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The Temporality of Fundamental Ontology and the Horizon of Being

Hypothesis/Hypotheses of Heidegger's Dual Temporality

Abstract

Keywords: Heidegger, question of being, temporality, ecstatic-horizontal temporality, temporality of the horizon of being, problem of reality, truth and temporality, ec-sistence and Dasein, clearing, phenomenological-ontological radicalisation, complex phenomenality

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The paper is divided into eight chapters, an introductory and a conclusion, forming in fact ten thematic units.

The *Introduction* puts forth mainly issues regarding the subjects covered, research- and analytical methodology, and bibliography, presented from the perspective of the research hypotheses.

The main research hypothesis formulated in the introduction is based on the assumption that the ecstatic-horizontal temporality discussed by existential analytics does not exhaust the Heideggerian meaning of the phenomenon of temporality, inasmuch as the concept of *Dasein* itself, in my understanding, covers an aspect of time (or, indeed, an aspect of *being-time*) which differs from the ecstatic-horizontal temporality interpreted in a fundamental ontological horizon. Accordingly, the fundamental hypothesis of the dissertation is based on the Heideggerian idea of *dual temporality*. This idea implies a clear difference in the horizon of meaning between the aspect of time contained in the concept of *Dasein* and the temporality of human existence, marked by this expression, understood as an ecstatic-horizontal projection. In relation to this, it can be assumed that, with reference to the question of being which is a fundamental subject of Heidegger's thinking, the two kinds of temporalities do not fulfil the same hermeneutical function and do not have the same ontological status. In my opinion, it is the abovementioned „*Dasein*-temporality” which is more significant with reference to the question of being. Elements of this are also present in *Being and Time* – albeit essentially subordinated to the perspective of fundamental ontology – but they are actually elaborated and articulated with regard to the question of being in the meaning horizon of subsequent thematizations, primarily in the semantic field of *the truth of being* and the phenomenological-ontological concept of the *clearing*.

These considerations also guide the subject of the introduction towards the problem of Heidegger's turn as a thinker, for in my opinion the „being-time” aspect of the *Dasein* is essentially present in the thematisations published after the *Being and Time*, in the particular concepts and horizon of interpretation they are embedded into. In this regard, *one* aspect of the temporality of the *Dasein* points beyond fundamental ontology, and lives on in the thematisations following the period of fundamental ontology.

The first two actual thematic chapters of the thesis propose an interpretation of temporality understood as an „ecstatic-horizontal” phenomenality discussed by existential analytics, as

suggested also by the title of these chapters: *Temporality in a fundamental ontological approach. Temporality as the constituent of situatedness-in-being; and Temporality in a fundamental ontological approach. Ecstaticity and horizontality*. In accordance, the basic aim of the chapters is an analytical tackling of the meaning of temporality and the mapping of all related units of meaning to the degree that it insures an authentic insight. This does not mean of course that I should have had to give up the selection of pertinent thematic units; therefore I only analysed some of Heidegger's key concepts deemed representative for my intentions, such as *understanding, state-of-mind, falling, discourse*, as well as the categories of *anticipatory resoluteness* and *hereditary sinful being* in the first chapter. In connection with these, the second chapter also discusses the interpretation of the Heideggerian meaning of the ecstatic and horizontal aspects of the *Dasein*-like temporal being, as well as the interpretation of the time concept that Heidegger calls „vulgar” or “lay”. It does so mainly with the aim to show that in Heidegger's interpretation the latter covers up the actual phenomenon of temporality in the form and at the cost of the structural levelling, objectivation and endlessness of the „hereditary”, ecstatic-horizontal temporality, understood as a specific modality of the *Dasein*'s situatedness-in-being.

The relatively detailed and minute temporality analysis presented in this chapter is actually meant to ground the consideration that temporality in a fundamental ontological approach is a specific modality of man's situatedness-in-being, a phenomenon interpreted as the aspects of man's selfness and finiteness, a specific „selfness movement” of a two-sided finite human existence, which, as such, is a kind of *inner* temporality, mostly characteristic for human existence. (Seen from this perspective, the existentialist interpretation of *Being and Time* does not seem completely unfounded.) Accordingly, this temporality is less relevant with reference to the question of being, that is, it is not the „horizon of being” kind of temporality which Heidegger actually thematises in the starting point and concluding remarks of his existential analytics. In this sense, the horizons of the sequential units of the ecstatic-horizontal temporality discussed by fundamental ontology open up to each other, and not to being, the „ecstasy” of the temporality is not directed towards being. The *Summary, partial conclusions* part of this chapter puts forth this message in such a way that, following the analyses which have somewhat diverted from the subject of the thesis, it returns to the issue of dual temporality based on the fundamental ontological meanings of the concept of the present, and the problem of the Heideggerian turn.

The third chapter (*The structural analysis of the question of being and the concept of Dasein*) offers a structural analysis of the question of being, focusing on the essential connection between the hereditary being-time relation implied in the category of the *Dasein* and its genesis-dimension rooted in the hermeneutical horizon of the question of being. The main point of the chapter is that the original/primary level of meaning of the semantic field of the *Dasein* is born in the hermeneutic range of the question of being, consequently the Heideggerian concept of temporality primarily has a meaning which is directly connected to the question of being. This issue is relevant for the thesis of the dual temporality only insofar as existential analytics, in my opinion, does not actually refer to this kind of temporality. This is so because Heidegger, once he had identified the *Dasein* as a being distinguished as to the question of being, that possesses a hermeneutical function of *the horizon of being*, left the interpretation of temporality related to the question of being, and went on to analyse the *inner* temporality aspects of the *Dasein*. This is the reason why existential analytics primarily and mostly offers the phenomenological description of the temporal manifestations of the specific modalities of man's situatedness-in-being, distancing itself from the horizon of the question of being raised in the introductory consideration of the major work of fundamental ontology. The examination of this semantic dimension in the chapter happens in relation to the specific inner hermeneutical dimension of the question of being, with reference to the fundamental hermeneutical difference between a circular logic and a onesided back-and-forth movement with regard to the structural elements of the question of being, also touching upon aspects of the logic of interpretation.

The fourth chapter of the work is entitled *The questions of the relation subject-object as well as external world and reality*, in reference to the fact that *one* of the aspects of the being-time relation of the semantic field of the category of *Dasein*, and with it the temporality of the *Dasein*, an aspect that I consider to be of a *being-horizon* character, also proves meaningful with relation to the classic dichotomies of philosophical tradition. The guiding perspective of the analysis is the emphasis on Heidegger's approach to the problem of reality, radically different from the traditional one. His approach is based on the ontological position of *Dasein's* particular situatedness-in-being, from where reality as the external world appears as a correlative constituent of *being-in-the-world*, while from the perspective of this *complex phenomenality* the abovementioned dichotomies that generate the traditionally aporetic hermeneutical situation lose their ontological stake and relevance. In this context, the chapter refers to a specific feature of the fundamental ontological treatment of philosophical problems

in general, namely that the first step of the analysis of any philosophical problem is the clarification of the ontological situation of the *Dasein* that poses or formulates that problem, a fundamental methodological principle that Heidegger had permanently followed in his investigations of the problem of reality. Also, because of its connection with the horizon of the fundamental ontological analysis of the problem of reality, the issue of ontological difference also forms a thematic unit within the chapter, justified by the Heideggerian statements about the parallel meanings of the categories of *real* and *reality*, and *being* and *the being*. The actual message of the chapter, relevant for the basic hypothesis of the thesis, are the statements that pose and discuss the question of how relevant the idea of dual temporality is to Heidegger's analyses of the problem of reality, with the aim of a thematic conclusion to the chapter. These attempts can be summarized in the claim that the interpretive horizon within which Heidegger analysis the problem of reality in the *Being and Time*, primarily validates the *hereditary*, being-time aspect of the concept of the *Dasein*, because the category of the *being-in-the-world*, which has a key role in these interpretations, appears here mainly with reference to the meaning of being, and less to the meaning of the internal temporality aspects of the existence thrown into the *Dasein*.

The fifth and sixth chapter of the dissertation form one thematic unit in fact, inasmuch as both of them connect the interpretations of truth in various writings of Heidegger with the question of temporality, primarily the temporality of the horizon of being. Accordingly, the titles of both chapters contain the keywords *truth* and *temporality*, and the truth *and* temporality relation. However, there are also thematic differences between these two chapters: the fourth one focuses mainly on the interpretation of truth in the *Being and Time*, and aims at the fundamental ontological (re)interpretation of the traditional concept of truth (with an eye also to some of the aspects of the truths of being that can also be identified here). In contrast, the fifth chapter predominantly discusses the concept of truth in Heidegger's writings on truth after the *Being and Time*, with the purpose to identify the temporality aspects of the particularly Heideggerian concept of the *truth of being*.

The fifth chapter bears thus the title *Truth and temporality. The fundamental ontological reinterpretation of the traditional concept of truth*. The main message of the chapter is built upon the considerations regarding the idea and ambivalent manifestations of ontological radicalisation with reference to the classic concept of truth used in the fundamental ontological and phenomenological interpretation of truth in the *Being and Time*. This ambivalence proves the simultaneous presence of the radicalisation both in fundamental

ontology and its direction pointing towards the truth of being. The chapter essentially sees the meaning of the ontological radicalisation of the interpretation of truth to the direction of fundamental ontology in that this interpretation widens the meaning of the „bearer” of the truth starting from the truth of the statement to the structure of being of the *Dasein*’s situatedness-in-being; furthermore, in connection with this, in that it grasps the phenomenon of truth as changing from an incidental phenomenon (characteristic *or* not of the statement) to a necessary existentiality that essentially pertains to the *Dasein*’s structure of being. The elements of radicalisation pointing towards the truth of being mainly appear in the chapter as the distancing of the phenomenon of truth from the existentiality of the *Dasein* and becomes increasingly an attribute of being. This distancing can be perceived primarily in Heidegger’s treatment of the lack of alternatives to the coming-to-*Dasein*; of the presumption of the truth; and of the way Heidegger points at why he uses the concept of “being *given*” instead of “*existing*”.

In the chapter, the subject of truth is connected with the question of the temporality of the horizon of being with reference to the radicalisation of the interpretation of truth in the direction of the truth of being, fundamentally on account of the *complex phenomenality* of the truth of being and the correlation of *being-Dasein* understood as a necessary constituent of the truth of being.

The sixth chapter, entitled *Truth and temporality. The truth of being (concepts of truth in the writings on the subject of truth)*, undertakes an analysis of the semantic field of the specific Heideggerian term of the truth of being which can be connected to the temporality of the horizon of being. It focuses on the phenomenological connections which can be identified between the hereditary temporality of the *Dasein* constituted in the horizon of the question of being, and the phenomenon of truth understood as the truth of being. This part of the work primarily analyses the ideas contained in Heidegger’s *On the Essence of Truth* and *Letter on „Humanism”*, with reference to the subjects described above; the chapter is therefore divided into two subchapters, connected nevertheless by the main discussion point. The most important element of this alignment of thoughts is that both subchapters consider that the foundation of the phenomenological-ontological connection of the truth (of being) and the temporality of the horizon of being is the correlation of *being and Dasein*, a kind of *complex phenomenality structure*. The first part identifies the phenomenological-ontological connection of the truth of being and the temporality of the horizon of being by analysing the keywords: the *setting-forth*, the *permissive being* constituted through the meaning-horizon of

the truth of the phenomenologically reinterpreted statement; and the particular *phenomenon of freedom and openness* as a fundamental phenomenon of being. It does so by highlighting the phenomenological-ontological connection between the *ecstatic* existence of the *Dasein* and the (horizon-of-being-like) meaning of the *Dasein*. The second part of the chapter continues the analyses on the connections between the truth of being and the temporality of the horizon of being, preserving the hermeneutical entities of the categories and aspects of the *ecstatic* existence and the *Dasein-being* relation, extending the interpretation to the phenomenological-ontological concept of action and thinking, and the ontological guarding function of the temporality of the horizon of being. In connection with this, with a quasi-conclusive aim with reference to the „meaning of being”, it formulates the following definition of being: „Being »exists« through the mode of *lingering* in the being of the *Dasein* and being *guarded* by it”. The interpretations of this part of the chapter, focusing on the relations of ecstatic existence and the temporality of the horizon of being guide the attention towards the meanings of the Heideggerian concept of *clearing*, which is discussed in the following chapters, leading to the concluding remarks of the entire work. At the same time, this chapter also offers a comparison of the thematic units of the *Being and Time* and the *Letter on „Humanism”*, providing new data for the thesis of dual temporality, and thus on the nature of the Heideggerian turn.

Chapter seven based on the interpretation of Heidegger’s *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, with special attention to the construction of the concept of *clearing* and the phenomenological-ontological correlations of the „end-product”, as well as their relevance with regard to the question of being, and the *Dasein-being-time* relation and the *temporality of the horizon of being*. The title, formulated as *Being or Clearing, Time or Being-there*, signals that the basic message of the chapter is the insight into the Heideggerian meaning of „being” and „time” from the horizon of the *clearing*, offering the possibilities of reinterpretations or changes in meaning. This message is constructed along the interpretations meant to highlight the phenomenological radicalizations of the concept of clearing, and can be summarized as follows: these radicalizations point towards the phenomenological origins of being, thanks to which the clearing is perceived as a self-sufficient, sovereign phenomenality, which needs no further ontological auxiliaries, and is not dependent on other mediating horizons, such as *Dasein* or the temporality of the horizon of being. In connection to this, the chapter also formulates considerations about the weakening of the ontological status of the *Dasein* and the temporality of the horizon of being by the phenomenological-ontological radicality of the

clearing, although these are questions rather than categorical claims. The chapter's title also contains references to the fundamental proposition of *Being and Time*, which signals a comparative approach to the two writings, in accordance with the central reference point of the analysed work. Its relevance and necessity is also emphasized by the fact that this major work of fundamental ontology ends with questions about the horizon-of-being-like nature of time, while the conclusions of the *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* are also questions regarding the achievement of the „being and time” relation within the *Being and Time*.

The thematisations of the chapter are relevant for the main thread of the dissertation insofar as they ask the following questions: if the *clearing* can be interpreted as a concept of being that moves towards a particular phenomenological horizon of interpretation, can *being-there* be analogously interpreted as a phenomenologically altered temporality? Can the *being-there* connected to the *clearing* be still considered temporality in any sense from the horizon of interpretation represented by the phenomenality of the clearing? What are the possible implications of these propositions with regard to the hypothesis of dual temporality?

Thematically connected to these problems, this chapter also contains interpretations on forms and instances of the forgetting of being in the history of philosophy, as well as interpretations on the concealed dimension of the clearing.

The eighth and last chapter of the dissertation is entitled *What is the clearing?*, which at a first sight does not seem as a unit thematically separated from the preceding parts. However, as the introductory part of the chapter reveals, the choice of subject is explained by the fact that the previous insights have not exhausted the topic of the phenomenological-ontological meaning of the clearing, there can be more interpretations. This chapter therefore proposes to enlarge the scope of interpretation of the category of clearing, to articulate the meaning of the concept, and refine its meanings. This interpretation is not an end in itself, as it happens in strong connection with our hypothesis on dual temporality, more precisely the „hard”, horizon-of-being-like meaning of temporality, and the „fate” of *time* and *Dasein* within Heidegger's philosophy of being, leading to conclusive remarks.

The articulations of the concept of clearing consider it to be a phenomenological-ontological metaphor that intends to grasp being as (the most) original phenomenality, in close connection with the phenomenological radicalisations mentioned in the previous chapter and now newly analysed. The chapter claims that the next steps and stages of this radicalisation can be

identified: the separation of the concept of clearing from a conceptual-analogical logic of interpretation and its placement into a phenomenological-logical horizon of meaning; the understanding of the clearing as a *free openness*, where freedom has a privative meaning (deprived *of* something, freedom *from* something), which extends the meaning of phenomenological origin to universality; the separation of the function of „gleaming” from the phenomenological status of the clearing, the elimination of the aspects of brightness/spectacle/gleaming from the concept of clearing. In relation to this, the question arises again to what extent the phenomenological radicalisations pointing towards being as sovereign phenomenality influence the hermeneutical function and ontological status of the Dasein and temporality (as horizon of being) with respect to the question of being.

In order to tackle these problems, the chapter applies a sort of reversed interpretive logic, meaning that it looks at hermeneutical and ontological fate of these categories *from* the direction of the clearing’s horizon of meaning, focusing on whether the clearing is radical enough from a phenomenological point of view for essentially influence, or even overwrite their ontological functionality.

The analyses lead to the conclusion that, considering the direction of phenomenological-ontological radicalisations at work in the shaping of the concept of clearing, one cannot avoid assuming that, with regard to *Dasein*, *temporality* and *the horizon of being*, the ontological status and function of these existentialities, judging from the sovereign phenomenality of the clearing, is significantly weakened. However, it seems – paradoxically precisely from the perspective of this very same phenomenological logic – that these phenomenological radicalisations cannot eliminate some fundamental correlations, so from a phenomenological and onto-logical perspective the clearing remains nevertheless a complex phenomenality, for the „phenomenal being-oneself” is ultimately a self-contradiction. Therefore Heidegger, similarly to the relation of *Being and time* used in his ground-breaking work, also uses the relation „clearing *and* being-there” (*Lichtung und Anwesenheit*) at the end of his work on the clearing, suggesting a correlation that *ultimately* resides in the phenomenological-ontological concept of clearing. However, in my opinion there still is some hermeneutical tension or contradiction between the meaning of the *clearing* approached from the direction of phenomenological radicalisations and its understanding as a *complex phenomenality* that allows for, or presupposes ontological auxiliaries. This is probably one of the „break-points” that the literature connects to Heidegger.

In the concluding chapter (*Retrospection, conclusions*), the main focus falls on retrospection, given that several (albeit temporary) conclusions have been formulated on several occasions during the analyses. The retrospection offers insight into the process of writing this work, explains its possible achievements, the nature of the working hypotheses, aspects of research methodology and the methods of exposition, and remarks about the literature used. The concluding remarks are embedded into the retrospective approach as the reiterations of partial conclusions formulated throughout the work, short reflections about them, and references to further possible directions of research.