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ABSTRACT OF Ph. D. THESIS  
**ECONOMIC DOCTRINE OF NIPONISM**

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## **Introduction**

In this paper entitled "The economic doctrine of Niponism", we want to capture the main defining elements of the doctrine, built with the passing of centuries in the Land of the Rising Sun.

For a better explanation of our theme we want to provide a definition related to doctrine:

*“Doctrine- represents a complex concept, a complex reality, built up from a theoretical component (which explains the economy situated on the position of certain interests) and a practical component (economic policy) which seeks economic orientation based on an underlying theory.”*

Based on this definition and on meeting the conditions which it claims, we consider that Niponism is legitimized as an economic doctrine, better, or maybe as good as the Social Market Economy in Germany.

The selection of the area of interest, as well as establishing the basis for the thesis entitled: “The economic doctrine of Niponism” have their roots in the curiosity provided by the fascinating advance recorded by the Japanese economy, especially after the Second World War: a country in ruins after the capitulation of the Allies, who, in 1952, were still fighting against famine, after less than two decades ends up being the third economic world power and the second of the capitalist world.

We consider that the model, that made possible an increase that was so significant and sustained, made of two numbers years on, deserves to be explained, discussed, theorized and adapted to the conditions of other states.

The lack of a material/ paper which would deal effectively the economic doctrine of Niponism, but only related items, also offered us an impulse for this theme to be approached.

### **Considerations upon the coverage of the study**

For a better accentuation of the elements, we consider essential to proceeded at the division of this paper in five chapters: Japan, from traditionalism to modernity, Japanese features, economic doctrine of Niponism, the economic evolution of Japan in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the origins of post-war advancement.

For a better understanding of the Japanese advancement, we consider that an analysis of the economic development is not enough, and we would have to descend on the time axis where we could see the source of the Japanese values. This is the reason why we will dedicate the first chapter, entitled “Japan, from traditionalism to modernity”, to the study of historic progress of the Japanese archipelago.

This first chapter, which refers to the period which began in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century, with the appearance of the first state (Yamato), until after the First World War, will be structured in five sub-chapters as follows: from Yamato to Edo (the 3<sup>rd</sup> century-1603), Edo Age- “a peace army” (1603-1867), The Meiji Restoration (1867-1912), The Imperialism of the Pre-war Japan, Japan and the First World War.

As its name states, this chapter wants to be a synthesis of the transition of Japan from traditionalism to modernity. We begin with an incursion towards the half of the first millennium to analyze the propagation of the main elements of the Chinese civilization in the Japanese archipelago: Buddhism, the Chinese writing, Taika measures, the shift towards meritocracy, the first juridical code, and the first Japanese capitals.

After a review of the wars which led towards the shogunate period (1603-1868), a great part of the first chapter will be dedicated to this. We will discuss in detail the evolution of the society with the afferent social structure, the isolation for over two centuries of the archipelago and its end with the arrival of the imposing “black ships”, as well as the end of the Edo “period”.

The next sub-chapter will focus upon the Meiji revolution, one of the most remarkable periods in the history of nations, or after Kenneth Henshall’s saying, even “the greatest achievement of a nation in the history of mankind”. Its debut corresponds with the beginning of the Modern Era. The subjects which will be approached here are the following: the problem of the abolition of feudalism (by the former feudal), the “recycling” of the superior classes, the introduction of land tax, the measures taken by Matsukata for the recovery of an economy which was in trouble and their importance, the industrialization and the role of the state in the evolution of this process. We will give an increased importance also to the Japanese westernization, to the seizure of all the modern elements retrieved in West, but also to the devotion with which the Japanese people put themselves in the service of society.

The sub-chapter number IV will put on the table the Japanese imperialism, where we would discuss in detail two major achievements of Japan: the defeat of China and Russia (two enemies which were

considered much more powerful), in only a decade, a short period of time after the Meiji Restoration, also the factors which led to this situations. We will also stop our attention upon the international context of that period, considering it extremely important for the understanding of things in their depth. We will ask ourselves how this country was capable to transform itself from a potential colony into an empire, propagating fear around their neighbors, but also around the great powers. How was it possible that instead of being included in the riches menu, it succeeded in sitting next to them at the table and to have an important word to say in the international politics? How was it possible to annul the so called unequal treaties?

The last sub-chapter will be devoted to the participation of the archipelago at the first world conflagration and the advantages it had during this period, from a military point of view as well as from an economical one. We will talk about the way in which Japan managed to become a beneficiary in a war in which it wasn't forced to make great sacrifices.

After this incursion in the history of the Japanese archipelago, in the second chapter (Japanese particularities), we will try to stop our attention upon some particularities sketched and branded in the consciousness of the Japanese people along the centuries. We will debate three problems that we consider to be essential, namely: Japan's cultures, groupism, as well as the theory of the Japanese paternalism.

In the first part we will widely analyze the three cultures that exist in the Japanese archipelago: the one of the emperor, the one of work and family and the one of harmony. First of all, we will study from a constitutional and ideological point of view, the authority which Tenno (Mikado) releases (puts) over the Japanese people. Second of all, we will try to explain a living truth and this is the fact that the Japanese work much more than other advanced states, and for this thing we will use the number of strike days, of additional hours (reported and unreported), of days worked annually and so on, compared with the numbers found in the United States, Great Britain and France. Third of all, we will make an analysis of the Japanese paternalism, of the system of life engagement which differentiates the Japanese management from the western one.

In the second sub-chapter we will debate the tendency that the Japanese have to belong to a group, the sacrifices that they are willing to make for this thing, as well as the type of relation that exists in the society, respectively the Japanese companionship. Next, we will take heed of the interest displayed by

the employers towards the employees' welfare, relationships and the atmosphere within the company; we will not miss out the employees, whom, in exchange of the favors they benefit, would be willing to sacrifice themselves for the family's company.

In the third chapter, we will try to blend the elements which were separated from the previous chapters, the achievement of a synthesis of the Japanese economic thinking beginning in the Tokugawa period, an accentuation of the original thinking, as well as the influence of Japan upon the international doctrines, their adjustment to the Japanese spirit for the curdle of the country's economic doctrine. For this, we will divide the chapter in five sub-chapters: the Japanese way of thinking in the Tokugawa period, Meiji period, the period between the two World Wars, after the Second World War, as well as the Japanese influences upon them.

The fourth chapter will deal with the Japanese economic development in the post-war period. The main goal is to observe the economic signs, their evolution, the adopted development strategies, with the transitions between them, the obstacles it had to deal with and last but not least, the lessons that can be drawn from Japan's Golden Age.

The first sub-chapter will be dedicated to the first phase of the post-war period (the period of the imports, of the restoration) where we will try to analyze the factors that influenced the comeback of the Japanese economy, after it was suppressed by the second world conflagration. To succeed a temporal dimension as close to the truth, we realized a comparison between the Japanese archipelago and the United States and Great Britain, at the level of the macro economical indicators.

The second sub-chapter will serve as an analysis of the second post-war phase (the production for the internal market), emphasizing here the path that the Japanese archipelago had to follow in the struggle and success in becoming the third world power, and the second of the capitalist world. In the implementation of this demarche, we will research the technology imports and their impact upon the production, the raise of the real salary and its impact upon the internal market, the gross domestic product (GDP) compared with the one of the first most advanced seven states, the performance evolution of Japan compared with the one of the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as the motifs that led to the immense growth which the Japanese archipelago enjoyed. We will then continue analyzing a great obstacle which the Japanese people had to face, and this is the first oil shock, summarizing its consequences and also with the solutions found at this challenge.



In the third sub-chapter we will try to understand the way in which Japan achieved performances, superior to those of the other states from the very beginning, even if it changed the strategy from the basis; we also reviewed the raw material grade of dependence, for understanding the acute need to export. We will then observe the main cause which led to the remodeling of the Japanese development coordinates, with a detailed explanation of the new governmental actions, pointing in the end their conclusions. We will not omit the moment of the Great Japanese Crisis, to which we granted an increased attention through the analysis of the whole mechanism which led to the formation of the speculative bubble, as well as to its breaking (also including the arising consequences).

The fifth chapter will be for the analysis of the factors that led to this great advancement registered in Japan after the Second World War. We will analyze the agricultural reform, the dual system of the Japanese economy, the monopolistic companies, the emphasized protectionism, and the high rates of savings with their implications upon the Japanese development. We will then use a model of international commerce to see its impact in the exports period (1975-1985).

In the last sub-chapter, we will try an econometrical study to highlight the percentage of consumption and of the import of technology in the economic growth.

This paper will end with the sixth chapter, the one afferent for conclusions, in which we will try to sum up the main elements extracted throughout the undertaken research.

### **The current stage of knowledge/ Approaches of the economic doctrine of Japan in the major literature**

Regarding the current stage of knowledge, the main paper where this subject is treated, is the one written by Tuiu Florea entitled “Niponism”. In this paper, the author makes a pertinent analysis of several factors about which we will debate in the present paper (the theory of Japanese paternalism, an introduction in the Japanese economic thinking, the original Japanese thinking etc). In the Romanian literature we also found two papers (Sava, Sorica- “Japan, the economic phenomenon” and Murgescu, Costin- “Japan in the world economy”) where there are approaches of some doctrinal elements.

The international literature is vaster, containing a significant number of works, the most appropriate to this subject being:

- The ones which debate the evolution of the Japanese economic thinking (Morris-Suzuki, Tessa- *A History of Japanese Economic Thought* or Sugiyama, Chuhei- *The Origins of Economic Thought in Modern Japan* ), where we find a series of elements of economic doctrine.
- The sociological ones which try the explanation of the Japanese spirit (Chie, Nakane- *La société japonaise* or *Relations Humaines au Japon*).

### **Limits of research, objectives, used methodology**

This paper wants to be one of the first bricks of a detailed study with respect to the theorization of the Japanese model, suggesting in the future, besides a broader modeling of it and, eventually, a particularization of the essential factors in shaping the Japanese economic doctrine.

One of the main limits of this paper is the lack of information concerning the Japanese economy on a period of time (1955-2011) which could have helped us in realizing a better econometric analysis.

In the first part of this material, in the first place we suggest a synthesis of the factors and theoretic elements that, merged along the years, forged the niponism. From this point of view, we want:

- The explaining of the historical ascent, with the detachment of the doctrinaire elements;
- The highlighting of some Japanese particularities on which was based the Japanese doctrine;
- The highlighting of the penetration into the Japanese territory of: classic liberalism, protectionism, Marxism, Neo-classicism, Keynesianism, monetarism and the influence of Japan upon them.

In the second part, we want to realize a study which would highlight the practical application of this Japanese model, with its specificities. From the two, corroborated, derives the main objective of this paper and that is, the exposure of Japanese economic doctrines' legitimacy.

From a methodological point of view, we tried an approach from three perspectives which intertwined. Here, we refer to the economical, historical and sociological approaches. The economical perspective, the most important and most often met, lays on the other two, using them for a better explanation of the economic advancement.

In what concerns the scientific documentation for the elaboration of this PhD thesis, after the information concerning the resources, data has been picked up, then we passed to the study of documents and, finally, these were used for writing this paper. Unfortunately, the direct documentation at the spot was not possible. This would have required the confrontation of everyday issues we would have found in the Land of the Rising Sun, with a bibliographical research to check practical and effective realities.

There have been used all three types of scientific research:

- Fundamental scientific research. It represented the significant theoretic activity with purpose in cumulating new knowledge regarding the main aspects of the theme of this PhD thesis, following the clarification of the theoretic basis. The purpose of this scientific research was represented by the identification, the obtaining and accumulation of information about the economic doctrine of Japan, providing the data base, the “library”, which opened to us the path to the applied research.
- Applied scientific research. Applied scientific research was used in order to extract the essence concerning the doctrinal part of the Japanese economy, in the theorizing of the Japanese growth model.
- The research for development and innovation. Based on gained knowledge both by fundamental scientific research and applied scientific research, we tried to include several new indicators. First of all, we studied the contribution of the international trade to the Japanese economic growth in the exports period (1975-1985). Second of all, by mathematical regression, we have investigated the explanatory factors of the economic growth over a long period (1952-2011).

Of the methods and techniques of scientific knowledge there will be included in the future paper, the following:

- Induction and Deduction. The inductive method (which starts from ideas, from concrete cases and tries to draw conclusions), was used mainly for the economic doctrine section of this paper, because from ideas (bound up for example with: the Japanese paternalism, life employment system, vertical structures, etc) conclusions related to the doctrine side be drawn. The same research method was used also for the analysis of the post-war period, where, starting from several aspects, principles, we will try to clot the general conclusions.

Regarding the deductive method (which represents the opposite of the inductive method, namely starting from general, general conclusions, and we try to draw particular ideas), this was used especially regarding the analysis, the drawing from the general aspects of the Japanese spirit, which are necessary to explain the Japanese ascent.

It was chosen that both methods of research shall be used for a better accuracy of the results:

- Analysis and Synthesis. This method will be used mainly for analyzing the economy in the period after the Second World War, either when we talk about oil shocks, Endaka (the high yen) or the Great Japanese Crisis;
- The comparison. We consider that the comparison method is one of the most important, from this reason, all over the segments of the post-war period, we compared the Japanese economic results (economic growth, inflation, unemployment) with those of other advanced countries. The economic growth of Japan was a spectacular one because of the fact that the other states registered advances of a weaker amplitude.

We also used: causal and subordination links, as well as interdependence relations, respectively succession or simultaneity relations.


Keywords: niponism, economic doctrine, economy, Japan

## Chapter 1. JAPAN FROM TRADITIONALISM TO MODERNITY

The economic evolution of a nation is closely correlated with the customs, characteristics, shades, values, practices, habits that developed since the emergence of the state. Without a preliminary analysis of these determinant factors, the task of understanding the economic development would be one difficult to achieve.

This chapter aims to make an incursion in the history of the Japanese archipelago, from the emergence of the state (Yamato) from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century until after the First World War, being structured in five subchapters: From Yamato to Edo, The Edo Period- “A peace army” (1603-1868), The Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), The Imperialism of Pre-war Japan, Japan- “the gainer” of the First World War.

Figure1. Japan from traditionalism to modernity



The appearance of the first Japanese state (Yamato), dates from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD, further expanding its influence upon the whole territory, along almost two hundred years. Beginning with the 6<sup>th</sup> century, for increasing its authority, the Yamato clan, with one of the dominant family from the Court (Soga), decided the adoption of Buddhism. This had a special significance because Buddhism brought with it a unifying ideology, and its propagation was similar with the leveraging of the imperial authority. In addition, to this new state was being made an infusion of dignity and civilization by the “Celestial Empire”. The Chinese influence would materialize in a series of aspects, as the Taika reforms or the adoption of a legal system, but also the clothing style, sports, kitchen, writing, poetry, administrative

methods, gardens, architecture, etc. The first Japanese capitals, Nara and Kyoto, were also built after the model of Tang's main city, Chang'an, with only the difference given by the decreased proportion from the prototype.

The "celestial" influence's moose will diminish significantly beginning with 9<sup>th</sup> century, once with the fall of the Tang dynasty, the Japanese people losing their fate that this civilization would be a superior one.

After this period of lull (which began with the second half of the 7<sup>th</sup> century), conflicts appeared. The most important conflict burst toward the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, between the two rival clans Minamoto and Taira, which ended with the victory of the first. This triumph allowed Yorimoto (the head of Minamoto) to impose as a shogun (1192). Thus, Japan became a two-headed country, with the imperial institution which only remained as an ideological power, the effective power being held by the "great general". Through this document, the age of military government was founded and lasted several centuries.

After the failed attempt of the imperial dynasty (through the medium of Go Daigo) to return at charge, the military dictatorship was falling through strategies and cunning treachery in the hands of the Ashikaga family (1338 and 1573). They were more interested in luxurious parties than in a good government of the country, which pushed Japan to the edge, becoming a disunited nation. Thus, given the division and weakness in which Japan was struggling, in 1568, Obu Nobunaga decided the unification of Japan under military domination, a thing that (after fierce fighting) he succeeded in a great part. His work was completed by his successors, Toyotomi Hideyoshu and Tokugawa Ieyasu, who, in 1603, received the shogun title.

After a period that was as bloody as the one afferent to the prior of the Edo period, the emphasis was put on peace, which represented the quintessence of the Tokugawa politics. As a result of this goal, at the beginning of this "era" more prevention measures have been adopted, the most important being: a close surveillance of daimyo and the "seal" of Japan (for over than two centuries).

From an administrative point of view, the state was divided into almost 270 fiefs, led by feudal seniors, called daimyo. For this title it was needed that the owned field to produce more than 10.000 koku of rice, as there was no upper limit.

The Japanese society was represented through a pyramid, having four important steps: bushi (warriors), peasants, craftsman (artisan) and merchants (traders). The society had, at the base, the inheritance of the welfare state, and “the mobility” between classes was difficult to achieve. Thus, the barrier from the first category and the other three was very well bounded.

The shogun, to provide more stability to this system, based it on Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, which urged people to keep the state they had. These trends represented the founding ideology of the new society in the Edo period.

The development of the market economy would destabilize this social order by the fact that merchants started to have more and more prominent wealth. The bold line of division between the bushido class and the others started to lose its intensity. Having no resources, the samurai will adopt the merchant’s children, to offer them a higher status in the society of the last ones, therefore, “the frozen system of classes, pillar of Tokugawa policy, inevitably began <to melt>”.

Outside this endemic crisis in which the system ruled by Bakufu was struggling and under which burden, maybe would have anyway collapsed, two major factors appeared (representing the last strikes given in the period of the shogun): the arrival of commander Perry and the rival strongholds response.

Thereby, in 1867, the Meiji Restoration was taking place, and the Emperor ascend the throne, but due to the fact that he was a minor at that time, the effective power was held by the fiefs who succeeded the dissolution in the period of the shogun, generally speaking by the lower-ranking samurai.

The new rulers had the belief that the axis mundi of their politics (Japan’s independence), can be only obtained with the help of a strong army, and for its creation and support far-reaching reforms were needed; they aimed all the structures of the country: economical, political, social and intellectual.

After an impressive policy of West imitation, the Japanese “will adopt from Great Britain the railways, the navy, the postal service; from Germany, the government, the high-schools, the research, the medicine and the army; from France, the centralized administration, the primary school, the constabulary, arts, the law and the judiciary; from Switzerland, the watches; from Belgium, the Central Bank and from the United States, the banks, the insurances, the stock, the campuses and pedagogies.”

The first major measure was represented by the abolition of feudalism. In 1876, the government decides the closing, once and for all, of pension payments for daimyo and samurai, giving them in exchange rent over several years, paid some in money some in state titles, with an interest ranging from 5 to 7%. The feudal nobility was transformed in the new bourgeoisie. The nobility was not destroyed but recycled.

The new nobility, with the money it received, will establish new banks and will launch in business. The old feudal of the land become the feudal of the capital. Some of them will succeed on the new path, but the great majority, without having knowledge in the business environment, will fail and will head toward bureaucracy, agriculture and handicraft. An important aspect is the spread of the bushido spirit, in all fields. The values of the samurai will dissipate all over Japan, loyalty, sacrifice spirit, piety, will take root, these values being determinant for the Japanese ascent.

The second important measure was represented by the implementation of a land tax. Being a fix payable fee with cash resources and not with cereals, encouraged the farmers to exploit at most the fields, to produce more in order to impair, in relative terms, the burden borne. In addition, the cultivators were forced to sell their crops, thing which had as an effect an accelerated growth of agricultural products trade.

The samurai pension payment created major imbalance in the Japanese archipelago, but as a following of the Matsukata measures, the economy of Japan based on reasonable grounds, creating the proper framework of industrial development.

As private equity hesitated to invest in this new field, the state represented the main pawn establishing several “model” companies. The states investment was scheduled to be a temporary one, having an initiator role for the private capital. The 1880’s were about to bring privatization of these companies.

The defeat of China (1895) and then of Russia (1905) has two significances:

- Represented an impetus toward larger industrial investments, being very satisfied of what they have accomplished;
- Proves the fact that the Japanese industry had already developed, because in its absence these military victories could not have taken place once again.




Short after the end of the Meiji Period (1912), Japan was about to be involved in another conflict. The outburst of the First World War propelled the archipelago in its most prolific period since then, and permitted the suppression of many weaknesses of the Japanese economy. Japan took an advantage of the international conjuncture, of the fact that the Great Powers were in conflict, succeeding in selling to them weapons, but also cheap semi-manufactured products, meanwhile they were purchasing from them affordable technology. In addition, these being busy in Europe, the Japanese people entered the Asian markets (especially India and China), from where they could buy, in exchange for exported textiles, the raw materials that were so important for the archipelago. The international trade simply exploded.

## Chapter 2. JAPANESE PARTICULARITIES

Each nation has its well defined characteristics which crystallized as the years passed and which determines the way of organization, action and thinking that exist within the borders.

Japan's case is not an exception to the rule, on the contrary, here standing out peculiar features only to the Japanese archipelago, of which we will analyze: the existing cultures (of the emperor, of work, and of family and harmony), the grouping of society and paternalism. We consider that outside the historical analysis, a study upon these features would be useful for a better understanding of the model which Japan followed.

**Figure 2. Japanese particularities**



Making an analysis of the Japanese society, one will find three cultures raised at the rank of fundamental laws, these being:

- The cult of the emperor (named Tenno or Mikado). Since ancient times, the Japanese archipelago was based on the cult of this character who was thought to be mystic, sacred, a god down to earth, supreme wisdom, providence, but at the same time an universal sovereign, head of country and family. This divine origin made that, over time, all the energies to spin around him. The population, at any level, builds a religion in the attempt to support his country and sovereign. The whole nation compiles one family who always had the emperor as patriarch. The Japanese society has always been as a bunch of grapes, in which, starting from the emperor, there can be found family connections until the last step on the hierarchical ladder of the society.
- The cult of work. Japan is the country which, without having a benefit from natural resources, succeeded, from a devastated state after the Second World War, to become, in 1968, the third world economy. The human factor managed, over a long period of time, to compensate the natural vicissitudes, the shortage of the land, the initial lack of funds and technology. In this “ant country”, work represents “a self-definition”, so the Japanese is more capable, diligent, tirelessly and allocates as much time as it is necessary to make a product or a service of good quality.
- The cult of family and harmony. Their importance derives just from the fact that they represented corner stones of the foundation of the Japanese society and culture. Their spirit still endures nowadays with almost the same intensity. The family system was considered to be sacred for its members who obeyed the decisions their chief would take. Therefore, individualism was not tolerated in the Japanese society, there existing very severe penalties for those who resisted, hence harmony being very important.

In the Japanese area, harmony was always considered sacred; since the first Constitution one could find texts as: “harmony is invaluable”, “Wa is the most precious thing”, “harmony must be honored and continued”, “each has to accept the decisions of the majority, even if he is sure that he is right”. Another argument that is here to support this sacredness is the name of Yamato that Japan had, meaning “the great harmony”.

Second of all, when we speak about the Japanese culture, an important aspect that comes into our minds is related to their instinctive desire to be part of a group. Without this, the individual means nothing, belonging to it body and soul, as the samurai belonged to the daimyo. Out of the context of all the people to which he belongs, the Japanese is non-existent because he lives for the group, living through it. The identity of each human being is not given by himself, but by the group to which he is affiliated.

In the Japanese archipelago there is no personal ambition, it being seized by the global one, because the Japanese people, once removed from the groups' breast, they become lost atoms. If in the West, thoughts fly mainly towards building a professional carrier, reputations etc, in Japan the groups aim makes the front row; the stimulus comes right from the desire of advancement belonging to the company or society. Everyone's desire is that the group to which they belong to be as wealthier as possible, supporting each other at the tasks they have to meet.

If within the group the Japanese show kindness, warmth, sensitiveness etc, outside the group their behavior changes radically. The more the group is united, stronger, the more it is isolated. A gap difficult to pass is created between the groups and "the others", thereby being formed two sides: "we" and "the rest".

Third of all, an important Japanese particularity refers to the Japanese paternalism. It represents the concept according to which the employers take care of the atmosphere and the interpersonal relationships that exist at the level of the company and the employees' prosperity. They offer in exchange their devotion.

Both employers and employees substantiated their thinking on Confucianism; the paternalism was one represented by a double duty, of the employees who had to work and of the company which had to take care of them, from a material point of view but also from an immaterial one.

So we can talk about a mutual benefit, the employee is practically treated in a "special" way, being offered to him some benefits: the warranty of a working place (through the system of life employment), two bonuses each year that can reach half of the salary, preferential rents and interests, etc, and as reward, the employee made everything he could to help the company.


Therefore, paternalism has as effect to reduce the divergences that exist between the ruling class and the working one, making that their interests converge and help each other. Thus, in this way it comes to the creation of a very strong cohesion of the interests of both parts, if not even to their destinies.

### **Chapter 3. The Economic Doctrine of Niponism**

Niponism is legitimized as an economic doctrine, as well as The German Economic Social Market.

For a good outlining of the economic doctrine of niponism, in this chapter we try an incursion in the Japanese economic thinking beginning with the Tokugawa period, when, the basis upon which this concept was built, were created. We then analyze the Meiji Restoration, a period in which the classic liberalism and protectionism were introduced and influenced by the Japanese culture. We shall then pass at the study of the period between the two World Wars, in which the Japanese economists embraced Marxism and Marginalism, so that finally to stop upon the post-war period.

**Figure 4. The economic doctrine of niponism**



The Tokugawa period is the period in which the economic ideas begin to shift from the political and social ones, the Japanese thinkers responding to the challenges generated by their own economy (in contrast with Kinichira Sukurai's opinion who saw the Japanese people only as apprentices of the western texts and not researchers of the Japanese economy). The subjects that the Japanese authors approached were in a close concordance with the difficulties they met:

- Agriculture- being a society predominantly agricultural, where the standard was represented by the koku of rice, it was obvious that this section will play an important role in the Japanese economic thinking of the period. As the source with which they ensured their living from ancient

times was the ground, it was normal that this would range in the middle of forming the ideas. Thus, the thinkers of the period were trying to find solutions for a more productive agriculture, the key to solving the majority of the economic problems that the Japanese archipelago was facing;

- The price fluctuations- not understanding enough the monetary problems by the authorities conjunct with an increase of the amount of money, generated in Japan severe monetary crisis, with important inflation rates which pushed the economists of the period towards the issuance of some theories;
- The foreign trade- the economists of the archipelago had to give answers in favor or against the opening trade; if this would be beneficial or not for the Japanese economy, and if so, in what conditions. The arrival of Commander Perry on Japanese field would have to give much more meaning to this subject.
- The trade development or the social order (or the stability of the system) - in a type of Japanese society during the period of the shogun, based on Confucianism, order and hierarchy had to be well delimited and strictly respected. A significant development of trade would have enriched the merchants and shaken the social order.

If in the period of the shogun the main purpose of niponism was played through the phrase “the art of governing and welfare of the people”, the trade openness obligation defiled their supreme value (honor). In the new circumstances, the endless desire of the Japanese people was heading towards catching up the westerns and overcoming them. Thus, the new purpose of niponism became in the Meiji period “to make a powerful army and a powerful country” (fukoku kyohei).

For achieving this new goal, an engrossment was tried of as much new elements from West as possible, for overcoming them. Once with the opening of Japan’s borders, a massive import of technologies and ideas was realized. Among them are included the west economic thinking, the economic doctrines, that (adapted to the Japanese spirit) represented the foundation of the niponism and here we remember: the classic and neo-classic Liberalism (especially the one represented by Gossen, Jevons and Walras), Protectionism (of German inspiration), and Socialism.

The Meiji Restoration covers two important stages in the coagulation of the economic doctrine of niponism, and these are:

- Up to 1890- the import of ideas- stage represented by the translation of the major works with economic content which existed up to that time;
- After 1890- the influence of Japan upon them- stage in which they had to be melted in the Japanese boiler, therefore forming their own doctrine.

The import of western economic ideas had two sources for the Japanese archipelago: the first was represented by the invitation, respectively the employment of foreign experts in Japan, and the second took the shape of the Japanese people who received an important amount of money to study outside the borders and return with the new ideas from the West.

The next step was represented by the translation of the western economic papers important for their period, both those which were found in the West but also those from the Japanese area. Therefore, in 1876, the translation of the work entitled *Essay on the Principles of Population* written by Malthus, in 1882 *Money and Mechanism of exchange* written by Jevons, in 1884 *Wealth of Nations* written by Smith, in 1886 *The Principles of Political Economy* written by J.S.Mill, and in 1889 *National System of Political Economy* written by List.

As Eijiro Honjo was showing, quoted by Florea Tuiu, between 1867 and 1890 were translated and brought 274 papers of economic theory. Until the 1890's only a gross import of economic ideas was realized, but it was then when the Japanese culture started to influence them.

The synthesis made by the Japanese people was supplied by three great thinkers: Adam Smith (laissez-faire), Friedrich List (the Protectionism) and further by Karl Marx (the Socialism), these "stars of the Classicism", around which also existed other constellations which derived from the first. In the Meiji period, the first two doctrines appeared and the establishment of the Japanese Academic Society of Social Politics took place, which represented a bridge towards the propagation of Marxism, developed in the interwar period with Marginalism. The confrontation between these two last doctrines occupied the foreground of the Japanese economic stage in the interwar period, when the Marginalists were trying to withstand the Marxists, whose number increased exponential.

Once with the accelerated industrial growth after the Second World War, capitalism was gaining important field before socialism, because seeing its results, the population became more confident in its power. In addition, once with the entering in the American sphere of influence, the Japanese economists

inspired from the neighbors across the ocean, starting from now. If in the pre-war period the influences came from the Old Continent, beginning from now the young non-Marxism economists followed the path of American schools.

In the period of spectacular growth registered in the Japanese archipelago, the economists weren't satisfied only to be some analysts, being some visionaries who influenced the government's growth policies.

In the post-war period, upon the Niponism doctrine developed several orientations:

- **Makurei School (of the high level of economic growth).** Once with the important advance registered by the Japanese economy, these rhythms of growth had to be explained but also answers had to be found for maintaining them as long as possible. The analysis of this period were especially based on econometrie, field in which Japan would excel at a world level in economic thinking;
- **The Theory of Technocracy.** The technocrats were and are prominent actors of economic life, being the craftsmen of directions towards which they headed. From this point of view, their selection is extremely strict creating elite of almost 500 persons at national level. Contrary to what is happening in other societies, the Japanese technocrats have the guarantee of a job, no matter what govern shall come or the party which would win the elections. Thus, they will not be tented to accumulate as much as possible for them because in a short while their replacement might be prepared, and being relieved of this care, they will be able to channel their energies towards drawing and achieving goals. The politicians get involved very little or at all in the clerk's tasks offering to them complete freedom in exercising their powers as they consider proper for the country;
- **The Theory of the central management, of the co-prosperity (of planning on capitalist bases).** In Japan, the State is not perceived as an organ meant to disturb the entrepreneur, developing a cooperation relation, having as purpose the achievement of national objectives that are assimilated also by the entrepreneurs. Through its interventions, the government has the role to ensure a favorable climate for the companies with private fund, for them to be able to perform their activity in a favorable environment and to offer general guidelines towards the way forward.

- **The Theory of Information Society.** Once with the appearance of new information and communication technologies, this theory also made room, Japan being the first country which established a strategy in consequence. Due to this, the use of computers simply exploded from 1.455 pieces in 1965 to 184.678 two centuries later, and the number of industrial robots was over two times bigger as the sum of the existing ones in the other advanced states at that time.
- **The Theory of Japanese paternalism** (debated earlier).

The Japanese society is “deeply rooted in traditional and each import from the West is first painted and polished with the spirit of the Japanese people, to have the same color and smell, to match their specific sensations”. Thus, at niponizing subject also the economic ideas that penetrate Japan, “capitalism, planning, protectionism, catching a new contour being adapted to fit to the Japanese realities, taking also the shapes and colors of the Japanese society”.

Hence, the economic doctrine of niponism having as main purpose “the art of governing and the welfare of the people” was formed and developed in time, in several stages, of which, two are fundamental: the stage of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) and the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912). These were followed by other two stages of delineation of this doctrine, namely: the inter-war period and the one after the Second World War.

The Shinto philosophy (The way of the spirits) which has as characteristics: the love for the country, the veneration of nature, of the emperor, honoring the gods, respecting the family values, where personal honor represents the supreme value, Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism (with similar values) grafted and a philosophy of life specific Japanese was created and within it a central economic doctrine on agriculture, close to the European Physiocrats, but developing elements peculiar Japanese: long work, moderation, maximum savings, the acceptance of hierarchy and authority, the awareness of group power, the perfect ambition, the care for the good of the humbles.

Pure Liberalism was and is perceived in the Japanese area as bearing negative connotations, representing a system disorder and an internal erosion, a threat from the outside concerning the way of life, an open gate for a colonization attempt of the weak persons by the powerful ones, a moral decadence, a social chaos.



Protectionism fits as a glove to a country where the accent is put on the nation and not on individualities, nationalism is a religion, where a strong hierarchy exists, and the “advices” that come from above are immediately accepted without denial, where any or sacrifice made for the emperor or society represents a great honor for the citizen. Nevertheless, long-term goals are outlined, the Japanese being prepared to make present sacrifices for future welfare.

In a society in which community prevail the individual, the socialist aspects carved their way. Thus, an important aspect is related to the fact that Marxism entered in Japan as a labor movement, due to the rough conditions that were imposed to the proletariat class, following that only after a generation it would enter the academic environment.

Regarding the Neo-classic thinking, the Japanese tried and developed their own marginal thinking in the same manner as the Lausanne School (of quantitative nature) and not in the manner of the School in Vienna (of psychological nature).

The path chosen by Japan wasn't represented by the USSR model, where a socialist planning existed, and not by the Anglo-Saxon liberal model, following a golden mean in which made its way a rational planning having capitalist basis. Therefore, this Japanese capitalism opposes to the Anglo-Saxon one that could not be assimilated in the archipelago, the western concept, having as starting point the isolated individual, could not take roots in a “ground” as the Japanese one, where the group, the harmony and the consensus prevail. Here, individualism has a pejorative connotation, laurels belonging to the group, not to a singular person, for not destabilizing the harmony. Consequently, each member of the group has to meet his role as good as possible and not making himself distinguishable, not to arouse adverse reactions from colleagues and not to affect the so important Wa.

The economic doctrine that we find in Japan could be called the capitalism of the latecomer, development, capitalism in development, capitalism of latter reaching, planning on liberal structures, controlled capitalism, organized liberalism, planned liberalism, contemporary feudalism, organized capitalism or we can simply say **niponism**. This is compound, as we previous showed, from the immixing in the peculiar Japanese melting pot of several doctrines influenced by the Japanese culture: Classicism, but especially Neo-classicism, Keynesism and Neo-keynesism, Protectionism and Socialism, succeeding a symbiotic combination of free market with the elements of capitalist

planning, a State-market complementarity. It's true that the remembered theories were established in the West, but they were impregnated with elements of originality by implanting a Japanese graft in a Japanese specific soil (formed along the years), where they took roots, risen and astonished the world with their fecundity. Thus, Niponism represents the result of the fusion between the Western economic thinking and the Japanese millennial system.

## **Chapter 4. THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF JAPAN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY**

After the finishing of the Second World War, the end of the '40s was bringing the invention of the concept of "Cold War", which referred at the ideological separation and, implicitly economical, between the Western liberal democracies ("open societies") and the totalitarian communist regimes ("closed societies"). The world was divided into two sides: The Chinese communists (led by Mao) were preparing for the expulsion of Chian Kai, and in Taiwan, Korea was already divided in two, Germany was following the same pattern, and Eastern Europe was falling under the communist wand.

This aspect, and the fear of a confrontation with USSR, determined the Americans to wish to transform Japan in a stronghold of "opened societies", trying to put the Japanese archipelago in the window of liberal and capitalist democracy. For succeeding this thing, statements weren't enough, being also necessary to give an economic power, which at that time was missing completely of a Japanese archipelago shaken to foundation from the Second World War. Therefore, immediately measures were taken, for example:

- A delay of war compensations, which eventually were transferred to certain Asian nations consisting of materials, equipments, certificates etc, but their consideration was an insignificant one;
- A significant American financial help (in quantum of 2 billion dollars- during the occupation period);
- Giving up seized machinery and equipment of zaibatsu type to some small enterprises which would not have been able to buy themselves;
- Giving up the complete eradication of these types of enterprises because they were conscious of their power and efficiency in Japan;
- Social advisers established in the Japanese archipelago.

The after-war Japanese strategy was based on a catch-up system through the medium of the teacher-pupil relationships. Japan's great advantage was, once more, the fact that, by trying to recover the advance of other powers, could have taken a profit from their experience; only had to select and adopt, carefully, the economic policies that fitted the most.


The fresh development model followed by Japan in this period ("the flight of wild geese") was created by Kaname Akamatsu, and its synthesis can be resumed as follows:

"Imports- domestic production- exports (products and further assets) (IDE)"

As one could observe the model is composed from four stages:

- Imports and the production of poor technology (the recover);
- Replace imports with own products (consolidation);
- The conquest of foreign markets (exports);
- The fund exports (production outside the borders).

**Figure 4. The economic evolution of Japan in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century**



Phase1: (1946-1955) - imports (the recover). This period was one in which the domestic demands were very weak, the population having a lot to suffer following the Second World War, resuming its acquisitions at the products that were strictly necessary. The Japanese production capacity was still directed towards war material; therefore, the great majority of the products were imported.

The most important aspect was the technology import, for which Japan invested in this period all the resources it had (the American help of over 2 billion dollars, plus the incomes collected during the Korean War with receivables of over 3.5 billion dollars).

Phase2: (1955-1975) – the consolidation (the production for the domestic market). Once with the increase of life level, a middle class was arising, and once with it, the domestic demand was following an upward trend. In this period the demand of motor vehicles explodes, followed of course by the offer. For example, if in 1960 there were produced 500.000, in 1967 its number increased to 2.5 million for in 1970, 5 million would leave the fabric gates.

In this period, precisely in 1960, a plan to double the income along 10 years was approved, that not only fulfilled, but was also brought forward, the results being achieved in only 7 years.

Due to this, Japan held, beginning from 1968, the third position in the world economy, respectively the second position in the capitalist area. After only five years, would hit an obstacle very difficult to pass, represented by the first oil shock that shook the ground of the Japanese archipelago's development.

Also in this period a pronounced protectionism applied, because a small number of enterprises had to be sustained to develop on the national market, and when they managed to hold enough power, they began the assault on foreign markets.

Phase3: (1975-1985) - the export. The Japanese market was approaching saturation and as a consequence of the first oil shock, the imports bill increased exponentially. In these conditions, the only solution was to escalate the foreign markets, to succeed the balancing of the trade balance. Sales abroad rose exponentially; the Japanese impetus was not able to be stopped by their trading partners whose deficits deepen (the one of the United States with Japan overcame 50 billion dollars in 1985).

Even if they were totally against the liberal policy with which Reagan came to power, because of the Japanese dependence for raw materials of other developed capitalist countries, the Japanese people were forced to “self-limit” their exports. In addition, to be less competitive internationally, it was imposed to them the appreciation of the yen reported to the dollar, but also to the other currencies of the great powers. As a result of these new coordinates, Japan entered a new stage: the stage of the capital export and the production outside the borders.

Phase4: (1985-2011) – the production abroad; the capital export. Once with the yen appreciation, Japan was loosing at the competitiveness chapter, but the currency could have been more obtained internationally. Thus it was decided, the maintenance of industries with a significant added value, the others being relocated in other countries. Afterwards, the issued capital was reinvested in the selected industries, for them to remain in the Japanese area.


In the new conditions, to succeed to continue the growing, Japan needed a new development paradigm also internally; the decision taken in this perspective was represented by the increasing of domestic demand.

After a period in which Japan gave the impression that it will acquire worldwide, once with the increasing of interest rate, the Japanese archipelago was entering in a profound crisis, in which it would struggle until now, without succeeding to exit out of the woods.

## Chapter 5. AT THE ORIGIN OF ASCENSION

We consider that the fulminate ascent of the Japanese economy in the post-war period deserves an analysis of the factors it was based. This remarkable success, with a growth between 1950 and 1973 of 10% annually, the way of overcoming oil shocks, Endaka, etc forces us to reserve a chapter to the elements which were at the origins of the post-war ascent.

**Figure 5. At the origins of post-war ascent**



As we can see in picture 6, firstly, outside the causes that we already talked about previously, we intend to analyze also:

- **The agrarian reform.** Following the implementation of the agrarian reform, the acreage of the owners reached in 1955 to 91% (from 58% in 1946). Therefore, the last feudal remnant was eradicated, democracy could gain contour, and from an economic point of view the premises to improve agricultural productivity were created, offering the workforce that was necessary for the other fields;
- **The dual system.** Duality as a reminiscent of the Japanese tradition we find it transposed also in economy, where the great holdings with many small and medium companies coexist. The combination of these types of companies represents an impetus for the development of Japan, because permitted the big companies to benefit from the cheap workforce and from an advanced technology. This combination made that the Japanese products to be competitive abroad and to play an important role concerning the exports;
- **The monopolistic companies.** Concerns economic and financial holdings that include an important number of enterprises from different fields. These depict the mainstay in the evolution of Japanese capitalism, the driving force of Japan's economy development. In the purest Confucianism spirit, all the other companies put themselves in their job that together would succeed to make all the Japanese people proud. Their desire was successful, because in 1995, among the largest companies worldwide after incomes, from the first six ranks, five were from the Japanese archipelago;
- **A significant dose of protectionism.** The Japanese archipelago embraced this doctrine with all certitude to support its domestic industries. For this, a lot of measures were taken, that would make Lessourd and Gerard state that: "Japan imposed protectionism more than other power in the free era", Saburo Okita stated that protectionism "would be in the Japanese islands, the best protected in the world" and Vogel said that "trade policy of Japan was the most protectionist in the world".
- **The significant rates of saving.** The Japanese saving rate was throughout the analyzed period superior to other developed countries, because of the many factors found in the Japanese space. These firstly permitted a steady pace of investments, for example the expenditure with acquisition of capital goods, which permitted a refurbishment from the base of Japan. Therefore,

the obtained work productivity was superior to the other advanced countries, being an important comparative advantage.

Second of all, they were a cause of the huge surpluses registered in the United States, because saving in significant amounts, the consumption diminishes, and the big investments generate an important production.

After the accentuation of these factors, we wish, through a quantitative study, to show the contribution of the Japanese trade exchange in the formation of national income, in the period of exports 1976-1985, being given the Japanese quasi-dependency of raw materials.

The second study, an econometrical one this time, is reserved to an analysis that aims to identify through a multiple linear model the factors that explain the economic growth of Japan. The sample data contains the annual values of the real GDP, of consumption, of the nominal technology import and of the barrel price in the period 1955-2011.

## **6. CONCLUSIONS**

The impressive economic advance registered by Japan stunned and still does the economists and also the persons who are strangers in this domain. A country with over six million returnees, with thirteen million unemployed, with a surface reduced with 678.000 square kilometers remaining with only 370.000 square kilometers, with a money supply which doubled in less than ten months, with the food level situated under the half of the one registered in 1935, with the industrial capacity destroyed in proportion of 60% from the level registered before the war, with big cities ruined in proportion of over 50%, houses over 25%, refineries over 75%, maritime fleet over 90%, steelworks over 15%, with a rice cultivated area reduced 30%, etc, succeeded the great performance that, at the end of the war, to occupy the second economy of the capitalist world and the third at the world level (after only two decades). This period is called “the Japanese economic miracle”.

We also want to emphasis the dynamic adaptive efficiency which was proved by the Japanese archipelago, mainly, after the first oil shock, when the Japanese industry was almost dissolved and rebuilt from scratch, continuing its growth, bigger than the one of the other developed countries.

Being totally dependent by the import of raw materials, the increase of oil barrel price would throw Japan in another era (of the exports). Following a well thought out and well put into practice strategy, the Asian country offered an important lesson to all the world powers, which weren't capable to cope with it, recording a surplus of over 80 billion dollars in 1986, fact that scared the western world.

Following the appreciation of the yen, the Japanese archipelago succeeded an important growth also in these conditions, reaching the performance that, after in the 1970's when the international bank rankings had no place for a Japanese institution, after only a decade, the first 8 in 10 banks at the world level to be from this territory.

Unfortunately, as a paradox, the success of the bank system led even to its impairment, because enterprises got richer, were accumulating backlogs and became increasingly less dependent on bank credits. Once with the liberalization in the second half of the 1980's, more and more enterprises were borrowing from the stock markets, which made them not to answer any more to the government "suggestions". Therefore, the Japanese philosophy itself was toothless, being infected with the financial markets and speculation of all kinds virus. This aspect would cost the Japanese very much. To the crash stock in 1989 has succeeded the steep decline of the real estate prices (1990-1992), the recession (1991-1993), an insignificant increase, stagnation, then another financial and fiscal crisis (1997), and then again recession (1998-1999). Japan was in strings due to this stagnation and could not overcome this situation. It was for the first time in the period after the Second World War when she was facing a problem like this and was not able to find a solution.

To explain the Japanese model that led toward such achievements (a fulminating growth a long period of time), we consider that we have to descend on the time axis. Therefore, we count the influence of the Edo period as one being very significant, at the most important decision we consider to be the one related to the isolation of the country for over two centuries. This had, on the one side benefits, Japan succeeding to keep its sovereignty, in comparison with other states situated in the South-East Asia, also contributing to the foundation and "reinforcement" of the Japanese unit, at the assimilation of the foreign influences absorbed before; and one less positive concerning the fact that the country was deprived of the Western material civilization development for a long period, accumulating a significant retard from this point of view. This would be recovered in the Meiji period.



We consider the Meiji “era” to be a very important inflection point in the history of Japan. But we wish to highlight a difference in perception, and that is: if we watch “the modernization” only as “westernization” along with what derives from it, then it is true that it appears only with The Meiji Restoration, when with the help of external influences, the state begins to lay the foundations of a capitalist economy. But, watching overall, one could determine that the Tokugawa era was the support pole of the rising of Meiji period, creating necessary conditions for it.

Regarding the factors that come to sustain the above mentioned, we also wish to mention others: the trends progress of a national market economy, the unit and bureaucratization of society, the conurbations (without rival in Europe) with the roads between them, the accumulation of cash resources, the emerging and growing credit, the emergence of wage labor, of cartography, of medicine, of astronomy, the development of Confucianism, the high rate of literacy, the strict control over the population, the development of artifacts and textiles industry, sprouting shipbuilding and gunboats.

We believe that is interesting to note the fact that through the manifestation of the Meiji revolution from the top of the pyramid and not from its base, from up to the top and not vice-versa, were put on the table a premiere and a contradiction: without challenging the state support in Germany and France, Japan was the first country where Capitalism occurred as a result of the manifestations of the public initiative and not the private one; the paradox consists of the fact that, on the new chosen way, feudalism had to be abolished and this thing even represented the work of the former feudal, the samurais suppressing the social distinction and the advantages their comrades had.

After a very short period from the end of the glorious Meiji “era”, the international context pushed Japan toward a new event which would represent an important impetus of the Japanese advance, becoming the main winner of the First World War (with the United States). After taking part at several military actions, at the end of the conflict, the archipelago was extending its influence in Shandong, an important territory from a strategically point of view, in the Germanic island in Pacific, from the North of the Equator, it had a place in the Permanent Council of the League of Nations in Geneva, was roofing their trade deficit of the last two decades and ended their industrial revolution.

At a retrospective analysis realized at the end of the first World Conflagration, one could observe that in almost half of century, Japan has forged the bridge which made a cross over from the situation of autarky to a significant social openness, similar to the one of the great western powers, from the

emergence of manufactures to the completion of the industrial revolution, and from the status of debtors to the one of net creditor. This period is called in literature “the first Japanese miracle”.

All these were possible, especially, due to Japanese particularities. A thing that was always peculiar to the Japanese people, no matter the time, was their obedience to the master (with the existence of the protector-client relations, the ability to seize the new, the total devotion that they are capable, etc.). The Japanese society has always been as a bunch of grapes, in which, starting from the emperor, such connections would be found until the last step on the hierarchical ladder of society. The population, at any level, will make a religion from trying to support its country and emperor.

Due to life employment system and to hard work, the Japanese have no time left for socializing outside the company, the working group kidnapping the great majority of time, being as a second family to them. These cases show a big Japanese difference toward the western world: while in the West the employee is firstly considered to be part of his social class, in the archipelago is considered to be part of the company. If the western employee is considered a person who sells his workforce to the company, his hiring representing something transient, in Japan these are perceived as integrated parts of the enterprise (insiders). If in the West one could find “a workplace”, in the archipelago he “enters in a company”.

Paternalism pushes the employer to take care of his employees from a metrial point of view but also from a spiritual one. Thus, besides being treated with respect, they are consider to be important (for example: their proposals are taken into discussion), a series of financial advantages is offered to them: bonuses, apartments for sale well below the market price, preferential rents, etc. In return for this concern manifested for employees, they will show a body and soul loyalty, will be willing to make any sacrifice for the protective company (as the samurais of the Tokugawa period). Thus being created emotional, affective, sentimental relations, alike those in the feudal period which gave force and substance to the group.

We want to note that, besides the fact that they feel protected and favored, the Japanese have instinctively developed group membership, making them to offer the loyalty they are capable of. The employees life is dedicated to the enterprise, thus even at the end of the week when meetings are organized (at the presence isn't compulsory) everybody attends. For them is very important to show their devotion, loyalty because it is the most appreciated aspect in a company. Often they work overtime

without thinking at the payment of additional hours, and the company as reward, when achieves its goals, distributes substantial bonuses.

An important role was also represented by the Japanese particularities spread within the company. In Japan, the company negotiates directly with the employees, the trade unions being structured on enterprises and not on guilds. We deal with the trade union of the X or Y Company, which included employees belonging to all hierarchies, and not to a trade union of welders which would represent them in all companies. This was a beneficial situation, because in the period when the company records performances, it has the possibility to offer bonuses and greater privileges, and in the case when the company is passing through certain economic “disorders”, their value diminishes, without appeals, because everybody knows the financial state of the company. A bargaining at a branch level could have created problems to a company that was in a difficult state at the time given, when it could even reach bankruptcy and the dismissal of employees (by creating payments above the existing possibilities).

Due to the life employment system, the selection of the new recruits was a very important process; not being able to be fired they had to be very attentively chosen from the start. Being a group society, the persons with the biggest adaptability and teamwork capacities were selected. At the other pole the individualistic qualities were situated, which weren't appreciated, furthermore were considered weak points that could unsteady the so important harmony. At framing, they will be placed at the base of the pyramid, thus eliminating the differences that could unsteady the group unit. In addition, they are subordinated to a mentor who will take care of them on their entire carrier, who will be as a parent.

The promotion was made according to the seniority and studies, this system being preferred detrimental to the one based on merits which is more subjective. Their interpretation could create dissension, which is why tangible things are preferred. So the promotion criteria are clear from the beginning for all employees, who instead of striving to advance can dedicate their time to cooperation and teamwork.

An important element is considered the consensus, being followed in every Japanese activity; therefore, within the companies there functions a system through which anyone can suggest the improvement of business processes; these are debated and after they reach a consensus are quickly put into practice. An important thing is the fact that once they found themselves in minority, the ones who didn't totally agree immediately ally to the camp that made the proposal. Therefore, the time lost during the decision

making process is won during the implementation and this because, after the talks, all the employees know and learn the new decision.

The international context had its role in the Japanese ascent, for example, Japan took an advantage from the world division between the two ideological currents: opened society and closed society. As Eastern Europe was already captured by a totalitarian regime, Germany and Korea were divided into two, and the non-communists were expelled from China, the United States had to have in Japan a based ally in defending democracy. Therefore, the Japanese archipelago was intensively supported to succeed in this direction.

The only non-European country who knew the industrial revolution before 20<sup>th</sup> century, Japan, had the great advantage of using Western technology and Asian workforce. Nowhere else in the world didn't existed at that time this combination. In the other Eastern countries the workforce was cheap, but the advanced technology was missing, while the Western states were benefiting of it, but wages were a major expense.

Due to an empirical study we made, we noticed, in the first place, that a 1% variation of the consumption will determine in average, a variation of 0.3798% of the economic growth, the other factors presuming to be constant, and a variation of 1% of the technology import will determine in average, a variation of 0.0738% of the economic growth, the other factors presuming to be constant. Therefore, 47.36% of the economic growth was caused between 1955 and 2011 by the domestic consumption and technological imports. The rest of over 50% was due to other analyzed factors (unfortunately, it was not possible to find them for so long and so we could not put them in our regression).

We then realized and analysis of the international trade multiplier in the period of the Japanese exports (1975-1985), to establish if commercial trades had a positive influence upon the national income. The conclusion we could draw following the study was that the income increased over the analyzed period, excepting the period marked by the second oil shock.

The economic doctrine of Niponism with the main aim “the art of governing and the welfare of the people” united along the years in several stages, the most important being the period of the shogunate (1603-1868), and the one of the Meiji “era” (1868-1912). These were followed by another two stages of

delineation of this doctrine: the inter-war period and the one after the Second World War. In the Tokugawa period, over the Shinto values (love for the country, worship of nature, of the emperor, honoring the gods, respecting the family values, where personal honor is the supreme quality) overlapped the ones of Confucianism and Buddhism (resembling the first), a Japanese life philosophy united and within it an economic doctrine having as foundation the agriculture. In addition to the issues resembling the European Physiocrats, in the Japanese archipelago are also found a series of Japanese factors: moderation, saving, acceptance of hierarchy and authority, long work, realizing the power of the group, harmony, perfect ambition, consensus.

A very important aspect in the outlining of the Japanese model is given by the fact that the Japanese spirit is created so it can not accept the new elements in their raw form. He mixes them, distilled, refines, following then a difficult process and at the end it absorbs only what he needs, and the rest is thrown away. Everything that reaches the archipelago suffers a process of niponization, nothing remains under natural form, and everything is transformed, adapted, for the “Japanese organism” to be able to assimilate. The new is “acclimatized”, metamorphosed, processed, its form, aspect and content is changed to fit the Japanese requests.

The same thing also happened to the economic ideas, which immediately after they got into the Japanese archipelago in the Meiji period were niponized. They only kept what was strictly fitting the Japanese spirit, the rest of the doctrine’s components being left behind. These could not simply be taken and implanted into the Japanese territory, because here were traditions and customs thousand years old. Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon Liberalism could not be accepted in a Confucian state. The chosen solution was the one of a state-market complementarity.

Through government intervention, it was “suggested” to the companies some limits (which were not imposed), and the state took its protecting umbrella from the ones that didn’t fit these brandings, which for example, produced other things than wanted; important to note that in the margin were given freedom of speech and were only economic constrains.

Contradicting Ludwig von Mises who stated that “the problem is always the same: the government or the market, other solution doesn’t exist”, a mixed policy has been applied with an unprecedented symbiosis between the two poles: the bureaucratic one and the business environment, the key consists in

the success of the two groups to reach a consensus. Thus, Japan is able to combine the advantages of free markets with the benefits of interventionism.

We wish to end this paper by answering two questions:

- Is this model a virtuous one?
- Can this Japanese model be copied entirely?

Concerning the first question, we consider that the tree is judged by its fruits, and the difference between a good and a bad political system is given by the results it had. Therefore, due to the unprecedented success that Japan had during four decades in the post-war period, we are entitled to consider the Japanese system as a remarkable one. The crisis that occurred in the early '90s was rather a departure from the principles set by this model, to which also the Americans competed to pressure the yen's rise.

Concerning the second question, we consider that the answer is a negative one because without the specific conditions: cultural, traditionalists and sociological factors that existed in the Japanese archipelago, this doctrine can not take shape. It is designed for Japan, adapted to the Japanese conditions and customs, here referring to groupism, paternalism, exacerbated nationalism, feudal inheritance, Japan's insularity, the three cultures (the emperor, the work and the family), and the combination between Shinto beliefs, Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. But even if this Japanese model can not totally be copied, it surely can be a solution source for other states, solutions that have to be adapted to their own needs. The fact that certain states, geographical close to the Japanese archipelago and with similar conditions (for example "The Asian Tigers") adapted this model to resist them, reaching with their help impressive growth rates, exactly as Japan after the Second World War, certifies once again Niponism as an economic doctrine.

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