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Foreign Decision-Making Process Analysis; The Case of Golda Meir (1970-1973)

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INTRODUCTION

This research deals with an analysis of foreign decision making process; focusing on Golda Meir's foreign decision making process between 1970-1973, whilst she was Prime Minister.

Since this research seeks to analyze foreign decision making process by focusing the characteristics of Golda Meir's foreign decision-making processes (1970-1973), the main research question is: How to characterize Golda Meir's foreign decision making processes during the period between 1970-1973?

In trying to describe and understand these characteristics, the research analysis deals with three main questions: What were the dominant reference events in Meir's foreign decision making processes during the war? What were the main factors that influenced Meir's foreign decision making processes? And how do the aspects of various decision-making approaches characterize Meir's foreign decision making processes?

The research also focuses particularly on the relationships between decision makers in four countries (Israel, the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Egypt), as well as two additional aspects linked to it - the military and intelligence aspects. Other aspects referring to relationships between countries such as economics, trade, culture and the like are not referred to in this study.

CHAPTER I: DECISION-MAKING APPROACHES OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The first chapter reviews the principal approaches in the field of foreign decision making, when the main consideration assumed that key foreign decision making processes are mental processes, and as such the study does not focus on research literature covering biological or physiological aspects. This part also includes a literature review about Golda Meir's biography.

This chapter arranged around three key approaches: rational, bureaucratic and psychological, which includes reference to irrational factors.

The rational approach, in its classical version, views the state actors as principal players who operate according to a clear system of priorities, players who are aware of all possible alternative, and choose the one that leads to maximum benefit from their point of view. This approach is the starting point for all comprehensive international relations analysis (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010).

The rational model has undergone many developments and references, some of which derived from its criticism. There were those who argued that the rational model could not serve as a basis for analysis in situations where decision makers were forced to deal with equal value alternatives, there were those who emphasized irrational components. These criticisms gave birth to myriad models that adopted only part of the fundamental assumptions of the rational model, such as, for example: Braybrooke &Lindblom (1963) Incremental Model or Simon's (1985) Bounded Rationality Model.

The bureaucratic approach developed as a reaction to rational explanations for foreign decision making processes and later as a criticism in the area of organizational research. Literature dealing with the study of bureaucratic aspects in foreign decision making processes began to develop in the 1960s, intending to apply new knowledge from the field of organizational research. Researchers such as Neustadt and Snyder recognized the influence of organizational part of foreign decision making processes, but did not apply this knowledge to specific decision making processes. Allison (1971, 1999) was one of the first to address this issue in-depth. He proposed two bureaucratic models as an alternative to the rational model: the first is the organizational politics model that perceived decisions as outputs of large organizations that operate under standard operating procedures (SOP's); and the second is the bureaucratic politics model according to which decision making is the result of the accumulated effect of attraction, rejection, bargaining and negotiation between actors carrying out political roles divided on political questions. Allison's models have earned many applications, and developments such as those suggested by Rourke, George, Halperin and others.

The psychological approach teaches how psychology has penetrated the area of research into foreign decision making processes field. It principle the intention is to show off the unique contribution made by specific decision makers to state foreign

decision making processes in determining policy. Within the psychological approach, two different streams emerged: one in the 1960s and 1970s were founded on psychodynamic studies into specific decision makers; researchers such as the Georges. Mazlish and Langer, who focused on studying individual leaders sought to prove that early childhood experiences affected their adult decision making patters. The second stream - starting in the 1980's addressed cognitive research to analyze foreign decision making processes in social sciences. Standout concepts emerging from these studies are 'system of beliefs' and 'operational code', developed by Leites, Holsti, George and others, which gave rise to a number of applications and developments.

The section that deals with irrational factors refers to relevant developments starting with Thaler (1980) who distinguished between "econs" (economic being) and human beings. Humans and "econs" may represent symbolic concepts for the differences between the various theories, and create a dichotomous distinction between two kinds of decision makers. According to Thaler, while "econs" are rational beings, there is sweeping evidence that humans are not able be rational decision makers. "Econs" do not have tendencies to heuristics and biases such as those set forth in this section, while human beings cannot avoid them.

This section presents some of the irrational factors involved in decision-making processes. It describes studies which focused on identifying heuristics biases in decision-making processes. This part will present in detail four selected biases, which have been found to be connected and relevant to foreign decision-making analysis: convert questions (Polya, 1945; Kahneman, 2013), heuristic affect (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979), availability bias (Schwartz, 1991) and risk and emotional biases (Slovic, 2000). In addition, it will focus on illusions regarding resulting from overconfidence bias (Sunstein & Koran, 1999; Tversky, 1973; Tetlock, 2005; Lovallo, 2005), which have been found to be an essential irrational factor in foreign decision making research in general and the subject of this research in particular.

In this chapter the researcher demonstrated that there is an impressive range of theories to explain various approaches in decision-making. The reviewed literature indicates that decision-making processes in political science are related to a wide array of complex bureaucratic structures, individuals' behaviors and unique personalities of those who are involved in decision-making. Specific theories of decision-making are designed to describe and explain characteristic functions of an organization, and particular interpretations by individual decision makers in relation to their environment. The rational tradition, on the other hand, prefers to analyze the decision-making process based on an assumption that these processes are primarily outputs of monolithic and established players. A large part of all other paradigms, approaches and theories have evolved thanks to its inspiration, or as a response to it.

The complex and extensive theoretical research, which includes paradigms, approaches, theories, models and frameworks, creates a broad ambiguity factor that dictates selection and adoption of one of the approaches presented here. On one hand, the broad range of theoretical alternatives is potential for creativity. On the other hand, too many theories create an obstacle to establishing a comprehensive theory for analyzing decision-making processes.

Awareness of the contribution of multi-disciplinary approaches has grown recently. This research seeks to address the challenge of connecting and mediating competing approaches in order to create a holistic, multi-disciplinary model, which integrates and synthesizes basic principles from various theories in order to improve the explanation of phenomena and create as much a holistic picture as possible.

Golda Meir's Biography (3 May 1898 - 8 December 1978)

Since this research engages in Golda Meir's foreign decision making in the time of her office as the leader of Israel, this section presents a literature review of Meir's biography.

Golda Meir was born on 3 May 1898, daughter of Blume and Moshe Maubowitz, in Kiev. Her family were part of the large migration during which more than two million Jews emigrated from Russia to the U.S.A in the period between the 1881-1882 pogroms against the Jews in Kiev, until the gates to the U.S.A. were shut in 1924. Her family emigrated in 1906, her father, mother and three daughters settled in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Her American accent remained a part of Meir's identity despite living in Israel for 57 years (Medzini, 2008).

Meir was known from her stubbornness from an early age. At 15 she refused an arranged marriage and fled to her sister who lived in Denver. She only returned to her

parents' home after two years. During her studies she joined the Zionist movement and in 1921 she immigrated to the Land of Israel with her husband Morris Myerson. She met him when she was living in Denver. After two years living and working in agriculture on Kibbutz Merhavia, the couple moved to Tel Aviv, where she worked in the Accounts Department of the Histadrut HaKlalit¹. Here she met David Remez, in time Secretary General of the Histadrut, Cabinet Minister and leader in Israel's early years. Remez became her political patron (Horton & Simons, 2009).

1928 was the year in which her political career in Mapai² (in time the Labor Party) started. At this time she began to serve as secretary to the Women Workers' Council. In 1930 she was appointed to the Histadrut Executive Committee. Between1932-1934, she served as an emissary to the U.S.A. as secretary of the Pioneer Women's (socialist) organization. There she became very popular and was considered an outstanding speaker in both English and Yiddish. On her return she integrated back into the Women Workers' Council and Histadrut Executive Committee: Head of Histadrut Political Department (1940), Mapai Faction Head (1941), Secretary of Tel Aviv Workers' Council (1944). In 1946, when Sharett³ was imprisoned by the British, Meir took his place as head of the Jewish Agency⁴'s Political Department. She continued in political roles, including the meeting with Abdallah, King of Jordan on the eve of the establishment of the State of Israel and fundraising in the U.S.A. (Meir, 1975)

With the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, she was one of the signatories on the Declaration of Independence, and in September 1948 was Israel's first emissary to the U.S.A. A year later, she was elected to the Knesset⁵ and served as Minister of Work until 1956 (ibid).

Meir had a significant impact as Minister of Work: she initiated and promoted the establishment of the National Insurance Institution, work and rest time legislation, annual leave legislation, youth workers' legislation, women workers' legislation.

¹ *Histadrut HaKlalit shel Ovdim B'Eretz Yisrael* is the General Organization of Workers in Eretz Yisrael, is known as the Histadrut and is Israel's organization of trade unions.

² Acronym for Mifleget Po'alei Eretz Yisrael, the Workers' Party in the Land of Israel

³ Moshe Sharett became second Prime Minister of Israel.

⁴ The Jewish Agency is the largest Jewish nonprofit organization in the world. Its mission is to "inspire Jews throughout the world to connect with their people, heritage, and land, and empower them to build a thriving Jewish future and a strong Israel" (Jewish Agency Report, 2014).

⁵ *Knesset* - Israeli parliament

Between 1956-1965, she served as Foreign Minister, and as instructed by David Ben Gurion⁶, Hebraized her name from Myerson to Meir. Her time as Foreign Minister saw a strengthening of relations between Israel and new states, primarily in Africa. Between 1966-1968 she served as Secretary of Mapai. When the three workers parties in Israel united to form the Labor Party, she was appointed its Secretary (Horton & Simons, 2008).

After the death of Prime Minister Eshkol in February 1969, Meir became the first and only woman to serve as Israel's Prime Minister, and only the third female Prime Minister in the world (after Bandaranayke of Sri Lanka and Gandhi of India). Meir was appointed to the position as a compromise in order to prevent an intergenerational and interpersonal struggle within the party. In contrast, in the elections for the 7th Knesset in 1969, she led the Labor party to victory and continued in the role (Medzini, 2008).

Looking back, it is possible to say that the years between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War were years of Israeli arrogance and complacency. These were the years of the War of Attrition, the start of settlements in the occupied territories and ignoring widening social gaps. Years of war and dealings with Palestinian terror organizations in Israel and around the world (Bar-Yosef, 2005).

Meir knew how to show her feelings, and despite this was known as the iron lady of Israeli politics.

Statements made by Meir's during her term of office:

"...She was the one who referred to members of the protest movement of young men who had immigrated en masse from Morocco as 'they're not nice'. About the Egyptians she said :'we will never forgive the Arabs for forcing us to kill their sons'. Regarding to the Palestinians request she said: 'there is no Palestinian nation'" (Man, 1998, pp. 84-85, translated from Hebrew).

She refused all attempts to change the status quo, especially between Israel and Egypt. Despite this, in 1970 she accepted the Rogers peace initiative to end the War of

⁶ Israel's first Prime Minister

Attrition, which is why the right wing (the Herut⁷ and Liberal bloc) under the leadership of Begin⁸ left the government (Weitz, Y. 2012))⁹

On 6 October, 1973 the Yom Kippur War broke out. Israel was caught by surprise. From a military point of view, the war ended with an Israeli victory, but with regard to the number of sacrifices, the shock of the hiding the army took, which until then had been undefeated, the war created growing public anger (Gordon, 2008).

The national commission of inquiry - the Agranat Commission - judged that blame should be placed on the military echelons alone and that during the War, Meir operated properly, but the public did not accept this. Meir was again elected as Prime Minister in the elections of December 1973, but daily protests against her took place. In June 1974, after a visit to comfort a family that had lost a son during the War, she resigned (Horton & Simons, 2008).

Meir lived to see the regime revolution in Israel in 1977, from many long and stable years of Labor government rule, in fact since establishment of the State, to the election of a right wing government headed by Begin, and to meet President Sadat of Egypt when he made his historic visit to Israel the same year.

After her resignation, she went to live with her daughter at Kibbutz Revivim in southern Israel, until her death on 8 December 1978.¹⁰

CHAPTER II: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The chapter deals with the research's methodology and details the research paradigm and approach. The research was performed using a qualitative hermeneutic interpretive paradigm, with a case study approach.

⁷ Herut - right wing nationalist political party that after merger with other smaller parties became Likud in 1998.

⁸ Menahem Begin, leader of Herut, who became Prime Minister in 1977

⁹ http://goldameir.org.il/archive/home/he/1.html

¹⁰ http://goldameir.org.il/archive/home/he/100/show_bio6.html

This chapter will discuss the methodology related to social science decision-making analysis. It will present a review of methodological developments in understanding decision-making processes in social science.

The first reference will focus on two major scholars who constitute the methodological background for the proposed research model, Dilthey (1976) and Ricoeur (1981). These researchers contributed to understanding interpretive methodology developments in decision-making and particularly in the political field.

One of Ricouer's important contributions is the "Hermeneutic Arc". Ricoeur referred to historical analysis as a naive interpretation that leads to more critical analysis that is deeper and open-ended. One end is open to how researchers interpret and understand the subject matter (decision-maker), and the other end is researchers' self-reflection.

Since the topic deals with Meir's foreign decision making in three case studies in the period 1970-1973, which are **historical events**, this part also discusses the revival of historical approaches to research in social science decision-making processes. In addition, it presents the strategies offered by Lustick (1996) in the implementation of this research type, which is adopted as a basis for the innovative proposed model. In essence, the chapter discusses the distinction between social science historical research and scientific research, and the interpretative approach in social science decision-making research. In addition, it also presents the main criticisms towards this approach and some possible answers to them.

Research Tools

While the first part of the chapter deals with the hermeneutic interpretive paradigm research characterization, the other parts deal with implications of the hermeneutic paradigm and the narrative structure itself, and address research definitions and design, as well as research tools.

With regard to the last subject, the main research tools used in this research was analyzing in depth narrative interviews and historical documents reviewing and analysis:

The in depth interview used in this research was semi structured interview including five starter questions. This kind of interview allows adding questions during

interviews in order to refine, focus and better understand interviewees' answers (Edwards, R; Holland, J. (2013). Edwards, R& Holland, J. (2013) noted that semistructured interviews become more complicated despite an orderly array of starter questions and are subject to change depending on dynamics created with interviewees, since the main purpose is to understand interviewees' norms, beliefs and motivations.

The research population selected consisted of 13 people who were aware of Golda Meir's foreign decisions making processes during that period from two circles of her acquaintance. The first circle comprised people who had participated or known Meir's' foreign decision making during that period, and the second circle of interviews focused on historians and journalists who have dedicated their life to researching these subjects.

Among the interviewees were the former Interior Minister, who has been called the hero of Israel for his brave decision-making during the war Golda Meir's relative; an armored battalion commanders in present and in Yom Kippur War and leading historian who recently published series of interviews on the subject of the Yom Kippur War in the Israeli press; a journalist who has researched Golda Meir's personal life. Additional interviews were held with senior military officials and politicians who contributed their knowledge to understanding foreign decision-making processes during that period.

Research Document Analysis

The second main research tool used in this research was historical document analysis. The documents included protocols and telegrams, drawn from primary sources located in archives in Israel and the United States.

With regard to the Israeli archive, in recent years, many classified documents kept in these archives have been released to the public. This process of sensitive document release was very helpful to historical analysis and allowed many more sources to be included in this research. However, there are documents that are not yet available to the public and therefore are excluded from this research. For example, protocols from Israeli government meetings from1970-1974 as well as those from Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee during the same period. In 2003, the State Archives declassified Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee protocols for 1973. In addition,

according to research regulations of the IDF archives and defense establishment, classified military and security issues are only declassified 50 years later. As a result, there are still confidential documents that are not available to researchers.

Research documents included telegrams exchanged between the dominant foreign decision making leaders. From the Israeli side: Golda Meir and her delegates. From the U.S. side: President Nixon, and Secretary of State, Kissinger. From the Egyptian side: President Sadat, and from the U.S.S.R: President Brezhnev and Prime Minister Kosygin. These are the main research documents categories, which refer to the period between June 1970- December 1973.

- Memcons (Memorandum of Conversation) between Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Israeli Cabinet between 1970-1973, including classified documents from the war cabinet between 5 October 1973-18 October 1973.
- 2. Top-secret telegrams and massages exchanged between Golda Meir, her staff members and the Israeli embassy in Washington, which described the military and the political situation.
- 3. Classified telegrams as top secret and high level urgency were exchanged between the dominant decision-makers in Israel, Meir, and the US, Kissinger.
- 4. I.D.F. (Israeli Defense Forces) archive documents. Summarizing of consolation meetings.
- 5. Washington Special Action Group (WSAG); Memorandum of the consultations between Secretary of U.S., Kissinger and his collogues.
- 6. Top-secret massages exchanged between American leaders Soviet leaders from FRUS archive (foreign Relations of the United State), including national security files from various sources (National Security Agency, National Security Advisor Files and National Security Council Files.
- 7. Memcons between the American and Egyptian leaders with regard to this period, from FRUS archive and NPMP archive (Nixon Presidential Material Project).
- 8. Official reports of the Agranat Committee, a commission of inquiry into the Yom Kippur War, which was established by the Israeli government under its authority, on 18 November, 1973. The main reasons for its establishment were heavy loss of life and news that flowed from the front and rear that led to mass public criticism. Following the government's decision to establish a

commission of inquiry, the Supreme Court president was appointed to lead it. The members of the committee, under the chairmanship Dr. Shimon Agranat were: Supreme Court justice Moshe Landau-Mer; state comptroller Isaac Nevatsal; Prof. Yigael Yadin and Lt. Gen. (res) Chaim Laskov. The committee's work continued for over a year and ended at the beginning of 1975. The commission gathered material and other archived IDF documents as directed by government.

The full list of archives used by the researcher and documents analyzed in this research is presented in the References section.

The following Table summarizes the second chapter:

Paradigm	Qualitative Paradigm – hermeneutic interpretive perspective	
Research Approach	Case Study approach	
Research Questions	 How to characterize Golda Meir's foreign decision making process during the period between1970-1973? In trying to describe and understand the characteristics of Golda Meir's foreign decision-making processes during the Yom Kippur war, the research analysis deals with three main questions: What were the dominant reference events in Meir's foreign decision making process during the war? How do the various decision-making approaches' aspects characterize Meir's foreign decision making process? 	
Research Assumptions	 The characterization of Meir's F.D.M.P. can be perceived by focusing on the following three case studies: Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding the American peace initiative of 19 June 1970 Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding Ending the Status Quo Israeli-Egyptian Relations (February-October, 1973) Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding the Ceasefire agreement (October 22, 1973- November 11, 1973). The characterization of Meir's F.D.M.P. can be perceived by using various research approaches (Rational, Bureaucratic and psych logistic) according to the identification of the influencing dominant aspects. The characterization of Meir's F.D.M.P. can be achieved by the analysis of the main influencing factors of Meir's foreign decision-making. 	
Research tools Research Population	 In depth narrative interviews Reviewing documents and text analyzing of historical reports. Interviewees who were related to Meir's foreign decision-making process during 1970-1973 in various relationships. 	
Research Design	Four levels of research: Level 1: conducting and analyzing In depth- narrative Interviews	

Methodological Summary

Level 2: Reviewing documents and text analyzing of historical documents. Level 3: Conducting 3 case studies with regard to Meir's foreign decision making process between 1970 -1973. Level 4: Developing a reflective model for foreign decision making analysis.
Qualitative document and content analysis Initial phase: collecting information; mapping & focusing and theoretical phase
Formal consent ;Explanation about the research ;
Option for partnership relations Confidentiality promise

CHAPTER III: DISCUSSION ON FINDINGS

The chapter presents and discusses the findings with regard to the various aspects that might characterize Golda Meir's foreign decision making process. The findings and discussion are presented and discussed according to case studies. Document and interview analysis carried out in this research showed that there were three significant events during that period, which Prime Minister Golda Meir's foreign policy decision making processes were expressed:

- 1. Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding the American peace initiative of 19 June 1970.
- 2. Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding Ending the Status Quo in Israeli-Egyptian Relations (February-October, 1973).
- 3. Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding the Ceasefire agreement (October 22, 1973- November 11, 1973).

An analysis of foreign decision making in the three case studies, which examined the nature of Meir's foreign decision making, was carried out according to the research questions, arranged in the following order:

- Layout and description of the event through research findings description, documents analyze, interviews and historical literature on the topic, as well as identification and marking of dominant decision points during the course of the decision making processes throughout this event.
- Emphasis on and analysis of the decision making points that affected the event and created it, in light of foreign decision making models from the main research approaches: Rational approach by the Rational model (Cashman, 1993), Bureaucratic approach by Organizational bureaucratic model and

Bureaucratic politics model (Allison, 1971) and Halperin's Governmental model (1974); Psychological approach by Prospect Theory (Kahneman &Tversky, 1979) and Festiger's Dissonance cognitive theory (1957). In addition, several decision making points analyzed according to the following Irrational Factors: Experts intuition (Simon, 1992); Experts' illusion of overconfidence (Tetlock, 2005); Planning Fallacy Bias by Tversky & Kahneman (1979); Optimism Bias by Lovallo & Kahneman (2005) and the Hindsight bias /outcome bias (Kahneman, 2013).

- The third phase highlight and analyze external factors that affected foreign decision making processes in studying the event. It is important to point out that the research focuses on external factors alone, and will not refer to internal factors emotional, psychological or any other factors with reference to the dominant decision maker Golda Meir. However, the researcher applied a psychological approach model for the analysis several decision making points in Meir's foreign decision making process. Finally, at the fourth stage, summary analysis of the event according to Cashman's (1993) rational model.
- Emphasizing and analyzing external factors that affected the foreign decision making process in studying the event. It is important to point out that the research focuses on external factors alone, and will not refer to internal factors
 emotional, psychological or any other factors with reference to the dominant decision maker - Golda Meir.
- Analysis of the entire event, in light of rational model approach by Cashman (1993). Employing the stages of the rational model in analyzing Meir's foreign decision making processes in reference to the entire case study process.
- Summarizing the event analysis.

The key emphases leading the analysis of the discussion:

The researcher refers to two levels of case study analysis – ontological and epistemological:

Ontological level of analysis is expressed by analyzing the event through **Decision Making Points** in light of different models from various approaches in reference to the reality dominant aspect that developed.

In order to maintain authenticity and remain faithful to the flow of historical reality in the event that stands at the focus of this research, the researcher wishes to analyze the event at these levels by describing the natural chronological reality. That is to say, the analysis will be integrated with important events that took place according to their chronological order. The description of events will refer to diplomatic meetings between Meir and the other players, influential meetings and consultations in the cabinet and other frameworks, conventions, declarations and media interviews in various countries, conferences and more.

Analysis according to developing and influential decision making points:

The choice of which analysis model to use at every influential decision point, will be made with reference to the dominant character that exists at each described decision point. The dominant character of the event will be examined by the behavioral expressions of Meir and other involved actors, as well as by identifying dominant aspects that exist in the event, such as dominant aspects of data collection, emotional expressions and power struggles, which contribute to characterizing the event's atmosphere.

Epistemological level of analysis is expressed as such when the researcher will examine whether to apply the foundations of the rational model by Cashman, 1993, throughout the event in an epistemological analysis framework.

Using combined analysis: the displayed combined analysis was created during initial implementation, at the stage where the research was dealing with the connections between theoretical approaches and foreign decision making models and findings resulting from using the research tools: analysis of documents, interviews, and historical literature. The researcher chose integrative analysis in this discussion and relates to the following dimensions:

The decision making points emerging from document analysis of Golda Meir's foreign decision making will be analyzed according to models from the different

approaches and in light of irrational factors: from the psychological approach -Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory and Festinger's (1957) Dissonance Cognitive Theory, and from the bureaucratic approach Allison's (1971) two models and Halperin's (1974) Governmental model.

Another perspective of combination might be perceived by applying Cashman's (1990) Rational Model, which creates an effective basis for analysis of the development of the whole event on a chronological axis.

The three case studies analysis concentrates on the political-diplomatic aspects of Meir's foreign policy, with reference to two further connected aspects - military and intelligence.

Following is a brief summary of the three case studies, constituting the core of research:

Case Study 1: The American Peace Initiative of 19 June 1970

This case study deals in the main with Meir's foreign decision making with regard to the presentation of the American peace initiative, against a background of increasing tension between Israel and the U.S.A., escalation in the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt (1967-1970) and increased Soviet military presence in Egypt. At that time, two parallel channels of communication developed between Prime Minister Meir and the U.S.A.: a formal channel with the State Department, headed by Secretary of State Rogers and a backdoor, secret channel with the White House, and in particular the President's National Security Adviser, Kissinger. This section describes Meir's foreign decision making in light of the tension that existed between Israel and the U.S.A. in light of the military happenings between Israel and Egypt, and the influence of contacts between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and Egypt.

The analysis of Meir's foreign decision making process in case study 1 will refer to the following five key decision making points:

First decision making point: Meir's initial reaction to the presentation of America's peace initiative on 19 June 1970.

Second decision making point: Decision on the nature of the first message sent to President Nixon regarding the American peace initiative.

Third decision making point: Formal reaction to the American peace initiative, in light of Egypt and the U.S.S.R.'s agreements.

Fourth decision making point: Meir's dealing with the crisis regarding wording of Israel's agreement.

Fifth decision making point: Reaction to Egyptian and U.S.S.R. forces violating the initiative.

Case Study 2: Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding Ending the Status Quo in Israeli-Egyptian Relations (February-October, 1973)

This case study addresses Meir's foreign decision making during 1973. The case study is divided into two parts, with the first part referring to before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War on 6 October 1973, and the second referring to her decision making during the War. Meir's foreign decision making in the first part took place at a time in which the **status quo** was established. **The status quo existed** both between Israel and the U.S.A., characterized by diplomatic support and long term military supplies, and between Israel and Egypt, characterized by a continued political stalemate that prevailed from the failed American initiative in 1970 until the outbreak of War. This section describes Meir's foreign decision making and her reactions in light of the rapprochement between Egypt and the U.S.A. and Egypt's distancing itself from the U.S.S.R. and the start of a secret communication channel between Egypt and the White House.

The second part of this case study deals with Meir's decision making during the War itself.

The analysis of Meir's decision making in this case study will focus on the following three principal foreign decision making points:

First decision point: Reaction to the Egyptian peace initiative, 25-28 February, 1973.

Second decision point: Considering a reaction to Egypt's threats of war.

Third decision point: The decision regarding an early preventative attack against Egypt.

During the course of the review and analysis carried out by the researcher regarding the first four days of the War, it emerged that these were critical days in Meir's foreign decision making on a political level, and of her partners, Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan; Chief of Staff, David Elazar; and Head of Intelligence Services, Eli Zeira, known collectively in the literature as 'The Generals'.

Therefore, the second part will describe and analyze three significant foreign decision making problems with which Meir had to deal during the first days of the war:

First decision making problem: the level of sharing with the White House the actual situation in the area.

Second decision making problem: foreign relations with Jordan during the War.

Third decision making problem: modus operandi regarding the international diplomatic arena.

Case Study No. 3: Meir's Foreign Decision Making Regarding the Ceasefire agreement (October 22, 1973- November 11, 1973)

This case study deals with Meir's foreign decision making at the beginning of the transition process in the conduct of conflict between Israel and Egypt until its resolution. During this period, a ceasefire agreement was reached (18 January 1974), which started with the 'six point' agreement signed between the parties on 11 November 1973.

This section describes Meir's foreign decision making whilst conducting contacts between herself and the White House and Egypt.

The analysis of Meir's decision making in this case study will focus on the following four principal foreign decision making points:

First Decision Making Point regarding U.N. Security Council Resolution 338.

Second Decision Making Point regarding the one-time provision of non-military supplies to the besieged Egyptian 3rd Army.

Third Decision Making Point regarding exchange of prisoners and permanent supplies to the 3rd Army.

Fourth Decision Making Point regarding the crisis around the 'Six Point Agreement'.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS

This research comprises a combination of a number of subject matters and research tools. Therefore, the conclusions will refer to each subject matter separately as follows:

The chapter is divided into three parts: the first presents the conclusions regarding Meir's Foreign Decision Making Process Aspects through the In-Depth Narrative Interviews Analysis:

- With Regard to Meir's Foreign Decision Making Process various Aspects
- With Regard to Meir's Foreign Decision Making Process Influencing dominant Factors.

The second part refers to Meir's foreign decision making characterization through the three case studies applied with regard to the various analysis approaches; based on historical documents review and analysis:

- With regard to the Selected Case Studies Events
- With Regard to the Analysis of Meir's Foreign Decision Making Processes Aspects
- With regard to the Analysis of Meir's Foreign Decision Making Processes Influencing Dominant External Factors

The third part is a presentation of a graphic description of the research conclusions with regard to the three case studies.

The conclusions chapter serves as a springboard for the next section, the researcher's proposal and contribution to study of foreign decision making analysis, the Holistic Combined Spiral Model (HCSM).

CHAPTER V: HCSM (HOLISTIC COMBINED SPIRAL MODEL)

The fifth and final chapter presents the HCSM: The proposed model combines the researcher's practical insights, which emerged from the literature review describing approaches to foreign decision making, the review of methodology employed in this research and the discussion of findings emerging from three case studies with analysis of Prime Minister Golda Meir's foreign decision making (between June 1970 and

December 1973). The conceptual framework of this research process and its conclusions have led to the formulation of the applied HCSM model.

HCSM tends to be a reflective model for foreign decision-making process analysis in political science, based on two key stages. The first stage is a rejection of the basic assumptions of natural science, as being a suitable application of the study of decision-making in political science. The second is adopting basic assumptions from the hermeneutic interpretation tradition, from Ricoeur's (1981) school of thought.

The researcher tends to adopt the basic assumptions made by Ricoeur (1981), and apply them in this proposed model process. This chapter will present basic methodological assumptions, model goals and questions, in addition to five core application principles:

ONE - HCSM aims for a holistic perspective: a theoretical level with an ontological and epistemological starting point; and practical levels - continuing on from Hermann's determination and thus similarly to the first complex point of view presented by Allison, the researcher in HCSM assumes that a holistic panoramic perspective of decision-making processes is likely to significantly contribute to understanding relevant phenomena.

TWO - HCSM offers to combine approaches and create new concepts; it offers to refer during the analysis to the **Rational, Emotional, Bureaucratic and Irrational** aspects taken from the fundamental approaches. The four aspects will be considered from two points of view: theoretical sources and practical applications.

THREE - HCSM tends to emphasize the dominance of a single decision-maker.

Relying on previous researchers' arguments, the model proposes a principal basic argument, according to which in cases of complex decision-making, decisions are taken by a lone and dominant decision maker, who is a senior personality in the ruling apparatus, and who therefore has direct responsibility for its outcomes.

FOUR – HCSM Influencing Dominant Aspect (IDA) & Influencing Dominant Factors (IDF) within each Decision Making Points (DMP). This principles derived from the case studies are three of the common prominent conclusions that emerged. IDA refers to the fact that in every decision making point, one can distinguish and focus on the existence and influence of one more dominant aspect among the four proposed; and IDF refers to the fact that in every decision making point, one can distinguish and focus on the existence and influence of dominant factors.


FIVE - HCSM proposes to describe foreign decision making process analysis as an ongoing process that gathers decision making points as represented by the **Spiral motif.**

In summary, this research advances and combines two parallel areas of research - historical research and foreign decision making in social sciences.

Historical research: by examining the period between June 1970 and December 1973, the research describes how Meir's decision making in the first part of the 1970s contributed to driving the peace process in later foreign relations between countries, as well as it being the background to the commencement of direct talks between Israel and Egypt in November 1977. In this context, this research contributes another level to understanding the Israeli-Egyptian conflict and its resolution at that time.

Foreign decision making in social science research: the research deals with analyzing chosen models from principal approaches in the field, as well as their application in three case studies that investigated Meir's foreign decision making in different events between1970-1973. The application process led to conclusions from which the researcher formulated a theoretical and practical model for reflective analysis of foreign decision making, known as HCSM.





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