**The analysis of primary and secondary sources** completes the research related to the New Intermarium and creates a wider spectrum of the topic addressed. The objective analysis of media sources and Internet sources is a helpful method for identifying the main cooperation projects, respectively the security domains in Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis of the official documents allowed us to make an inventory of the security domains through the prism of belonging or connection with the European construction and through the integration of the entities in the vision of the states of which they are part or under whose authority they are.

The main sources for collecting scientific data are the primary documents of the European Union, the constitutions of the states, or their organic laws. The conclusion derived from the analysis of primary documents will be completed by resorting to press releases, studies, articles and analyses as secondary sources of information. The specialized literature will be selected, considering the not very generous bibliography on the subject of the *Intermarium* concept.

This doctoral thesis is based on both primary sources (which refer to all categories of EU communiqués, press releases, speeches, legal texts, maps, etc.) and secondary sources (specialized works, articles, Internet pages, etc.).

Among the secondary sources we include published volumes, books, scientific articles published in Romania and abroad. Of course, the proportion of primary and secondary sources is distinct from one chapter to another. In the first chapter we find the secondary sources, and the primary ones can be considered the electronic archives where historical data can be identified. The second chapter is based on the analysis of primary legal documents. The third chapter is based on an analysis of primary sources - electronic pages and secondary sources, among which we list: publicist articles, extensive specialized works, etc.

Regarding **the limits of the research**, from a geostrategic point of view, the analysis will focus on Ukraine, the states of the Visegrad Group, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. Therefore we cannot speak of an exhaustive analysis of all aspects, as the paper will focus on the Eastern direction of relations.

Another limitation of the work relates to the restricted number of sources of information regarding the *Intermarium* and to the fact that the issue cannot be understood only from the perspective of the published sources.

Thus the work presents the genesis of the *Intermarium*, its evolution and its transformation into the *Trimarium*, but allows enough space for further research.

## Chapter I

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<sup>12</sup>Also called the Visegrad Group, this includes the coalition of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

## **1. The genesis of the *Intermarium* concept in the interwar period**

With the period of 1919-1920, the treaties marked the end of the principle of the balance of powers and the of old world while still supporting the preservation of the new status quo and the continental unity of Europe. The recent opportunities presented by the Russian Revolution and the threats of the expansion of left-wing extremist politics, push for a new approach to the international security system, to replace the disorder in the field of interstate relations with a new institutional order intended to present the guarantees of a new stability at the end of the conflagration<sup>13</sup>.

The discussions held about the League of Nations project developed between February and March 1920 had as repercussions the opposition of the American Senate, dissatisfied with the non-compliance with the provisions of the Monroe principle<sup>14</sup>, a reaction stimulated by the resistance of the British to the provisions guaranteeing freedom of trade and navigation, appreciated levers for launching the expansion of the American policy<sup>15</sup>.

### ***1.1. Intermarium - project of collective security solutions between the two world wars, envisioned by France in Central and Eastern Europe, alongside the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact***

The notion of power stability appeared in international politics during the Renaissance era, being de facto taken over from other fields, where balance and disintegration had a special outcome. Morgenthau used the notion of *balance* as a law of nature, underlying most things we consider desirable. Hans Morgenthau stated, at the beginning of his volume "*The Balance of Power*", that "*the desire for power of several countries, according to which each of them tries either to maintain or to overturn the state of affairs, leads to the necessity of creating a configuration, which is called balance of power and policies aimed at the balance of power*"<sup>16</sup>. Through this statement, Morgenthau was trying to highlight the importance of the notion of balance in all its forms, especially in its area of political power.

In a similar way, around the year 2000, the founder of the neo-realism movement, Kenneth Waltz, wrote that "*just as nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors power imbalance*."<sup>17</sup> Waltz wanted to demonstrate through this current of political neo-realism, that between the protagonists of the international political scene, a series of altercations and tensions will appear at some point, which will produce a great imbalance.

### ***1.2. Premises for the Intermarium – Poland's bilateral treaties with other states in the region***

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<sup>13</sup><http://www.sim.tuiasi.ro/wp-content/uploads/Neagu-Istoria-constructiei-europene.pdf>, last accessed on April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>14</sup>The lack of intervention of the European powers on the American continent, elaborated with the view of responding to the threats of intervention of the Holy Alliance in the USA.

<sup>15</sup><http://www.sim.tuiasi.ro/wp-content/uploads/Neagu-Istoria-constructiei-europene.pdf>, last accessed on April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>16</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "*Politics Among Nations The Struggle for Power and Peace*", Sixth Edition. Revizuit de Kenneth Thompson. pp. 187-189, 192-196, 198-215, 218-233. Copyright © 1985 by McGraw-Hill, Inc., found at [https://blackboard.angelo.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/LFA/CSS/Cours%20Material/SEC6302/Readings/Lesson\\_5/Morgenthau.pdf](https://blackboard.angelo.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/LFA/CSS/Cours%20Material/SEC6302/Readings/Lesson_5/Morgenthau.pdf), last accessed on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017

<sup>17</sup>Keneth, Waltz, "*Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security*", nr. 25/1, p 28 found at [http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz\\_Structural%20Realism.pdf](http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf), last accessed on August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2017

The geostrategic situation and the implications on the political scale in the Baltic and Pontic area, where important western and eastern empires met throughout history, formed the beginning of an almost identical path for Poland and Romania<sup>18</sup>. The image outlined in the body of our work shows the similarities between the two countries, Romania and Poland, countries with common borders, strengthened by the friendship established by this bilateral treaty.

### ***1.3. Intermarium aspires to be an integrative solution of the entire space between the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea***

Neighbouring Eastern European countries also share this security threat and know from history what could happen again if Russian power were to be confronted. Redesigning the Intermarium in the 21st century to be valid for today's security expectations would unite the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to compete against Russia's power stability, as well as to help each other both politically and economically. However, the Intermarium will not have a chance to succeed until all post-Soviet countries work together and have a common global threat to unite them. Moreover, Intermarium, as a united front, still needs help from the US military to be able to confront Moscow. If Intermarium in the 21st century were to succeed, it would create the strongest union in Eastern Europe since the 1989 national uprising dedicated to overthrowing communism<sup>19</sup>.

The defence of states in the grey zone such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan have all become subordinate to whichever party chooses to cooperate with them. This pattern of switching between east and west proved to be highly volatile, as it did not help resolve the Transnistrian problem in eastern Moldova or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in southwestern Azerbaijan, and was shaken by the Russo-Georgian war of 2008<sup>20</sup>.

If an Intermarium were to be created today, Ukraine would have priority because it has no protection from NATO or other security measures outside of its country. Then Poland, the original founder of this union, would be on the list. Poland faces the threat of Kaliningrad in the north and would also not want Russia on its southern border in the event of a takeover of Ukraine<sup>21</sup>.

A 21st century Intermarium would be called to protect every nation threatened by Russia. However, the most important factor to consider in a 21st century Intermarium would be not to repeat the mistakes of the first project. This means not letting domestic matters dominate and hopefully uniting under a common global threat. Intermarium cannot succeed until "the entire post-Soviet sphere in Europe learns how to work together in solidarity."<sup>22</sup>

Intermarium is a plan that is part of the geopolitics of the 20th century, gaining more momentum with each passing year. The exact operation and politics of how the Intermarium

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<sup>18</sup>Romania și Polonia în perioada interbelică, alianța inimilor. Un singur popor cu două drapele. See: <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/romania-si-polonia-in-perioada-interbelica-aliana-inimilor-un-singur-popor-cu-doua-drapele>, last accessed on May 10th, 2018

<sup>19</sup>Cohen, Nick A. "Intermarium in the 21st Century." *New Eastern Europe*, November 2019, 101–5.

<sup>20</sup>Fedorenko, Kostiantyn and Andreas Umland. "How to Solve Ukraine's Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe." *War on the Rocks*, August 29, 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/>

<sup>21</sup>Drozdowski, Richard. "Intermarium as a Compromise Solution." *EMPR*, March 1, 2019. <https://empr.media/opinion/analytics/intermarium-as-a-compromise-solution/>

<sup>22</sup>Chodakiewicz, Marek Jan. *Intermarium: The Land Between the Black and Baltic Seas*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2017

would operate in the 21st century is still being debated by post-Soviet politicians, diplomats and intellectuals.<sup>23</sup>

## Chapter II

### 2. The Eastern Partnership – a half (economic) Intermarium?

#### 2.1. The genesis of the Eastern Partnership

With the end of 2007, the rationale with which the ENP was considered for the Eastern European states had to be modified and adapted to the new realities. Above all, it needs to correspond to the regional and national particularities of the member countries. In the essence of the reissuance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Paris in July 2008 and the issuance of the Black Sea Synergy in Kyiv in February 2008, the Eastern Partnership was recommended in May 2009. This recommendation aimed at a figure of six ex-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan)<sup>24</sup>.

On a previous date, following the evolution of international relations with some new interactions, the new geopolitical realities or some current ideas of the European Union's foreign policy, the step was taken to a more advanced standard of international relations: the Association Agreements. These agreements were of the AA type and were concluded only by a few eastern countries: Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia in Brussels in June 2014.<sup>25</sup>

The European Union also intended, by encouraging the Eastern Partnership, to strengthen and intensify the ENP in the Eastern European space. The initial objective was to support and speed up the neighbourhood of Eastern European countries to the European Union. The two countries, Moldova and Ukraine, took part in the category of the six countries included in this partnership since the beginning of its legal launch. Under this understanding, common values such as democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, the execution of the concepts of the market economy, the sustainable expansion and good governance were added. The Eastern Partnership was based on "common interests and commitments, as well as shared involvement and responsibility", being "governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality"<sup>26</sup>. These common values have contributed to

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<sup>23</sup>Fedorenko, Kostiantyn and Andreas Umland. "How to Solve Ukraine's Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe." War on the Rocks, August 29, 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/>

<sup>24</sup>Peter Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, "Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Neighbouring Countries of the European Union?", în *European Law Review*, Vol. 36, p. 691, 2011, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039449>, accesat în data de 01.09.2015, *Apud.*, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Mircea Brie, Nicolae Toderaş, "Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. Oportunități și provocări în perioada 2014-2020", in *Studii de Strategie și Politici SPOS 2015*, Study no.2, p.42, 2016

<sup>25</sup>Roman Petrov, "Constitutional challenges for the implementation of association agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia", în *European Public Law*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2015, p. 241, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2598431](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2598431), last accessed on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015, *Apud.*, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Mircea Brie, Nicolae Toderaş, "Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. oportunități și provocări în perioada 2014-2020", in *Studii de Strategie și Politici SPOS 2015*, Study no.2, p.42-43, 2016

<sup>26</sup>*Declarația comună a reuniunii la nivel înalt de la Praga privind Parteneriatul Estic*, (The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit) Prague, May, 7<sup>th</sup>, 2009, (1), p. 5, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=RO&f=ST%208435%202009%20INIT>, last accessed on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015, *Apud* Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Mircea Brie, Nicolae Toderaş, *Cooperarea transfrontalieră între*

better development and cooperation in various fields, leading to the strengthening of the partner countries.

We can agree with Kostanyan, according to whom the relations between Russia and its eastern neighbours have not been given the necessary importance both in the European Neighbourhood Policy and in the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, in the last period, Russia used its economic, energetic, military and even cultural influence near the EU, thus managing to be a catalyst for the Eastern Partnership<sup>27</sup>.

## ***2.2. Actors of the Eastern Partnership***

Along with the Commission's recommendation to create a new Eastern Partnership, a recent stage began in the relations between the European Union with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus<sup>28</sup>, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The agreement was a demanding one and provided for the significant lowering of the degree of political engagement, as well as the future transition to a recent generation of association agreements, widespread integration in the EU economy, the facilitation of the movement of citizens to the European Union only on the condition of meeting certain requirements from the area of security, the establishment of more effective ways of guaranteeing energy security, which would be favourable for all the parties that were part of it and the development of the degree of pecuniary assistance.

The European Union intends to help as much as possible, through its daily concerns, the collaboration initiative of its partners, by mediating a global platform of institutional consolidation for them and creating the free trade area with them, this allowing the drafting of a solidarity response to common instigations. This new agreement includes the taking of new measures to help the social and economic development of the six targeted countries, but also some large-scale initiatives that will definitely prove the EU's help<sup>29</sup>.

Within the Eastern Partnership, representatives of Belarus contribute to the activity of all its four multilateral thematic platforms (democracy, public administration and stability, economic security and convergence with EU policy in the field of industry, energy security, people-to-people contacts). Belarus is also involved in the activities of the major initiatives of the Eastern Partnership on civil defence, integrated border management, development of small and medium enterprises, environmental management and energy.

In the last two years, progress has been made in EU-Belarus relations. Belarus achieved the lifting of sanctions and fixed its relations with the EU well. In the period between 2014 and 2017, the EU assistance package for Belarus under the European Neighbourhood Instrument amounted to 91.5 million euros.

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*România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. Oportunități și provocări în perioada 2014-2020*, in Studii de Strategie și Politici SPOS 2015, Study no.2, p.43, 2016

<sup>27</sup>Kostanyan Hrant – „*The Eastern Partnership after Riga – Review and Reconfirm*” – CEPR Commentary, May 2015, 3

<sup>28</sup>The degree of participation of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership will depend on the overall development of EU-Belarus relations

<sup>29</sup>IP/08/1858 Bruxelles, December 3rd, 2008

### ***2.3. The Eastern Partnership and the Ukrainian crisis***

The Eastern Partnership, which began five years after the presentation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, precisely in May 2008, is a process that had as its initial initiative the recommendation of Poland and Sweden regarding the creation of an environment for the Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union, obtaining different support from the leaders of the EU and the Member States. Thus, the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic or Sweden have expressed their support for this new framework, the Council of the European Union requesting a detailed proposal from the European Commission, a proposal that was made public in the first half of 2009 when the EU presidency was held by the Czech Republic .

Russian aggression in Georgia, lightly disguised as the defence of Russian citizens in South Ossetia, and later in Ukraine opened the potentially long period of increasing instability in Europe and Eurasia. The EU, as it is at the moment, is not quite ready to deal with this problem, demonstrating its vulnerability<sup>30</sup>.

The Ukrainian crisis and the EU's relations with Russia have led to the emergence of new types of borders, which were given different interest by authors concerned about this issue<sup>31</sup>. First of all, we have to face the border between two types of regional integration, the EU type through the Eastern Partnership and the one promoted by Russia through the Eurasian Customs Union.

In the perspective of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU, the best form is the association agreement, not the partnership and cooperation format that has minimal potential for reform, does not exert general external political pressure on the elites in Ukraine to intensify their efforts to reformation. The association agreement on the principles of integration, taking into account the interests of the internal market in the free trade zone, reveals the most the potential and attractiveness of the reform for the Ukrainian elite. In fact, such an agreement represents a large-scale integration of Ukraine into the European internal market, but without a foreseeable prospect of joining the EU. In this case, Ukraine will not waste time and is waiting for a favourable foreign policy situation to recognize the prospect of accession as a signal to start moving on the path of integration<sup>32</sup>.

### ***2.4. The Eastern Partnership between crisis and deadlock (2014-2015)***

The first initiators of the implementation of Eastern Partnership policies were Poland and Sweden, who, in 2008, recommended deepening relations with their eastern neighbours, which are the basis of the European neighbourhood policy. The delegates of these countries presented the Eastern Partnership Project in May 2009. The program aims to develop cooperation between EU member states and relations between countries. The most important part of any program is the financial part. In the end, even good ideas, without the necessary financial support, might remain ideas on paper and never come to fruition<sup>33</sup>.

This program was dedicated to increasing EU assistance to regions, opening EU markets to neighbouring goods and, among other things, phasing out visa requirements. The

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<sup>30</sup>Ioan Horga, Ana-Maria Costea, "*The Ukrainian Crisis: Between National Preferences/Interests of EU Member States and the EU Security*" Eurolimes. "*The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Members States National Preferences*" (2014), Vol. 18: 190

<sup>31</sup>Horga Ioan, Istvan Suli-Zakar, "*Still Eurolimes*", Eurolimes, vol. 20, 2015, pp. 7-19

<sup>32</sup><https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/ukraine-association-agreement/>, last accessed on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>33</sup><https://mtu.gov.ua/en/content/shidne-partnerstvo.html>, last accessed on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2018

idea was to give neighbouring countries stronger incentives to adopt European norms and rules, to unite their economic systems with the EU and, thus, to make the region more prosperous and stable. The concept is sound - but the initiative, as well as the full European policy for Eastern Europe, will suffer if the EU does not take more visible steps to help its neighbours through the economic crisis.<sup>34</sup>

According to Thomas Valasek, the crisis hit Eastern Europe hard. Ukraine's currency, the hryvnia, has lost more than 50 percent of its value. Belarus also has problems. Most of the economy boosts the export of equipment to Russia, where demand has collapsed<sup>35</sup>.

The economic crisis brings a huge new challenge to the EU's Eastern policy. The first danger is the risk of increasing nationalism and protectionism on both sides of the EU borders, which prevents economic integration. The European Union and Ukraine are agreeing to a new free trade deal, but senior EU officials say Ukraine has become a big supporter of protectionism since the crisis broke out. It insists on keeping a host of controversial taxes, which has forced the termination of negotiations.

## ***2.5. Attempts to revitalize the Eastern Partnership and its future trends***

In order to analyse the Eastern Partnership from the complex perspective of regional security, Barry Buzan's theory will be used, namely the four levels of analysis<sup>36</sup>:

1. The internal level - i.e. the analysis of the internal situation, from the perspective of weak and strong points, but also in the context of their effects on stability
2. States relations - relations between states, especially in terms of the interdependencies of security;
3. The region's interaction with neighbouring regions
4. The role of the great powers in the analysed region at the level of security interactions<sup>37</sup>.

The statement of a Romanian politician is important in this context as it indicates the fact that, through an effort on the part of the two Polish-Romanian parties, the Eastern Partnership could be revived by creating a working group that would include other nearby states with the aim of transforming the Eastern Partnership into a more effective tool, in a context of ENP's revitalization. This instrument must be thought of in a more visionary way, so as to encourage internal reforms<sup>38</sup>.

## ***2.6. Why is the Eastern Partnership a half Intermarium?***

For Brussels, the Eastern Partnership represents a new source of opportunities. Even if they see the same thing in the Eastern Partnership from Central and Eastern Europe, the price was considered too high to counterbalance the reaction of Russia and its energy dependence, in the case of the countries of the Visegrad group or Bulgaria. From the point of view of Brussels, the promotion of a free society is a primary condition in the record of the Eastern

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<sup>34</sup><https://www.cer.eu/insights/economic-crisis-and-eastern-partnership>, last accessed on June 5th., 2018

<sup>35</sup>Ibidem.

<sup>36</sup>Barry Buzan „Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security” cit. în Ioan Horga *Support de curs (Informational course support)*, SNSPA, 2013

<sup>37</sup>Ibidem

<sup>38</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Consultations of Minister Bogdan Aurescu with the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grzegorz Schetyna, in the margins of the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy", in <http://www.mae.ro/node/33349>



Partnership and in the proximity of the countries in this space to European values. Even if up to a common denominator the opinions converge with those of Brussels, Central and Eastern Europe believes that the liberal type society will not be able to bring stability to these countries that belong to the Eastern Partnership, given the fact that in the not too distant past this space enjoyed a period of peace<sup>39</sup>.

### Chapter III

## 3. The new Intermarium – the complementary security formula of the Eastern Partnership?

### 3.1. The context in which the New Intermarium is launched

The European Union is now going through a deep crisis, in which it is not only the product of the British vote to cease being a member, but also of the failure of the organization to face the effects of the economic crisis, of the new realistic expansion of Russia, but also of terrorism and the phenomenon of migration, according to Aleksandr Voronin<sup>40</sup>.

In order to better understand how things are going, many of the countries of the European Union and their neighbours are considering different solutions, says the Ukrainian commentator. One of the most interesting solutions is a new push for the establishment of a Union between the Baltic Sea - the Black Sea or the "Intermarium" - not as a replacement for the EU and NATO, but as a supplement and assistant to them<sup>41</sup>.

The Baltic States on the one hand and Poland on the other hand, even if they are members of the EU and NATO, feel insecure because of Russia's rather aggressive foreign policy. The Baltic States understood that they would not receive European political or military help because of this serious danger coming from the East. From this point of view, closer integration with some countries that have strong militaries to repel a potential attack, such as Ukraine and Poland, would be their only chance. Poland's president-elect Andrzej Duda revived the Intermarium idea in 2015. Poland is often seen by its eastern neighbours as an example of successful economic reforms and has played a particularly important role in pushing the EU for a greater response to the crisis in Ukraine<sup>42</sup>.

Against the background of international relations, this new concept of the Intermarium was addressed for the first time by the Polish general Jozef Pilsudski<sup>43</sup>, in the period after the First World War.

The mode of operation is still unclear, through Brussels or through an own command. But for this there are two things that are very well discussed: the first thing would be America's reinstatement of the operational system during the Cold War and the second thing

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<sup>39</sup><http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/magnetizarea-parteneriatului-estic-rolul-rusiei-%C8%99i-implica%C8%99Biile-pentru-moldova/>, last accessed on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>40</sup><http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/05/intermarium-an-idea-whose-time-is-coming-again/>, last accessed on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>41</sup><http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/05/intermarium-an-idea-whose-time-is-coming-again/>, last accessed on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2018

<sup>42</sup>Ibidem

<sup>43</sup> Józef Klemens Piłsudski (5 Dec. 1867 – 12 May 1935), Marshal, Polish statesman: Minister of Military Affairs (1926 – 1935), Prime Minister of Poland (1926 – 1928, August - December 1930), Head of State (1918 – 1922); As an important figure on the European political scene, he was the artisan of the creation of the Second Polish Republic.

would be the re-discussion of the Intermarium strategy, which would outline the defence of the eastern flank having US with a guarantor status<sup>44</sup>.

### ***3.2. The developments of the New Intermarium - the meetings that occurred***

After the First World War, *Intermarium*<sup>45</sup> was initiated by the great general Jozef Pilsudski, and the fate of the region that was targeted between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea was rather difficult to anticipate. The Polish general had an impeccable sense of ascertaining the self-importance of the area, going through a period of great geopolitical changes. The profile that was discussed on paper at that time continues to retain, though partially, its importance. The countries that are currently part of Central and Eastern Europe, whose heads of state met on November 4, 2015 in Bucharest, seem to realize that they belong to a perimeter of geostrategic interference with different stakes, which has a unique potential, though not yet well explored, of contributing to the security and stability of Europe<sup>46</sup>.

The geopolitical problem of the area geographically bounded by the Black Sea, the Dniester, the Baltic Sea, the Oder and the Danube, also known as Central Europe<sup>47</sup>, appeared on the agenda of European politics more than 100 years ago. The topic of re-discussing the strategy of the political, economic and military interests of three great empires (German, Austro-Hungarian and tsarist) began to gather in an ever more vivid knot at the beginning of the 20th century, at the core of the reawakening of national consciousness of the dominated peoples of the region, going to impose themselves on the map after 1918. During the mentioned period, nine countries were reborn or consolidated their profile: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania<sup>48</sup>.

In order to have a strategic stability in the game of external pressures, and to guarantee them a satisfactory level of security, but also a way of influence in the continental power equation of the time, the presidents of the Central European states have several options that are plausible. The common ideas that each of them had reached was the need for mutual support in the face of possible threats that could appear both from the west and from the east, and none of the Central European countries could have faced them alone. Also, the issue of

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<sup>44</sup>[https://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/criza-ucraieneana-matrioska-intermarium-1\\_54d09056448e03c0fd3c284d/index.html](https://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/criza-ucraieneana-matrioska-intermarium-1_54d09056448e03c0fd3c284d/index.html), last accessed on June 12th, 2018

<sup>45</sup> Intermarium (orig. Międzymorze): a never materialized initiative of Polish Marshal Pilsudski, who wanted to establish a federation of states between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea (Poland, the Baltic States, Finland, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), as a counterweight to German (west) and Russian (east) imperialism; The Intermarium was not successful, with the Lithuanians seeing it as a threat to their recently won independence; the Ukrainians saw it as a threat to their aspirations for independence, and the Western countries, except France, opposed the idea, considering Bolshevism a passing threat.

<sup>46</sup>[https://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/un-intermarium-secol-21-noile-mize-strategice-frontiera-rasariteana-occidentului-1\\_56338706f5eaafab2c29d791/index.html](https://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/un-intermarium-secol-21-noile-mize-strategice-frontiera-rasariteana-occidentului-1_56338706f5eaafab2c29d791/index.html), last accessed on June 10th, 2018

<sup>47</sup>It seems that the geopolitical notion of Central Europe does not correspond to a geographical reality, which can be clearly defined, it having vague outlines and defining itself according to the circumstances; there is no consensus among specialists regarding the definition of Central Europe; it is clear, however, that it can only be defined in relation to the east and west of the continent and depending on the relationship that the two extremes maintain; on the other hand, the Hungarians and Czechs consider that the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire constitutes the historical core of Central Europe, and the Poles include the entire region between Germany and Russia, including the Baltic countries and Ukraine, but exclude Germany from here; In the Catholic (papal) vision, Central Europe plays the role of a cordon between liberal (Catholic) Europe and the east dominated by Russian Orthodoxy.

<sup>48</sup>[https://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/un-intermarium-secol-21-noile-mize-strategice-frontiera-rasariteana-occidentului-1\\_56338706f5eaafab2c29d791/index.html](https://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/un-intermarium-secol-21-noile-mize-strategice-frontiera-rasariteana-occidentului-1_56338706f5eaafab2c29d791/index.html), last accessed on June 10th, 2018

the need to resolve in time the latent bilateral misunderstandings of some of the states was debated<sup>49</sup>.

### **3.3. From the *Intermarium* to the Three Seas**

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the strategy of the *Intermarium* concept has been developed in Poland as a political theory. The concept of the *Intermarium* was to answer the general question of how to rebuild a sovereign Polish state and how to secure its future. The concept was innovative, although its purpose was not. Only the Poles, and Poland as the only actor, would not be able to achieve such a goal. Poland's enemies, especially Russia, were considered the main obstacle to independence and excessively powerful.

Those who developed the *Intermarium* strategy, Józef Piłsudski and the closest associates of the Polish Socialist Party, discovered the yield of the nationalist desires of other nations living inside the Russian state. The concept was simple: predicting a national uprising at an appropriate moment and the decomposition of Russia along national divisions. On this occasion, both major Polish goals would have been fulfilled: independence and a secure future. Russia, if pushed out of Europe and removed by conquest, would be annihilated as an empire and would no longer pose a threat to the newly established states<sup>50</sup>.

The *Intermarium* strategy saw its first opportunity to become a reality when the war between Russia and Japan broke out in 1904. Piłsudski presented his political study and idea to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. But after the exposure of the project, of course the Japanese did not take this proposal seriously. The second opportunity also appeared at the end of the First World War, where the Polish left-wing partitionists won (Russia, Germany and Austria).

Cooperation in the field of laser technology and solar panels

A cooperation agreement was signed in the field of economic and technical cooperation. Efforts were made to combat terrorism and extremism. The Emirates supported Lithuania's request to receive the status of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Cooperation has been extended in the field of InfoTech, logistics, telecommunications, electronics, and biotechnology.

The research shows that from 2011 to June 2015, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had about the same level of top visits to the Emirates. Since July 2015, there has been an increase in visits to Estonia and Lithuania, and Latvia has maintained the same level.

### **3.4. The new *Intermarium* and the crisis in Ukraine**

The pressures between the EU and Russia related to their common neighbourhood were at the crisis stage long before they erupted in Ukraine at the end of 2013. The Eastern enlargement of the European Union and the issuance of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 began the process of gradually strengthening the role of the European Union in the region. Until the Eastern Partnership (EP) policy was launched in 2009, the objectives of the European Union and Russia in the common neighbourhood proceeded on a collision

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<sup>49</sup> It is, among other things, the post-Trianon dispute between Romania and Hungary and the disputes between Czechoslovakia and Poland, which targeted localities on the common border

<sup>50</sup><http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/intermarium-vs-the-three-seas-initiative/>, last accessed on May 7th, 2018

course. Against the background of such circumstances, it appeared as if the two sides pretended to omit the perspective of the other<sup>51</sup>.

The commemoration of one of the most tragic moments in our history, the First World War, was marked by an atmosphere of mistrust and a breakdown in solidarity between the West and Russia, following the Ukrainian crisis that began on 21 November 2013 when Viktor Yanukovich, the President of Ukraine, cancelled the announced preparations for signing an association agreement with the EU<sup>52</sup>. The events in Ukraine and their internationalization could be seen as a prelude to a "new" conflict between the West and Russia, an ideological conflict that sometimes seemed to diminish after the end of the Cold War<sup>53</sup>.

To draw a conclusion on Germany's involvement, it would have an existential interest in a united Europe, as well as in protecting Ukraine and other countries on the EU border. In this sense, the Intermarium cooperation can bring more security to Eastern Europe. The risk is, however, that Intermarium could also divide the European Union; as the driving force behind it, it can counterbalance Germany's role as a leading power in Europe. We can say that the question of whether an Intermarium can be a security solution for the states in the "grey zone" between Russia and Europe is highly discussed. Eastern European NATO members should have the resources and time to defend their non-NATO neighbours<sup>54</sup>.

### **3.4.1. War and identity: the case of Donbas in Ukraine**

The most recent political transformations in Ukraine, such as mass protests, regime change, and war, broaden the importance of this case for theorizing changes and the continuity of identities and divisions. The regional diversity of Ukraine is caught in an intermingling of ethnic, linguistic, socio-economic, historical and political factors that make the country a prime case for studying political identities and cleavages. Researchers with an interest in Eastern Europe have long debated the relative importance of individual cleavage. War and displacement are synonymous with disrupting the daily lives of the people who live them. The war puts the parameters and the meaning of identities to an extreme test. The dynamics that could otherwise develop progressively can suddenly intensify and accelerate<sup>55</sup>.

The data from the four interrelated surveys suggest that there was no obvious effect of the war on the identity of the current and former Donbas population. Although there is evidence of a degree of polarization and ethnicization, this is only part of a more complex pattern. Mixed or civic identities were, of course, preserved in all four groups and, in some cases, consolidated. It is particularly surprising that Ukrainian citizenship is by far the most prevalent self-reported identity in Kyiv-controlled Donbas and among internally displaced persons. An already strong identity was strengthened, particularly by a shift he reported from regional identities centred on the Donbas or, more specifically, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup>Stewart, S., 2009. Russia and the Eastern Partnership: Loud criticism, quiet interest incooperation, SWP Comments 2009/C 07. Accessed February 21, 2017. [https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2009C07\\_stw\\_ks.pdf](https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2009C07_stw_ks.pdf), Apud, Kristi Raik, (2017): The Ukraine Crisis as a Conflict over Europe's Political, Economic and Security Order, Geopolitics, p.1

<sup>52</sup>Dacian DUNA "Normative power faces Great Power politics. The European Union, Russia, and the Ukrainian crisis", *The European Space. Borders and Issues*, p.413

<sup>53</sup>Ibidem

<sup>54</sup><http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/intermarium-a-view-from-germany/>, accesat la data de 07.06.2018

<sup>55</sup>Gwendolyn Sasse, Alice Lackner "War and identity: the case of the Donbas in Ukraine", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 34:2-3, p.139-157, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452209>

<sup>56</sup>Gwendolyn Sasse, Alice Lackner, *op.cit.*, p.153

Among displaced people in Russia, Ukrainian citizenship represented a more significant identity category before the crisis (about a third of respondents in this category was the most important identity) than might be expected in light of previous studies that highlighted conflicting ethnic, linguistic or categories of regional identity in Ukraine. Among the persons displaced in Russia and DNR/LNR residents, Ukrainian citizenship as an identity has been significantly weakened by the war. Among the displaced, "bigger" movement—moving from Donbas to Russia—is linked to greater self-reported identity change<sup>57</sup>.

### ***3.5. The New Intermarium versus the Old Intermarium***

The "Intermarium" concept will return to the forefront of defence discussions in Central and Eastern Europe, marked around the 1990s by the secessionist adventurism of a Russia, shocked by the collapse of the "imperialist" scaffolding. At the same time, Poland initiated revival efforts for the Intermarium project, regarding the mistrust of the area aimed at regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea. An "Intermarium" based on contemporary European realities could bring together countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Turkey, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Poland, as well as other countries that could join this coalition, Romania, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Western Balkans or the South Caucasus. As a bottom line, combining the old with the best of the new is, in theory, a path to renewed growth and vitality. We can say that pursuing the return of the old kingdoms of Europe or the original republic of the United States are worthwhile goals and spiritual fulfilments<sup>58</sup>.

### ***3.6. The new Intermarium - the attitude of the actors on the international scene***

The amplification of NATO's strategy to integrate the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), was received by Russia not only as a threat, but also as a preparatory event for Ukraine and Georgia, which had recently proclaimed their intentions related to their democratic prospects<sup>59</sup>.

The leaders from Kremlin did not want to lose the power they had over Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia or even the Caucasian region. Achieving such an objective involved using a series of procedures, from political machinations (Ukraine, Moldova) to employing the force of the army (Georgia, August 2008), despite the risk of losing or affecting Russia's relations with important powers, such as the USA and NATO, a circumstance that is maintained and continues to remain tense for the next period of time<sup>60</sup>.

The ties established with NATO witnessed a slight relaxation in the first part of 2011, although the link with the USA in the Georgia problem is equally controversial. On July 29, 2007, the US Senate unanimously voted for the resolution on the acceptance of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia, but those territories were under Russian military occupation<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup>Ibidem

<sup>58</sup><https://thermidormag.com/intermarium-for-the-21st-century/>, last accessed on June 11th. 2018

<sup>59</sup><http://www.scipio.ro/documents/41456/267466/Impact+Strategic+3-2011+ro>, last accessed on October 11th, 2017

<sup>60</sup><http://www.scipio.ro/documents/41456/267466/Impact+Strategic+3-2011+ro>, last accessed on October the 11th, 2017

<sup>61</sup>Ibidem

### ***3.7. The new Intermarium – a regional security structure at the EU border?***

Every political unit, social entity or nation that aspires to a world leadership role is fundamentally marked by a certain philosophical idea. This idea represents the reason for the existence of the respective entity, and its force causes the entity to achieve performance in its path. In most cases, such ideas are developed, borrowed or built in order to generate the evolution of the created entities. Ideologies such as the imperial ideology of ancient Rome, the Catholic ideology of the Habsburg Empire, the ideology of Jihad on the Ottoman Empire, the industrial imperialist ideology of Great Britain, the Marxist ideology of the Soviet Union, the National Socialist ideology of the Third Hitler Reich, the capitalist ideology democracy of the United States of America, all started from philosophical paradigms that contributed not only to their realization, but rather to their perpetuation.

The concept of *Intermarium* is generally associated with a wide variety of countries located between Germany and Russia. It is a word intended to replace the concept of Central and Eastern Europe and a concept that suggests the idea of a lively federal centre. In the volume entitled *Intermarium: Wilson, Madison and Eastern Central European Federalism*, Jonathan Levy emphasized the fact that the union of these states, created on federal principles, could generate long-term solutions for solving the problems in the region, but also for ensuring security and in especially to support his individual and economic development.

A more formal, multilateral and official alliance of countries that frequently enjoy close bilateral corporate relations would not only be in their national interest. They could also help the EU and NATO achieve more stable eastern borders and find new partners, while avoiding confrontations between the West and Russia<sup>62</sup>.

### ***3.8. The new Intermarium – is it an enlarged Visegrad Group?***

This Visegrad group, founded in 1991, represented the most remarkable peak of regional cooperation in the Central European space after 1990, bringing together three of the Central European states: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The importance of this group consisted primarily in the establishment of a common platform for action and coordination of foreign policy actions by taking into account the political manifesto of the "return to Europe". In the first phase, the Budapest-Warsaw-Prague trilateral cooperation agenda was perpetuated in the coordination of actions towards the USSR, especially along the lines of breaking up the Warsaw Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Central Europe. The aim of the grouping was, in particular, to create an exclusive club that would allow the three member states to join the Euro-Atlantic structures as quickly as possible.

The Visegrad Group announced its action plan in October 1991 when the Krakow Declaration was approved in which the heads of the three states formally requested security guarantees, as well as a general commitment from NATO in order to launch the enlargement process towards East. Once this agenda was established, NATO integration became the political manifesto and the main objective of the security policy of the states of the Visegrad Group<sup>63</sup>.

The Visegrad Group (V4) has encountered the most resistant crisis since its establishment in 1991. The very special importance of this crisis exists in the acceptance of the fact that at the level of the group, being appreciated as the most developed construct of

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<sup>62</sup>[http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/este-posibil-intermarium-sprijini-singuri-esticii-1\\_5791e6e95ab6550cb819a2e4/index.html](http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/este-posibil-intermarium-sprijini-singuri-esticii-1_5791e6e95ab6550cb819a2e4/index.html), last accessed on April 15th.,2017.

<sup>63</sup>Adrian Hyde-Price, "The International politics of East Central Europe", (Manchester University Press, 1996), p.244

regional cooperation with inevitable desires to climb into a regional mini-alliance, there is no common reflection on crucial security interests and imperatives.

#### **V4 and GCC**

The establishment of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) in 1981 and of the Visegrad Triangle (1991) had similar intentions but different circumstances. The GCC was a reaction to the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as much as a creation to the growing power of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. While the Visegrád group (V4) was favoured by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR which created a security vacuum in the area. This group was based on 2 pillars: integration into NATO and the EU. During the formation of this group, the Persian Gulf War began<sup>64</sup>.

The weakening of the power of the USSR and its dissolution had an impact on the Visegrád Group and on the Gulf War. The Visegrad Group countries are members of NATO and the EU, and in contrast the Gulf Cooperation Council operates in one of the world's most volatile environments with conflicts led by terrorist organizations, with failed states such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen and with tension in Iran. Due to certain limitations in the deepening of cooperation between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council resulting from the lack of an agreement (P. 110) that, for more than 20 years, has been waiting for negotiation, the V4 countries should strengthen relations at the bilateral level. They (the V4 countries) have strong agriculture, while the Gulf Cooperation Council has to import 90% of its food. While Visegrad countries import oil and gas, the GCC countries have extensive oil and gas resources. It should be emphasized that the Visegrad countries, having the same number of votes in the EU Council as France and Germany, have greater potential to establish/influence the EU's common foreign and security policy. V4 (countries that are part of the Visegrád group) have cooperative relations with Benelux, Africa, the Scandinavian and the Baltic States, South Korea and Japan<sup>65</sup>. They started to develop dialogues in the Middle East by talking with countries like Egypt, Israel and Lebanon. Attracting tourists from Visegrád countries to the Gulf area is also considered.

In 2017, the Visegrád Group established relations with Israel. On July 19, 2017, the Prime Ministers of the V4 countries met in Budapest with the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu. The Budapest summit was the first meeting of the Visegrád group with Israel at the head of state level. In July 2017, the V4 Prime Ministers met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The migration crisis and the anti-terrorist fight were discussed with the president of Israel and Egypt. As part of the Middle East peace process, the Visegrád Group is campaigning for a two-state solution. The V4 states are committed to improving EU-Israel relations, to update the EU-Israel Association Agreement signed in 2000. The energy sector offers prospects for cooperation. Israel began producing natural gas from the Mediterranean Sea.

After the V4-Israel meeting in Budapest, two working groups were created on security and counter-terrorism, as well as research, development, innovation. Arms cooperation with Israel can also be discussed<sup>66</sup>.

On July 1, 2019, the Czech Republic took over the V4 presidency, emphasizing the importance of the EU agenda in the cooperation of the Visegrád countries<sup>67</sup>.

#### **Case Study**

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<sup>64</sup>Grabinski, T., *The Summit in the frosty ruins: the background of the 1991 Visegrad Meeting*, 2020

<sup>65</sup>MOFAT 2017, *2017-2018 Hungarian Presidency*, [www.visegradgroup.eu](http://www.visegradgroup.eu)

<sup>66</sup>Dyduc, Joana, *The Visegrad group's policy towards Israel. Common Values and interests as a catalyst for cooperation*, 2018

<sup>67</sup>Ogrodnik, L., "Rozsadna Europa", 2019

The Visegrád countries established diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates between 1980 and 1990. It was an exceptional period for all V4 countries. Poland and the Visegrád countries have contributed to the construction of the new European order in the 21st century. V4-UAE relations are characterized by a different dynamic and meaning<sup>68</sup>.

### **The Czech Republic**

In 1988, Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations with the UAE. Until 2014, the V4-UAE relations in the field of economy and tourism developed. More top-level visits were needed. In 2015, Czech President Miloš Zeman visited Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for countries violent extremism and participated in a UAE-Czech Republic economic forum. In November 2015, the Minister of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, together with the Czech Chamber of Commerce, came to Dubai to enhance and expand cooperation. In 2019, another UAE delegation came to the Czech Republic. The partners want to cooperate in the field of smart city solutions, manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, tourism and artificial intelligence.

### **Hungary**

In 1990, diplomatic relations were established between Hungary and the United Arab Emirates. In 1976, 5 years after the creation of the UAE, the Hungarian Trade Office opened in Dubai. Hungarian President Árpád Göncz visited the UAE in 1995. But a Hungarian embassy was not established in Abu Dhabi until 2006.

Since 2015, Hungary-UAE political and economic relations have entered a more dynamic stage. An agreement on Hungary-UAE political consultations was signed in 2015. In 2016, the UAE-Hungary Joint Economic Committee was held in Dubai, the dialogues focusing on relations such as investments, trade, energy, small and medium enterprises, agriculture and environment, management, health, transport, intellectual property. The UAE Foreign Minister (Sheikh Abdullah) wanted to expand relations with Central and Eastern Europe in areas such as economy, trade, investment and security cooperation. The Embassy of the Emirates in Budapest was established in 2018.

### **Poland**

On September 4, 1989, Poland established diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates. In the period 1989-2010, the relationship between Poland and the Middle East experienced various dynamics. The period 1989-2003 was characterized by a new openness when the first agreements were signed in a framework of cooperation. Since 1995, the dynamics of relations have been changing and after the start of the war in Iraq (2003) there was a growing interest in the Middle East. The UAE was considered one of the five important countries for Poland and the Middle East. In 2011, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development visited the UAE. The embargo on Polish beef was lifted. In 2012 Emirates Airline launched a connection between Dubai and Warsaw. In April 2015, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Piechowski came to the UAE, where he met UAE leaders and participated in two economic forums in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Cooperation Agreements in the field of innovation and small and medium-sized enterprises were signed between Poland and the UAE; The memorandum of understanding in the field of agriculture, food safety, cooperation in the field of research, marketing in food and agriculture. A cooperation agreement in the field of tourism was signed.

### **Slovakia**

Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and the Emirates were established in 1993. They saw different periods until the end of 2013 when the embassy opened after 10 years. Since 2015, there is a cooperation agreement between the two countries. In 2015, the Joint Economic Committee was established between the two countries to deepen economic,

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<sup>68</sup>Krzyszowski, A., *The Visegrad Group countries: The United Arab Emirates Perspective*, p.112, 2021



commercial and investment cooperation. In December 2015, the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico established the embassy in Abu Dhabi and the foundations of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement were laid. Discussions were held on economic and investment cooperation, promotion of common interests in the international environment, as well as global and regional changes. An agreement was signed for the mutual protection of investments. Security cooperation is being considered.

In relations with the Emirates, in the period 2011-2015, Poland was the toughest leader (champion). The Czech Republic and Slovakia have the same dynamics, but they are not as strong as Poland in this respect. In the period 2015-2020, the number of official visits to the UAE by the V4 increased. The author presents a graph of the dynamics of these visits to the UAE. Looking at trade, it is shown that Poland was the leader of the prosperity dynamics and Hungary recorded the biggest decline. The Czech Republic and Slovakia recorded stable increases in exports. After 2015, Poland shows declines in exports. Slovakia has a lower growth in exports. The author shows (p.120) with the help of a graph the export of the V4 countries to the United Arab Emirates in US\$.

The research shows that the V4 countries and the Emirates have a great interest in cooperating with Central and Eastern Europe and have opportunities to cooperate in several areas. The UAE is a partner of NATO and has a transatlantic vocation. The UAE wants to deepen relations with the EU through joint initiatives. The UAE has become the 7th recipient of EU goods in the world.

A strategic goal of the V4 is the EU which can support V4 initiatives in the Middle East area. For Russia, Egypt can become a key player in MENA REGION. Egypt can play a stabilizing role in the Middle East and North Africa in combating illegal emigration.

The arms industry is a reason for cooperation between the V4 and the Emirates.

### ***3.9. Political-economic aspects of the Intermarium concept***

The very heavy historical obstacles of the potential members represent another barrier for the birth of the Alliance. Any country in the region would require its neighbours to accept its role as a historical leader. In reality, no Pole would have agreed to participate in an Intermarium, and no Ukrainian would tolerate a dominated Pole. The situation is the same for the other nations, the case seems quite similar<sup>69</sup>.

All these should be included as instruments of the state in Poland's grand strategy that could lead to the preservation of sovereign nation states in the region and to give a significant boost to the Intermarium. This fabulous strategy should, of course, ultimately aim at limiting the role of the state in favour of empowering private enterprises<sup>70</sup>.

### ***3.10. Intermarium: The security pact of the countries between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea***

The two neighbouring countries, Poland and Ukraine, bridge the Baltic Sea region and the wider Black Sea area, which connects to the strategically important Middle East, and with all of them they have a certain related history. Moreover, since the 1990s, the two countries have experience with a number of different forms and spheres of cooperation. However, requiring a Polish-Ukrainian engine for any realizable intention of Intermarium, the volume's

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<sup>69</sup>Ibidem

<sup>70</sup>Ibidem

contributors also provide a clear tool for analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the whole idea<sup>71</sup>.

Even though Poland and Ukraine are perceived as the natural engine of the Intermarium, similar to the Franco-German engine at the heart of the EU, it soon becomes clear that there is no consensus on the conceptualization of Intermarium between the Polish and Ukrainian sides, nor indeed within each country's own speech. This relationship is interesting in that it demonstrates that the transfer was not always one-way: while Ukraine certainly benefited from the adoption of best practice models that aided Poland's accession to NATO, Ukraine provided significant armaments to Poland. Moreover, Ukraine's experience with the Donbas conflict provides Poland and other NATO countries with valuable information about Russia's capabilities and tactics<sup>72</sup>.

### ***3.11. The Trimarium (Three Seas Initiative) is not the old Intermarium***

The participating states, because they are all members of the European Union, live differently from the eastern border with the EU. The original idea of the Intermarium, which belonged to Józef Piłsudski, was always combined with a parallel Promethean idea - the idea of liberating nations suffering from the Soviet rule. The current Trimarium project looks more selfish. And this is the core of the problem: the risk of moral autism that would widen the gap between the countries of the Eastern Union, becoming richer and richer, and their "poorer relatives", deliberately kept out of the door<sup>73</sup>.

However, the architects of the Trimarium also seemed united in neglecting the problems of the regions they decided not to consider. If we look to the east through the current border of the EU, we can choose several problems, among them: an increase in authoritarianism, the criminalization and oligarchization of public life, the pauperization of the population (outside the dominant elite), the aggressive ethno-nationalism of the dominant groups, the persecution of impartial journalists and activists for human rights, the destruction of monuments from the past, the falsification of history, the justification of genocide and the legal protection of war criminals, leaving an open space for the infiltration of opposing superpowers, the development of new areas of law, the promotion of human trafficking, etc<sup>74</sup>. This would be the map version of the proposed Initiative.

## **Conclusions**

We conclude that the area of which Central Europe is a part is in an accelerated process of change. The analyses focus in particular on the increase in regional insecurity against the background of the return of high-power hegemonic "games", Russia's geopolitical offensive and the multiplication of mistrust and security threats. The West, for its part, is facing a deep internal crisis, with the central stake being the redefinition of the role of the EU and NATO in the new systemic architecture.

Due to the increased fluidity of the European and global security map, the topic of regionalization has returned to the attention of debates and strategic analyses as a possible

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<sup>71</sup><https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/11/12/intermarium-an-empty-signifier/>, last accessed on December 17<sup>th</sup>, 2020

<sup>72</sup><https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/11/12/intermarium-an-empty-signifier/>, last accessed on December 17<sup>th</sup>, 2020

<sup>73</sup><http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/07/06/trimarium-is-not-intermarium/>, last accessed on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2018,

*Apud*, "Intermarium in the 21st century" based on the conference held on July 6-7 2017, Lazarski University in Warsaw

<sup>74</sup>*Ibidem*

solution to solving the security and defence slippages on the eastern border of the West, located in the area where the Russian threat is most visible.

Starting from the realities presented above, this work tries to offer an encompassing presentation of the existing visions, out of the desire to explain as clearly as possible this old and at the same time new concept called Intermarium. The proposed objective is to discover the nature of this process, the implications and strategic imperatives, the severities that value its overall energy that will allow us to issue evolutionary perspectives and implementation solutions in the future.

Conducting research on this process, several important conclusions can be highlighted.

We have seen that the peoples are the most important on the international political stage. They are shown to be rational actors, using their information and resources based on certain calculations. Regarding Polish-Romanian relations, they continued to progress slightly during the interwar period, and the connection that the two states manifest can be seen even today, after both states went through the traumatic experience of the anti-capitalist regime. Partner countries in the European Union and NATO, Romania and Poland have a common future, even if in an increasingly twisted and difficult geopolitical situation.

The interval between 2009 and 2013 constituted a stage of fundamental changes, which marked a new geopolitical dynamic at the level of the European Community. The main element of this reconfiguration was the regaining of the Atlantic orientation, which aimed at a thorough process of "re-pivoting" the USA towards Europe and the reorientation of NATO's visions, which envisages the objective of defending the eastern flank.

The Ukrainian crisis has signalled important deficiencies in the efforts to design a common security agenda. The explanation lies mainly in the perception of the threat. For the states on the southern border of NATO/EU, the southern direction constituted a major security interest due to the potential for instability originating from North Africa and the Middle East. The refugee crisis and the increase in terrorist threats have aggravated security fears in the capitals of Western states. By comparison, Russia's aggression in Ukraine was not perceived as generating a direct and immediate threat to national security.

Secondly, building an element of demoralization towards Russia on NATO's eastern flank does not solve the security problem of Ukraine and that of the Republic of Moldova, leaving an increased space of vulnerability that Moscow can easily use to maintain a state of uncertainty in the CE. Ukraine is facing a precarious economic situation, with refugees from Crimea or Donbas, who no longer have jobs or the means to ensure a decent living, with a support that it must permanently allocate to its military forces but which creates a constant pressure on its budget. With a society completely separated from the more or less determined involvement in supporting or fighting the conflict on its territory, Ukraine has not registered concrete progress in its democratic reformation.

We believe that it is necessary to maintain a categorical position on the part of the European Union regarding Ukraine, the situation in Crimea being from our point of view irremediable, the concentration of European efforts and actions being necessary to go towards Dombas, so that the military forces in the area are removed, and the possibility of federalizing Ukraine should no longer be considered a remedy.

If for states such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia the current relations they have with the European Union give us the opportunity to build a scenario in which they keep their European path, for Armenia, Belarus or Azerbaijan we consider that it is not an impossible scenario, which places them under the influence of Russia and in a union with it that is not only economic but also political.

Our emphasis on the Intermarium demonstrates not only the most effective way to approach the complexity of the region as a cohesive collection of a million indigenous

components, but also reflects a tradition that the extinct population of the region will find most familiar and least dangerous. Since the goal is to share Intermarium knowledge with US policy makers, it is essential to explain the region in terms that would help the US influence the target populations. This is necessary to break the practice of speaking only to their Imperial supervisors in Moscow or elsewhere.

The Intermarium for the 21st century was intended to be a very rigorous defender of Dmowski's Piast concept of an ethnically and religiously homogeneous homeland. At the same time, the Intermarium reflects the Jagiellonian idea of widening the country's international horizons through a Warsaw-led network of states similar to the Central and Eastern European states that would stabilize them against their Western "partners".

Germany's involvement in the Intermarium would have an existential interest in a united Europe, as well as in protecting Ukraine and other countries on the EU border. In this sense, the Intermarium cooperation can bring greater security to Eastern Europe. The danger, however, is that Intermarium could also divide the European Union; as the driving force behind it, can counterbalance Germany's role as a leading power in Europe. We can say that the issue is highly debated, whether an Intermarium could be a security solution for the states in the "grey zone" between Russia and Europe. Eastern European NATO members should have the resources and time to defend their non-NATO neighbors.

To conclude everything I have written in the paper, the idea of reviving the Intermarium could become an indispensable integration alternative for Eastern Europe during the crisis periods of those organizations, such as the OSCE, the EU and NATO. After England's desire to leave the European Union, the Intermarium project was seen as one of the forecasting options for the future of the European Union.

The objective of the Three Seas Initiative is to associate the 12 member countries of the European Union by forming energy, telecommunications and transport lines in the North-South direction. This strategy is not categorically directed against Russia, but it could be that in the future, if the project takes shape, it could be a solution to neutralize the Russian method of using energy as a political weapon. It is not clear if Bucharest will take the initiative to connect the two terminals from the Baltic and the Adriatic through a terminal to be built on the Black Sea in Romania or if this eastern part of the Initiative will remain pending, linked to Russian gas imports.

Countries such as Poland, Romania and Estonia are three of the six NATO member states (out of a total of 29) that have already begun to follow the commitment to spend at least 2% of annual GDP on defence. In 2014, all countries in the Alliance agreed to reach this investment goal in the national military budget by 2024 at the latest. Countries like Spain or Belgium that do not spend even 1% of their GDP on maintaining or increasing their combat capability own army. But there are others, Hungary, the Czech Republic, which easily passed the lone percentage only after the United States of America, through the voice of President Donald Trump, pointed out to NATO allies that they should seriously pay their bills in order to enjoy future of national security.

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