

**NATIONAL PREFERENCES
OF THE EU AND NATO MEMBER
STATES AT THE EASTERN BORDER**

**STUDY CASE:
ROMANIA AND POLAND**

-Resume-

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the significance of the national preferences concept in shaping the policies of NATO and the EU regarding their Eastern border, emphasising the three levels of analysis proposed by Andrew Moravcsik: the domestic, the interstate and the supranational level. Although this theoretical framework was mainly developed in order to explain the economic dynamics within the EU, it will be used in order to explain the foreign policy dynamics within the EU and NATO in order to test its applicability at international level and to prove that states are not only abstract concepts that have abstract, immutable national interests. States are formed of people that have different bargaining powers, different positions, different preferences and that ultimately take decisions. The hypothesis that is tested throughout this thesis is that states are always the main leaders in terms of conducting foreign policy in security related aspects regardless of the organizational development in this area, no matter how much the international/supranational organizational framework has been developed over the years. Moreover, the thesis will also test the assumption according to which the EU's and NATO's preferences or strategies are the result of the sum of national preferences/strategies of their member states or if there is a single state or a small group of states that represent the constant or changeable leader of the organizations taking into account the following dependent variables: regional stability/instability, geographical proximity of a chosen external actor of the two organizations, historical links that NATO/the EU member states have with the aforementioned external actor.

Regarding the geographical limits, the thesis has a special emphasis on the Eastern border of the two organizations, especially the relationship that the two organizations, on one hand, and their member states, on the other, have with the following states: the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Moldova- the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, the Ukrainian energy crisis, the Georgian war, the Ukrainian crisis, NATO after 1991, NATO enlargement, the ABMDS, security matrix, etc. Regarding the timeline, the analysis will concentrate on the post 1991 events until the Second Minsk Agreement (February 2015) given the current rapid dynamics changing and its importance in explaining the EU's changing decision making process.

The case study of the thesis concentrates on a comparative analysis between two frontier states of NATO and the EU, Poland and Romania, in order to test the geographical proximity and the negative historical factor variables and their role in settling the status of being a donor or a receiver in terms of national preferences at international/supranational level.

Keywords: *national preferences, the EU, NATO, Eastern frontier, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, member states*

CONTENTS

Introduction.....	12
1. Theoretical Approach – National Preferences within International Debate.....	24
1.1.First level of analysis: the domestic level.....	29
1.2. Second level of analysis: interstate bargaining level.....	34
1.3.Third level of analysis: supranational level.....	37
1.4. National preference versus national interests.....	39
1.5. Critics to Andrew Moravcsik’s theoretical framework.....	41
2. The European Union: National Versus Supranational; Economic Versus Political.....	44
2.1.EU’s political character and external power projection.....	45
2.2. The European Union and Eastern Europe ante Vilnius.....	49
2.2.1. The reawakening of Russia.....	49
2.2.2. The EU and the Russian Federation: a sustainable bilateral relationship?.....	53
2.2.3. European strategies towards Eastern Europe.....	55
2.2.4. The Eastern Partnership.....	60
2.2.4.1. The Republic of Moldova within the Eastern Partnership before Vilnius.....	62
2.2.4.2. Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership before Vilnius.....	68
2.2.5. Hard security threats at the EU’s border: the Georgian War.....	74
2.2.6. Five traditional approaches within the EU.....	81
2.3. Energy security within the EU.....	90
2.3.1. Energy crisis of European Security – Ukraine.....	93
2.3.2. The EU as a Net Importer.....	97
2.4. The Ukrainian 2013 events-change of paradigm?.....	102
2.4.1. Eastern Attitudes- the politically grounded hawks.....	108
2.4.2. Western attitudes-the upgraded economically grounded doves.....	112
2.4.3. Western attitudes-the economically grounded doves.....	116
2.5. Conclusions.....	122
3. NATO- Between Military and Economic Preferences.....	126
3.1. Internal changes after 1990.....	127
3.2. NATO in Eastern Europe.....	131

3.3.NATO enlargement.....	133
3.4.The Anti Ballistic Missile Defence System	140
3.4.1. The nuclear bomb: threat or mean towards stability?	140
3.4.2. Nuclear Zero- real possibility or utopia?.....	143
3.4.3. Traditional theoretical perspectives regarding ABMDS.....	147
3.4.4. The Anti Ballistic Missile Defence System-brief history to present debate.....	149
3.4.5. ABMDS-technical aspects.....	156
3.4.6. The threat	162
3.4.7. The ABMDS form a nuclear balance perspective- the Russian Federation.....	169
3.4.8. Conclusions.....	173
3.4.9. Future research on ABMDS.....	175
4. Case Study: Eastern Border of EU and NATO Views From Poland and Romania.....	178
4.1. Regional framework.....	178
4.2.Romania.....	179
4.2.1. Romania-Moldova-Russia triangle.....	186
4.2.2. The Black Sea region.....	189
4.3.Poland.....	194
4.3.1. Poland-Ukraine-Russia strategic partnership ante Vilnius.....	198
4.3.2. Poland-Ukraine-Russia post Vilnius.....	201
4.3.3. Conclusions	205
Bibliography.....	207
Annexes.....	230

**NATIONAL PREFERENCES OF THE EU AND NATO MEMBER STATES AT
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Introduction

The main objective of the present PhD thesis is to develop a comprehensive analysis on the decision making process within the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) regarding their foreign and security policies with a special focus on their policies occurring at their Eastern frontier.

The importance of the theme lies in the fact that, although both organizations have stipulated their desire to be global actors, their immediate Eastern frontier has been for years an unstable and unsecure region that reminded us about the interplay of the Cold War between the East and the West. At the same time these negative dynamics reveal a deficient partnership between the EU and NATO on one side and the Russian Federation on the other which in turn affects their international recognized legitimacy and their status (Russia wants to be recognized as a great power and to be part of a multilateral international system, NATO is still redefining itself in terms of threats responses mechanisms and the EU wants to be recognized as a global power). The dysfunctional partnership between the aforementioned actors reveals two aspects: internally, NATO and the EU still have problems in developing a comprehensive, unitary and categorical position given the too different preferences of their member states (which automatically affects their status of global powers since they are perceived as not being prepared to create stability and security in their own neighbourhood), externally their normative power is not accepted by certain states (for example neither Russia, nor China accept the European model) and this creates approach difficulties for both institutions.

In order to elaborate this analysis, I will test the hypothesis that states are always the main leaders in terms of conducting foreign policy in security related aspects regardless of the organizational development in this area. Given the theme of my thesis, I will try to prove that although both organizations (NATO and the EU) have passed through several developments that conferred them a distinct identity and several competences over the years, in terms of foreign policy security related issues the national preferences of their member states are the main driving force. States have not given up their sovereignty, but are more inclined to negotiate, to make

compromises, hence to cooperate given the nature of the regional system that these two organizations have created. The interdependence between the members and the shadow of future¹ make states more reliable to cooperate rather than to defect. At the same time states are not only abstract concepts that have abstract, immutable national interests. States are formed of people that have different bargaining powers, different positions, different preferences and that ultimately take decisions. If the shadow of future is a very important element that makes states more willingly to cooperate especially within an institutional framework, externally the shadow of the past is equally important. This element is crucial when discussing about the relationship between Russia and the Ex-soviet republics that are now part of NATO and the EU. Even more importantly, for their relationship, we should take into consideration the shadow of their past and how this element affected their preferences.

Throughout this paper I will analyse: the primary source and the appurtenance of EU or NATO external and security policy decisions; the nature of the national preferences and their in/variability character. In this sense I will test the assumption according to which the EU's and NATO's preferences or strategies are the result of the sum of national preferences/strategies of their member states. Although officially all vote or informally agree on a single decision, generally it represents the national preferences of only one country or of a small group of states. Additionally, whereas in the case of stability and predictability the national preferences are economically driven, during crisis situations, the national preferences that dominate the negotiating scene are the political driven ones and the main decision makers are the executive branch and the public opinion. Also during crisis periods states tend to cooperate more within the organization they are part of, especially if they perceive an external threat and thus they can pass the limit of the minimum common denominator. Additionally, the geographical proximity has the potential to change the nature of the national preferences, from economic based to political-

¹ The term defines a situation in which cooperation can emerge due to the belief that the two players will meet in the future. For example, state A will develop a more cooperative approach towards state B due to the fact that it is aware of the fact that they will meet in the future and if state A will defect now, then states B will defect in the future. It was developed by game theorists that explained the emergence of cooperation given the rationality of a player that pushes him to defect (prisoner's dilemma). Robert Axelrod described in his paper "The Evolution of Cooperation" the situation I which cooperation can be stable "For cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently large shadow. This means that the importance of the next encounter between the same two individuals must be great enough to make defection an unprofitable strategy. It requires that the players have a large enough chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance of their next meeting too greatly". http://www.cultureofdoubt.net/download/docs_cod/evolution%20of%20cooperation,%20axelrod.pdf
p.4

strategically ones. In order to create a glibly approach and to get to point 0 of the European and Trans-Atlantic decision making processes I will analyse the three levels of decision making proposed by Andrew Moravcsik: the domestic level where the preferences are formed; the inter-state level where states bargain and the supranational level in the case of the EU/international level in the case of NATO, where the inter-state decisions are taken.

Throughout this thesis I will try to answer the following research questions: How is the EU's and NATO's "common interest" formed? Does it represent the sum of the national preferences of their member states or does it represent the national preferences of the state that has the largest bargaining power at that moment? Thus, which are the receiving and the donor states in terms of the foreign and security policy of the EU and NATO regarding Eastern Europe? Are the Eastern frontier states donors or receivers in matters that concern Eastern Europe? In order to answer those questions, I will take into consideration as dependent variables: the member states' identified national preferences regarding Eastern Europe, their geographical proximity towards Moldova, Ukraine and mainly Russia, their traditional approach towards Russia (moderated or not; positive or not); and their historical linkage with Russia. In terms of chosen independent variables, they are: the economic and political-strategic dimension of preferences and foreign policy aspects.

From a theoretical point of view, I will use Andrew Moravcsik's concept of national preferences. As part of my personal contribution I will add a more political-strategic dimension in order to explain better the dynamics from the Eastern part of the European continent and the two organisations' approach. Hence, although Andrew Moravcsik's theoretical approach was mainly created to explain the economic dynamics within the EU, given the political-strategic nature that I will add to the concept of national preferences, I will apply it to the EU foreign policy and also to NATO, a military alliance that does not possess large supranational competences. The choice of both organizations is a crucial element of the paper since one cannot speak about the security of Eastern Europe and Russia's reactions without also mentioning NATO. Additionally, the majority of EU member states are also allies within NATO and it is very important to see if the different institutional framework generates different perceptions and if the domestic decision making actors change or are the same.

Regarding the limits of my research, geographically it will extend to Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. Exception will make Iran in the case of the

anti-ballistic missile defence system because this state is the official reason (the main threat) why the Euro-Atlantic project is being under development. The Georgian war also represents an exception given its importance in analysing the relationship between the EU and Russia and its role in explaining the current Ukrainian dynamics. The choice of the Republic of Moldova lies in the fact that this state has a common border with NATO/the EU and Russia, that it has registered the highest score within the Eastern Partnership program and thus had the highest chances in signing Association Agreements with the EU, and that at the same time it is perceived by Russia as being part of its traditional area of influence. Additionally, the strategic partnership between it and Romania has the potential to influence the EU's approach towards Moldova. The choice of Ukraine rests in the fact that it has a common border with NATO/the EU and Russia. This is the largest Eastern immediate neighbouring state for EU and NATO after Russia, it is a transit country (Druzhba pipeline which ensures approximately 70% of the Russian natural gas exports towards the European market is passing through its territory), its strategic position is of great importance for the EU and NATO. Also, it is a riparian state at the Black Sea, an area traditionally perceived by Russia as being within its area of influence. Additionally, Ukraine is perceived by Moscow as one of the most important ex-soviet republics that has a crucial role for Russia strengthening its status on the international scale, not only in terms of power, but also in terms of identity. Last, but not least, its strategic partnership with Poland has the potential to influence the EU and NATO's policies towards Ukraine. The choice of Russia is quintessential for the theme of the paper since this state is the largest neighbour of the EU and NATO. It is also the official successor of the USSR, it is one of the main exporting countries in terms of natural gas and oil for the European states, and it perceives NATO and the EU as threats to its own region of influence. Moreover it wants to be a model for the ex-soviet space distinct from the Western one and it has large minorities in both Ukraine and Moldova. It does not accept the European model, it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and it is a Black Sea regional power which is traditionally considered to be under its area of interest. Additionally it had strategic partnerships with several EU and NATO member states, the very existence of which could have changed the position of these two institutions vis-a-vis Russia.

Regarding the timeline, the analysis will concentrate on the post 1991 events, on one hand, since this is the year when the USSR faced disbandment, Ukraine gained independence, Moldova gained its independence, Russia became the official follower of the USSR, NATO

stopped having a threat to which it had to respond (thus it had to reform itself or to dissolve), and the EU was passing through one of its most important developments, the Maastricht Treaty. On the other hand, the other temporal limit of the present paper is the Second Minsk Agreement (February 2015) given the current rapid dynamics changing and its importance in explaining the EU's changing decision making process

In terms of thesis organization the first chapter will be dedicated to the theoretical framework that is going to be tested throughout the paper. I will start with the definition of the *national preferences* concept, its nature, and its limits. Given the fact that the theme of the paper is the influence that these national preferences have over the international decision making process, I will also focus on the three levels of analysis that Moravcsik is proposing and the possible strategies that states imply in order to achieve their desired outcomes. Within the chapter there will be developed also a parallel analysis between the concepts of national interests and national preferences in order to highlight the similarities and the differences that exist between two concepts that are often confused. The first chapter will end with the analysis of several critical views that have been brought to Moravcsik's work in order to get a comprehensive theoretical image.

The second chapter of the thesis will focus on the European Union. If in the first chapter's the approach was a bottom-up one (national towards international or supranational) in order to highlight the influenced and the logic lines of a decision that was taken internationally, in this chapter the analysis will be a top-down approach (supranational towards national). In this sense I will analyse, first, the results of the European policies vis-a-vis the Eastern part of Europe and then their national sources. The second chapter will be structured mainly in two parts: ante Vilnius and post-Vilnius summit dynamics in order to highlight the different approaches and the changes of strategies. In this sense throughout this chapter there will be analysed: the European Neighbourhood policy and the French preferences' influence, the Eastern Partnership and the Polish influence, the relationship with Russia and the German influence, the relationship of the EU with Moldova and Ukraine and the Romanian/Polish influence, the Georgian war and different and even contradictory national preferences, and the energy security. Also there will be analysed the emergence of a supranational preference and the current Ukrainian crisis and the Polish/German national preferences' influence over the decision making process. Thus, there

will be analysed events that pertain to both low (energy security during stability and instability periods) and high politics² (the Georgian war, the Ukrainian crisis).

The third chapter will focus on NATO and its policies regarding Eastern Europe. Since the Georgian war and the current Ukrainian crisis are analysed in the previous chapter and based on the fact that Russia places itself on a more negative position towards NATO than the EU, within this chapter I will focus on the early development of NATO after 1991, its enlargement towards the East coupled with American/French/German influence. In what regards the current developments, the chapter analysis will focus on the anti-ballistic missile defence system and the different national preferences regarding it (American, French, German, Romanian, Polish): why it is needed, the threat, the technological development and its limitations, its influence over the regional security and NATO's relationship with Russia, which are the donors and which are the receivers, the domestic process: who were and who are the main domestic players that had the largest bargaining power when settling their national preferences within NATO.

The last chapter represents the study case of the thesis and it will focus mainly on Romania and Poland vis-a-vis their influence over the European, Euro-Atlantic decision making process and their capacity to be receivers or donors in terms of uploading their national preferences to the international/supranational level. In this sense there will be developed a parallel analysis between the Romania-Moldova-Russia relationship and between Poland-Ukraine-Russia. I will analyse which are the main national preferences of these states relating to Eastern Europe, which was their influence over the international decisions that were taken within the EU and NATO framework, if they became donors or receivers, if their strategies proved to be efficient and if they should change their strategies in order to reach their desired outcomes (their preferences). The study case will test the above mentioned research question: is the geographical proximity influencing the status of a state in terms of being a donor or a receiver within an international/supranational framework? In this sense, I have chosen Poland and Romania since

² The two concepts are used in international relations theory in order to describe the different perceptions that state have over the different areas in which they cooperate or not. The distinction is usually made by scholars that research on EU's decision making process, sovereignty ceding/transfer and supranational competences of EU's institutions. The concept of *high politics* refers to vital national interests. In a narrow sense it refers to peace or national security aspects. In a broader sense it refers to all the situations that a state finds of high interests. On the other hand, the concepts of *low politics* refers to the ordinary agenda that does not affect the vital interests of a state. Examples regarding the EU could be the Common Foreign Security Policy (high politics) and the fishery policy (low politics). More information regarding the subject can be found: Herman Lelieveldt, Sebastiaan Princen, "*The Politics of the European Union*", Cambridge Textbooks in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2011

they both are frontier states of the EU and NATO; are geographically very close to Russia, Historically their relationships have being based on negative dynamics, they still perceive Russia as a threat, they have strategic partnerships and support the integration into the Western structures of Moldova and Ukraine, two states that are considered by Moscow to be part of its traditional area of influence.

In terms of used *methods*, throughout this paper I will use, besides the conceptual analysis, that was already mentioned, *document analysis and variable based case study – which is testifying the validity of the theory*.

The main documents that are going to be analysed are: the EU's 2003 Security Strategy³ in order to see how this organization is placing itself at international level, how it perceives Russia and if it was efficient in following its own strategy; and the Lisbon treaty which will be useful in emphasizing the organization's current competences⁴. Regarding NATO, there will be analysed the North Atlantic Treaty⁵ for the above mentioned reasons and the organization's two strategic concepts⁶ that were adopted after 1991, documents that reveal the organization's view regarding the international system and Russia. Given the specific theme of the paper, I will analyse the official documents that have been released regarding Eastern Europe: The European Neighbourhood Policy⁷, the Eastern Partnership and to a certain extent the Third Energy Package. These documents will reveal the EU's degree of implication in this area, the opportunities and the limitations of these strategic documents, elements that should provide us with information about the current situations (one size fits all approach, more for more principle and the lack of clear membership perspectives). There will also be analysed the recent released

³ "A Secure Europe in a Better World", The European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, Brussels <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> accessed on 23 March 2014

⁴ Lisbon Treaty, 17 December 2007, ISSN 1725-2423 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL&from=EN> accessed on 23 September 2014

⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 1949 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed on 23 September 2014

⁶ NATO's strategic concept from 1991- http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm and NATO's second Strategic concept from 2010 http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf accessed on 23 September 2014

⁷ "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" COM(2003)104 final, accessed March 20, 2013 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0104:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed on 23 September 2014

documents regarding Ukraine and Moldova's reform status⁸ ante Vilnius, which would highlight the procedural, objective development of the in aligning to the European standards, and their East-West approaches.

There will also be analysed key documents of national importance like for example Poland's National Security Strategies from 2007⁹ and 2014¹⁰ in order to establish which are this state's national preferences and which is the strategy it implies for Eastern Europe, if they are constant or if they have changed. These variables will be analysed in the case of Romania, also. Thus, there will be examined Romania's National Defence Strategy from 2010¹¹ since it is the most recent security document released by the Romanian authorities, and the Agreement between Romania and the US regarding the ABMDS¹² from 2011. Given its regional power status, the same variables will be analysed within Russia's 2009 National Security Strategy¹³, the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept¹⁴ and its 2014 Military Doctrine¹⁵ in order to see how it positions itself at international level, vis-a-vis the EU, NATO and Moldova and Ukraine, if its strategy has changed and how this affected the Western decision making process (member states' strategies, national preferences)

At the regional level there will be analysed: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed between the EU and the Russian Federation from 1997¹⁶, the six point's plan

⁸ European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries," (May 2012), <http://www.soros.md/files/publications/documents/EaP%20Index%202012%20final.pdf> accessed on 23 September 2014

⁹ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 2007, <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Poland-2007-eng.pdf> accessed on 23 September 2014

¹⁰ *National Security Strategy of the Republic Of Poland*, 2014, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf accessed on 23 September 2014

¹¹ *Strategia Nationala de Aparare a Romaniei (SNAp)* (2010), Romanian Presidency, <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf> accessed on 4 April 2014

¹² Agreement between Romania and the United States of America on the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in Romania, 13 September 2011, Washington, http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/files/file/tratate/2011.09_scut_en.pdf accessed on 14 April 2014

¹³ Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года (Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020), 2009 <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html> accessed on 24 April 2014

¹⁴ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 12 February 2013 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D accessed on 12 May 2014

¹⁵ Military Doctrine of Russia, 26 December 2014, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/23447> accessed on 4 April 2014

¹⁶ The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between European Communities and their Member States and the Russian Federation, 1997, http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/partnership_and_cooperation_agreement_1997_english.pdf accessed on 4 April 2014

which was signed in order to stop the Georgian war¹⁷, the Geneva Agreement¹⁸, the economic sanctions that the EU imposed to Russia¹⁹ and the Minsk Agreements in order to highlight the positions of the EU as a whole in its relations with external partners, if they revealed a minimum common denominator, if they represented the common view or if they were the result of a state's national preferences uploading.

Apart from these official documents, I will also analyse declarations/official statements made by the European Commission²⁰ regarding the European energy security in the case of a new Ukrainian gas crisis and Eurostat statistics²¹ in order to see which EU member states import the most from Russia and if it is a direct link between this aspect and their national preferences, hence their strategies towards Eastern Europe.

The analysis of official discourses will also be useful in order to see which are the differences between strategic documents and authorities' discourse (if they are convergent or divergent). Given the fact that the theme of the thesis and that the events from Ukraine are still ongoing and that not all analysed parties released new strategies regarding the area, recent discourses proved to be a useful tool in analysing if there was a change in EU's and NATO's member states' national preferences or if it was only a change of strategy. In this sense, there will be analysed the discourses of: EU representatives, national states' authorities from EU and NATO countries, Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan discourses regarding the two organizations. In the case of the Georgian war, special emphasis will be placed on discourses of Germany,

¹⁷ IANS, "Georgia, Russia agree to French-brokered peace plan," *Thaindian*, 13 August 2008,

http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/83465_10083465.html accessed on 3 January 2014

¹⁸ Geneva Statement on Ukraine, The European Union External Action, Geneva, 17 April 2014, doc no. 140417/01

http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140417_01_en.pdf accessed on 5 May 2014

¹⁹ "Council Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine" and "Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine", Official Journal of the European Union, September 12, 2014, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN> accessed on 20 September 2014

²⁰ Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council on the short term resilience of the European gas system Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015, Brussels, 16.10.2014 COM(2014) 654 final, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_stresstests_com_en.pdf accessed on 20 January 2015

²¹ Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-28, 2002–12, Eurostat, 15 May, 2014

[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-28,_2002%E2%80%9312_\(%25_of_extra_EU-28_imports\)_YB14.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-28,_2002%E2%80%9312_(%25_of_extra_EU-28_imports)_YB14.png) accessed on 20 January 2015

France, Poland, Lithuania, Italy, United Kingdom²²; in the case of energy security: Austria²³, Germany²⁴; in the case of the Ukrainian crisis: Germany²⁵, Poland²⁶, Lithuania²⁷, Romania²⁸. Regarding Eastern Europe, a special attention will be given to Putin's discourses at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy from 2007²⁹ in order to explain Russia's behaviour regarding its neighbourhood.

Besides these primary sources, the thesis will present also secondary ones, the analyses of the main researchers in the area like: Nicu Popescu: "*A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*"³⁰, Alexander Dughin "*Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right*"³¹, Zbigniew Brzeziński "*The Grand Chessboard American Primacy and Its - Geostrategic Imperatives*"³²,

²² "EU freezes talks with Russia at summit," *Euractiv*, 2 Sept 2008 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-freezes-talks-russia-summit/article-175031>, accessed on 25 January 2013

²³ Gustav Gressel, How should Europe respond to Russia? The Austrian view, European Council on Foreign Relations, 21 January 2015 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_should_europe_respond_to_russia_the_austrian_view405 accessed on 10 April 2015

²⁴ Markus Wehner, How should Europe respond to Russia? The German view, European Council on Foreign Relations, 18th November 2014 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_should_europe_respond_to_russia_the_german_view356 accessed on 10 April 2015

²⁵ Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel on the situation in Ukraine, The Federal Chancellor, 13 March 2014 http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reden/2014/2014-03-13-regierungserklaerung-ukraine_en.html accessed on 10 April 2015

²⁶ Lally Weymouth, "Talking with Poland's foreign minister about the Ukraine crisis and Russia's next moves", *Washington Post*, April 18, 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-with-polands-foreign-minister-about-the-ukraine-crisis-and-russias-next-moves/2014/04/17/f1811e84-c5ad-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html accessed on 2 May 2014

²⁷ John D. Stoll, "Lithuania President: Economic Sanctions Will Backfire; Political, Diplomatic Action Best", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 19, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20140319-707155.html> accessed on 5 May 2014

²⁸ "Basescu: What the Russian Federation wants is to federalize Ukraine and hamper presidential elections", *AgerPress*, 14 May 2014, <http://www.agerpres.ro/news-of-the-day/2014/05/14/basescu-what-the-russian-federation-wants-is-to-federalize-ukraine-and-hamper-presidential-elections-10-12-20> accessed on 17 May 2014

²⁹ Putin's Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, Munich, President of Russia website, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml accessed on 5 May 2014

³⁰ Mark Leonard și Nicu Popescu în articolul *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, FRIDE, http://www.fride.org/uploads/file/A_power_audit_of_relations_eu-russia.pdf pp.30, 36-37 accessed on 5 January 2014

³¹ Cit in *Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed from the Right*, Alexander Dughin, Arktos Media Ltd (September 30, 2014)

³² Zbigniew Brzeziński, "*The Grand Chessboard American Primacy and Its - Geostrategic Imperatives*", Basic Books; 1st Edition edition (September 18, 1998)

Andrei Tsygankov “Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin”³³, Henry Kissinger “Do We Achieve World Order Through Chaos or Insight?”³⁴, Kenneth Waltz “Structural Realism after the Cold War”³⁵, Stephen Walt “The Origins of alliances”³⁶, Robert Jervis “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate”³⁷, Dmitri Trenin’s Foreign Affairs article “Russia Leaves the West”³⁸ etc. All these works are useful in order to analyse the Eastern European security dynamics taking into account different perspectives. The theoretical chapter will be based among others on Moravcsik’s papers: “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”³⁹ and “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”⁴⁰ in order to see which is the current theoretical development, which are its limitations and how can it be applied not only to the Single Market, but to the international decisions that pertain more to the foreign policy.

Given the fact that I also analyse recent events, the present research will rely also on journals/academic articles and media news like Foreign Policy, Reuters, Moscow today, Jamestown, etc.

The second method will be used throughout this thesis is *variable based case study*, which is going to be used to testify the validity of the theory. It will focus on the Eastern dimension of the EU and NATO, their relationship and strategies with Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, if they use the same strategy in all three cases, which are the current regional security dynamics and which are the involved national preferences and actors in the

³³ Andrei Tsygankov. *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012

³⁴ Interview with Henry Kissinger: 'Do We Achieve World Order Through Chaos or Insight?', Interview Conducted By Juliane von Mittelstaedt and Erich Follath, *Spiegel*, 13 November 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-henry-kissinger-on-state-of-global-politics-a-1002073.html> accessed on 3 February 2015

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz – “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Summer, 2000), p.36 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf accessed on 3 February 2015

³⁶ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1990, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/political_science/users/elena.gadjanova/public/Walt%20Origins%20of%20Alliances0001.pdf accessed on 3 February 2015

³⁷ Robert Jervis . *Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate*. <http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C632.pdf> accessed on 15 June 2013

³⁸ Dmitri Trenin, *Russia Leaves the West*, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006 issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2006-07-01/russia-leaves-west> accessed on 3 February 2014

³⁹ Andrew Moravcsik “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” , *International Organization* 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–53 <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf> accessed on 3 February 2014

⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4

supranational/international decision making process. The method implies the development a study case which will be dedicated to a comparative analysis between Poland and Romania, two frontier states members of the EU and NATO, which have a negative historical links with Russia, are geographically close to it and have developed strategic partnerships with Ukraine, respectively Moldova. This study case will be used in order to test the validity of the second assumption: the geographical proximity transforms the national preferences from economic based to political-strategically ones and make states act more as donor within the organizational framework.

Using the aforementioned methods has had their limitations, namely the security aspects, especially regarding the ABMDS, since much of the information is not accessible for the public. I tried to overcome it by accessing the online declassified resources from the NATO online database available at EU's archives and by analysing more online and print analyses/simulations regarding the subject made by American specialized companies or by European experts. Another limitation with which I had to deal with was the language barrier, since not all documents are translated in English or French. Regarding this aspect I tried to overcome it by studying the Russian language and by translating the major documents. Last, but not least, another limitation was represented by the probability that the official discourses to be biased and to not follow the official national strategies. I tried to tackle this issue by analysing both the strategies and the discourses regarding the States' strategies.

1. THEORETICAL APPROACH – NATIONAL PREFERENCES WITHIN INTERNATIONAL DEBATE

From the theoretical point of view, I will use Andrew Moravcsik's concept of national preferences in both cases, the EU and NATO since I believe that it provides the most appropriate explanation for understanding the current dynamics occurring, on one hand, within the two organizations, and on the other hand between the organization and external actors (in this case, states like Russia, Moldova and Ukraine).

The concept can be framed within the institutionalist neo-liberalism. Its scholars concentrated their research on analysing political economy matters. For them the international system is anarchic, states are rational players, as in the case of realism, or neo-realism, but the gains are seen in absolute terms, not in relative ones as in the case of neo-realists. This basic distinction is of great importance since the outcomes influence the states' strategy. Since state A does not generally compare itself with state B, and it does not perceive its development as threatening to its own security, and they do not need to measure their gains by relating to others' gains and their power does not decrease or increase according to other's power development⁴¹, the chances of a security dilemma⁴² emergence are rather limited.

Additionally, the nature of gains has the capacity to make states cooperate more often, as they do not perceive each other in competitive situations. Moreover, by not perceiving each other in zero sum terms⁴³, the level of trust between the states can increase. Taking into consideration this undeniable chance for cooperation between states, the institutionalist neo-liberalism promotes the role of institutions that have the capacity to increase even more the level of cooperation between their member states⁴⁴. They do not perceive themselves as parts of an anarchic international system that obliges them to be mainly in competitive situations, where

⁴¹ Cit in Scott Burchill et al. *Theories of International Relations*. Third edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) available at : http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.65

⁴² The concept defines a situation in which state A is trying to ensure or to increase its national security. Its actions are perceived by states B as threatening, therefore it also start to increase its national security, thus creating a spiral of mistrust that leads to a accumulation of common perceived insecurity. The concept was developed mostly by the realist and neo-realist scholars. For Jervis, for example, "unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive constitute the "security dilemma" in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey, 1976.p.66

⁴³ The Zero sum games are an extreme situation, in which one party wins what the other has lost. The opposition between the parties is absolute. For more information you can access Adrian Miroiu. *Fundamentele politicii. Vol II: Raționalitate și acțiune colectivă*.(Iași: Polirom, 2007).p.27

⁴⁴ Robert Jervis . *Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate*. <http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C632.pdf> accessed on 15 June 2012. pp.44-45

everyone has to follow its own national interest, which is mostly a conflicting one. In this situation states tend to form organizations more often, because an increased level of safety is given by the stability of that institution. Being part of it, a state will be less worried about who gains more and who gains less. Defection itself is less probable in this situation, as the rules and the procedures developed within that institution will make it too costly for a state to take it into consideration. Hence, states will choose to cooperate⁴⁵. Connecting it with the present topic, it is less probable that Germany's gains are perceived by Romania in relative terms.

Returning to the concept of *national preferences*, they are not fixed as the *national interests* since they are not taking into consideration only constant elements like: the geographic position of a state, its resources, its population, its size, etc, but also the preferences of the major decision making groups that may vary over time and over issues. At the same time, given the fact that I will analyse the decision making process of two international organizations, the EU and NATO, from within and then the domestic level's influence over the external level, we need to take into consideration the existence of several levels of negotiation: domestically when the preferences are formed and externally, interstate bargaining between member states or between member states and players from outside the organisations. Additionally, when we are speaking about security, we cannot rely anymore only on the military aspect and an example in this sense would be the financial crisis. Economy is a sector that influences all levels of society. But at the same time, we cannot say that economic security is more important than the military one, or the political-strategic security. Regarding this aspect, I will try to demonstrate that the concept of national preference can also apply to politically strategic situations.

Critics to Andrew Moravcsik's theoretical framework

In terms of major critics that can be brought up to Moravcsik's model, I will analyse throughout this paper the nature of the national preferences. Are they only economically grounded as he is suggesting, or could we speak about national preferences in terms of security terms (strategic, security, political interests)?⁴⁶ An example in this sense could be seen in the case of Lithuania's policy towards Russia. Although it is practically dependent on Russian

⁴⁵ Gunther Hellmann; Reinhard Wolf "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO" *Security Studies*. 3:1 (1993)pp.8, 10

⁴⁶ Michelle Cini, "Intergovernmentalism" in *Politics in European Union*, Michele Cini, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.113-114

energy resources, thus it is economy will register a regression and the economic interests of the major business group are in favour of developing a productive relationship with Gazprom, Lithuania has almost developed a negative approach towards Moscow. In this case the national preferences were rather dictated by the political elite and emerged as being historically and politically grounded. And at the interstate level, these political/security preferences tend to have a higher bargaining power, thus downgrading the economic ones, if the external player is perceived as becoming more threatening or unpredictable.

Referring to the debate regarding the influence of the domestic actors upon the foreign policy of a state, we could say that the larger the security threat is perceived the larger the extent in which the governmental bodies have a bigger influence. An example could be Merkel's policy towards Moscow after the first Minsk agreement failed to implement. Although in Germany the interest groups have clear economical preferences in favour of lifting the existing sanctions against Russia, the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has become more critical towards Putin's policy in Ukraine.

Another major critic to the aforementioned model that will be tested throughout this paper is the fact that although Moravcsik takes into account the structures of the EU, namely its institutions, they have mainly the role of providing a specific framework to negotiations⁴⁷. Taking into account their role, in terms of competences they are rather limited, thus they cannot influence the national preferences of EU member states. But at the same time, we can encounter the empirical situation in which a supranational institution has the necessary competences in order to be able to change one state's preferences. One example is represented by the European Commission and its competences regarding the energy security of the EU. Although it mainly pertains to national states, the Third Energy Package is the main reason why South Stream project was not implemented although national states like Bulgaria and Hungary needed and wanted this project. At the same time this example can be seen as a consequence of inefficient negotiations, since these competences were given over time by the member states.

Last, but not least, Moravcsik assumes that states are rational. According to the definition, a rational player has mainly three characteristics:

⁴⁷ Pollack, M.A. „Elaborarea politicilor UE – teoretizari”. In Wallace, Helen. William Wallace, Mark A. Pollack (coords). Elaborarea politicilor in Uniunea Europeana. Bucuresti : Institutul European din Romania, 2005 p.18

1. It has its own preference, which is selfishly established. Additionally, the state is not interested in other players, meaning that it does not want to harm others, but at the same time it has not the objective to accomplish the interests of other states. The international system is creating an interdependent network in which one state's preferences are often interacting with others'. In this situation it cannot accomplish its preferences without influencing other states.
2. It has at its disposal perfect information. This aspect refers to the fact that a state supposes that the others are rational actors as well; it supposes the possible alternatives to that specific situation; it supposes the alternatives of others and it supposes the fact that others know all this information about it.
3. It is a perfect rational actor. It has the capacity to develop a cost-benefit analysis, to evaluate the available alternatives, to develop a hierarchy, to compare them and to select the most suitable one for it⁴⁸.

But taking into account that the domestic players that set a national preference at a given time at referring to a certain issue, it is very hard to assume that all of them are rational actors. Moreover, it is even more difficult to say if the possible alternatives that they are taking into consideration include the future inter-state level, especially since Moravcsik considers that the national preferences are not influenced by external factors, the strategies that states develop in order to accomplish them are.

⁴⁸ Adrian Miroiu. *Fundamentele politicii. Vol II: Raționalitate și acțiune colectivă*.(Iași: Polirom, 2007).p.11

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL VERSUS SUPRANATIONAL; ECONOMIC VERSUS POLITICAL

This chapter focuses on the EU's and EU's member states preferences over the Eastern Europe that is not part of the organization (especially Ukraine, Moldova and Russia). There will be analysed: the EU political character, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, Moldova's and Ukraine's scores within the EaP, the relationship that the EU has with Russia in the context of Moscow's reawakening, the current Ukrainian crisis, the energy security, and the Georgian war.

Throughout this chapter there were answered the following questions: How is the EU's "common interest" formed? Does it represent the sum of the national preferences of its member states or does it represent the national preferences of the state that has the largest bargaining power at that moment? Thus, which are the receiving and the donor states in terms of the foreign and security policy of the EU regarding Eastern Europe?

In the case of the EU, the foreign policy is clearly conducted by its member states especially regarding the security related aspects in relations with Eastern Europe. As an exceptions can stand the Third Energy Package which is the result of supranational competences of EU institutions that have the power to influence the states' behaviour regarding energy security, especially Russian energy monopoly. Therefore, the decision making process of the EU can be explained through Moravcsik's lens, but with few exceptions. In this sense the tested assumption according to which the EU's preferences or strategies are the result of the sum of national preferences/strategies of their member states is not confirmed. Rather than that, the single decision that emerges at EU's level and that commonly takes the form of a minimum common denominator is the result of an intensive bargaining process in which all member states are involved and want to upload their national preferences at supranational and international level as they all want to be donors. Regarding Eastern Europe, there can be identified some constant donors, depending on the time and geographic elements. After the enlargement rounds from 2004 and 2007, the non-EU Eastern European issues became a constant in the EU agenda, mainly because the Eastern frontier EU member states viewed this region as part of their national security. Given the fact that they have common borders with Moldova, Ukraine, Russia transforms Poland, Romania, the Baltic States' strategies into a constant trying to upload and transform the issues of Eastern Europe into a matter of EU's interest.

The time variable proved that states behave rationally since they tend to cooperate more within the organization they are part of, especially if they perceive an external threat. Thus they can pass the limit of the minimum common denominator. This was the case of Ukraine crisis and the sanctions that were imposed against the Russian economic sectors. Although the EU member states like Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Italy have developed over the years intensive bilateral economic relationships with Russia, after the non-compliance of Moscow with the perceived acceptable principles of the current international system (Crimean annexation, the break of the Minsk Protocol), the aforementioned member states changed their preferences regarding Moscow, adopting a common view in which all agreed to impose sanctions that will affect also their economies, but will balance Russia. At same situation cannot be applied also in the case of the Georgian war in which although the six points plan was signed, it was never completely followed by Russia that did not suffer any repercussions regarding this aspect since the negotiations regarding a new PCA were restarted. We could say that the EaP is the result of a crisis moment given the fact that it was adopted after the Georgian war. Although it represents a more developed and focused view regarding specially Eastern Europe, it still represents a policy that can be perceived as a minimum common denominator in which the EU Eastern states pushed for more EU involvement in the area and the Western ones had other preferences regarding other areas. Thus, the solution was found in a strategy that offers integration prospects to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgian, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine without full membership possibilities.

Regarding the geographical proximity, we can notice that the highest intensity of the national preferences in what concerns Eastern Europe is to be found at the Eastern frontier of the EU, since this is viewed as a matter of national security. The intensity seems to decrease as we move from the border line, but here another element is crucial, the nature of the national preferences implied since the geographical element has the potential to change the nature of the national preferences, from economic based to political-strategically ones.

The national preferences are the driving force that represent the T0 moment behind almost every European decision in security matters. They are different from state to state, from situation to situation in terms of the outcome that the domestic actors want to be achieved. In terms of their nature, they are not only economically grounded, but also politically. Regarding the special case of Eastern Europe, we can notice that the frontier EU member states have

developed more constant preferences that are mainly politically grounded, while the Western states developed a more economically grounded, changeable set of preferences. In this case, the time aspect does not have the automatic power to change the outcome. Whereas in the case of stability and predictability the national preferences are presumably economically driven, during crisis situations, the national preferences that dominate the negotiating scene should be the politically driven ones. At the same time we can notice the reluctance of Germany in imposing sanctions against Russia during the Georgian war, the suspension of the Mistral contract for a period of six months by France in order to avoid its severance or the energy based Memorandum signed by Austria under full sanctions.

Apart from their nature, in the case of the EU the changeable characteristic of the domestic actors that have the largest bargaining power as Moravcsik is implying depending on the situation. When the situation is not perceived as being a threat to the national security of the state or to the international agreed principles, the economic actors are the ones that dominate the national scene in what concern the development of national preferences regarding Eastern Europe. An example in this sense is the business groups from Germany that were opposed the possibility of imposing sanctions against the Russian sectors because such a measure would affect their business activities and implicate the German economy. At the same time, they are the main driving force when the national preferences are economic grounded, but the situation changes when we refer to politically grounded ones. In the case of the latter, the executive branch is the main domestic actor that develops the national preferences and the strategies that will lead to the desired outcome. This would be the case of the Baltic States regarding Russia. At the same time, the public opinion is also a very important element in the national debate, since the executive actor depends on its votes. But, these situations are rather constant and they develop similar preferences over time, fact that contradicts Moravcsik's theory regarding the changing aspect of national preferences. Rather than that the politically motivated national preferences tend to remain constant regardless of the time and situation criteria, having strategy changes (as it can be seen in the case of Lithuania that developed a constant negative approach regarding Russia, Romania that has a constant preference towards Moldova and Poland which expressed its preferences towards Ukraine). In the case of the economically motivated ones, they tend to be changeable, especially during crisis situation in which they can change or they can be upgraded to political motivated national preferences (an example in this situation can stand

Germany which passed from the economic preferences of not imposing sanctions to political measures against Russia even if they would affect the economic development of the state).

Returning to the receiver/donor debate, the assumption according to which although officially all vote or informally agree on a single decision, generally it represents the national preferences of only one country or of a small group of states is sustained by the present study case. Thus, we return to the research questions: which are the receiving and the donor states in terms of the foreign and security policy of the EU regarding Eastern Europe? Are the Eastern frontier states donors or receivers in matters that concern Eastern Europe? According to the study case of the EU regarding Eastern Europe the following conclusions can be developed: since they have these preferences as a constant being mainly politically grounded the Eastern EU member states have the potential to become donors in terms of European policies especially in or after crisis situation in which their legitimacy is growing. At the same time given the large differences between EU member states' preferences regarding Eastern Europe, a more moderated approach will have the largest chances to be adopted at international level. Additionally, when the crisis is perceived as being threatening the traditional recognized leaders will have the largest bargaining power. This logic can explain the reasons by in the case of the Georgian war, France had the largest bargaining power and led the negotiations. The situation tends to complicate in the case of the current Ukrainian crisis, but it still found itself under the same logic. Immediately after the crisis erupted, Poland was perceived by the other EU member states as being a regional leader regarding the area, it was recognized as being the leader of the V4 group, it was neighbouring Ukraine, it proposed the implementation of the EaP, it was the main promoter of Kiev's integration in the European structures, and its position was supported by other Eastern EU member states, creating a support group within the organization. All these aspects increased its bargaining power and it became a leader in the negotiations round regarding the situation settlement. But once the situation aggravated and Poland started to develop a more negative approach towards Russia, the EU leadership changed and Germany took the leading position, since it was perceived as being a traditional leader within the EU, it mediated between the US and the EU, it adopted a moderated approach that followed both parts of the Western and Eastern national preferences and maybe the most importantly, it was perceived by Russia as being an equal partner at the negotiation process.

3.NATO- BETWEEN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PREFERENCES

This chapter focuses on the NATO's and NATO's member states preferences over the Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova and Russia). In terms of analysis structure, given the fact that it is practically impossible to identify all the national preferences regarding Eastern Europe within the alliance since many of them did not reach the negotiations' agenda and that they may not be officially displayed, especially given the nature of the alliance (military security is encompassing a great extent of classified information), the chapter is organized on a top-down approach through which, firstly there will be identified and analysed the decisions that were taken at the NATO's level and then analyse their sources, the different national preferences and strategies that exist behind it, if there are politically, strategically or economically grounded. Hence throughout this chapter, there will be analysed: the internal changes that were undertaken by the allies after USSR's disbandment, NATO enlargement, nuclear bombs and the possibility of a nuclear free world, the anti-ballistic missile defence system- brief history, present debate, technological limits, the threat against which it responds to, the regional perspective and future research.

In order to develop a glibly analysis over this regional level, this time there will be applied the two levels proposed by Moravcsik, since we cannot talk about the supranational level in the case of NATO even taking into consideration the developments that occurred during the years. Thus, regarding the preferences of the organization, it represents a very different case from the EU, in the sense that given the very nature of the organization states are more than less likely to transfer parts of their sovereignty to the organization's institutions.

The chapter will answer to the following research questions: How is the NATO's "common interest" formed? Does it represent the sum of the national preferences of its member states or does it represent the national preferences of the state that has the largest bargaining power at that moment? Thus, which are the receiving and the donor states in terms of the foreign and security policy of NATO regarding Eastern Europe?

As in the case of the EU, in the case of NATO, the foreign policy is clearly conducted by its member states especially taking into consideration the nature of this organization. Therefore, the decision making process of NATO can also be explained to a certain degree through Moravcsik's lens, although at the first look the member states were developing more likely national interests than national preferences. Although the alliance is dealing with partly open

information, and that ultimately the governmental domestic actors is the one that decides upon the national preferences of that certain state, the public opinion and the interest groups are also very important domestic players. Moreover, the decisions are the result of a more intensive bargaining process than initially expected, element that is not present in the case of national interests. Examples in this sense can stand: the 2009 open letter to President Obama of 20 scientists among which different Nobel laureates which said that the ABMDS will not be capable of defending the region against a real missile attack. In 2010, studies made by Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis from M.I.T. and Cornell, showed that SM-3 that is going to be used also in the case of the European missile defence system are not that efficient. Although the official tests show that they can intercept 84% of the incoming missile, they say that in reality the rate of success is only around 10-20%, fact that the Pentagon disagrees with⁴⁹. Regarding the influence of the governmental actor in opposition with the President, the Republicans supported in 2014 a defence authorization bill that was rejected by Obama and that entailed the fact that the European allies should participate with at least a share of 50% of the costs of implementing the missile defence project. On the other hand, the domestic interest groups are also very important actors, since for example according to the 2015 budget, \$8.5 billion will be directed towards “missile defense, including \$7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency”⁵⁰. Another domestic actor that is in favour of the project is Raytheon Company, a company which worked at the development of the SM-3 and conducted the tests⁵¹. Additionally, in 2014 it gained an Engineering Services contract worth \$109 million for Patriot Air and Missile Defence System⁵².

In terms of nature of those preferences, they can be both economic and strategic. Economic preferences are obviously coming from the institutions that received public funding for research and development and the strategic ones coming from the government. On the other side, the preferences of US regarding NATO’s enlargement were strategic in the sense of gaining more influence over an area that was perceived to be part of its former enemy area of influence,

⁴⁹ William J. Broad And David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program”, New York Times, 17 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/18missile.html?_r=0 accessed on 5 March 2014

⁵⁰ Frank A. Rose, “International Security and Missile Defense, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland 19 November 2014, US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/234194.htm> accessed on 2 February 2015

⁵¹ “Mission: Global Defense”, Raytheon official website, <http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/missiledefense/> accessed on 4 March 2015

⁵² “Raytheon receives \$109 million contract for Patriot Air and Missile Defense System US and international Patriot partners strengthen defense against evolving threats”, Raytheon official website, 10 September 2014, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?item=2638> accessed on 5 March 2015

and in order to gain international recognition as the sole superpower of the system, but also economic, since NATO's enlargement gave them access to new markets. In the case of the Eastern states that were integrated in NATO their national preferences were clearly strategic in their nature, given the historical and geographical factor. Being more close to Russia and witnessing the communist area, or them bring part of NATO was a matter national security.

Whereas in the case of the EU the preferences and thus the national strategies were changeable, in the case of NATO they tend to be constant. This aspect can be explained given the fact that NATO has limited competences and jurisprudence. The allies are negotiating on specific parts of their foreign policy (the ones that imply the military aspects) and not as in the case of the EU where several domains are implied, hence creating a suitable scene for future compensations regarding other aspects that are more in the interest of other states. Additionally, the national preferences are more constant since all states want to achieve a high level of military security. The same cannot be said also about their strategies. An example in this sense can stand the Czech Republic. Initially this state accepted to be a hosting country for some element of the ABMDS. The reasons, once operation it will increase the states national security, it will increase its prestige level and it will attract foreign investment given the high level of security. After Russia's negative reaction, this states did not ratified the agreement, thus changing its strategy. Once again the geographical factor and the historical one played a decisive role.

Regarding the source of the preferences within NATO, as in the case of the EU, it does not represent the sum of the member states' national preferences, but of a single or a group of states that have the largest bargaining power. If in the case of the EU, the leading state has been identified according to a specific subject, but having still a constant in the case of Germany or France, in the case of NATO the leadership is rather constant, the US, with identifiable periods of debate between the European leaders (Germany and France) and the Atlantic one (US).

Future research on ABMDS

The ABMDS has the potential to change radically the regional balance of power, the opportunities and future challenges of hosting states in their relations with Western states and also with the Eastern part of Europe, as Russia. Following this logic, the development of a matrix of opportunities, risks and vulnerabilities that these states would have to face on short, medium and long term is crucial. The matrix has to evaluate the system's impact over the level of

Romania's, Poland's, Turkey's security/ EU member states and NATO allies from a quantitative and qualitative perspective.

4.CASE STUDY: EASTERN BORDER OF EU AND NATO: VIEWS FROM POLAND AND ROMANIA

This case study will help me establish if we can put a direct link between the geographical rapprochement and the quality of being a donor or receiving state in terms of national preferences, thus answering the final research question of the thesis. For this reason I have chosen Romania and Poland, two EU and NATO Eastern frontier states that had and have bilateral traditional relations (negative or positive) with: the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Throughout this chapter I focused on the bilateral level between Romania, Moldova and Russia on one hand, and Poland, Ukraine and Russia on the other to highlight the major similarities and differences that exists in their approach. I have chosen to analyse Romania-Moldova and Poland-Ukraine bilateral relationships because both of them represent strategic partnerships. The comparison is also useful, especially in terms of identifying the differences, in order to see which would be the more efficient approach in terms of becoming a donor state in terms of national preferences uploading.

Romania

Romania and Russia find themselves within a grey area since 2008 and negative dynamics can be seen in all sectors: economy, energy, social, diplomatic etc. If we were to include the Romanian state in one of the five different groups regarding their approach towards Russia, it would be the “Frozen Pragmatics”⁵³.

Although at the declaratory level, Romanian authorities are very active, in terms of bilateral meetings, bilateral agreements, and official documents regarding Russia, Romania proves to be rather passive, proving low intensity preferences, that makes this states a rather receiver than a donor in terms of EU’s strategy towards Moscow. Things tend to change in the case of Moldova, where Bucharest is very active trying to become a donor and to upload its national preferences at the EU’s level, fact that was partially achieved when the EU signed the Association Agreement with Moldova and the visa free agreements after the Ukrainian crisis erupted. At the same time signing these agreements could be interpreted as a reaction to Russia’s action in Ukraine, fact that is very hard to quantify. Although it is formally engaged in

⁵³ The names of the five groups were given by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu in the aticle *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, FRIDE, 2007, http://www.fride.org/uploads/file/A_power_audit_of_relations_eu-russia.pdf accessed on 15 March 2014, pp.30, 36-37

supporting Chisinau in its road towards the EU, Romania lacks a sustainable strategy towards Moldova, since for example the citizenship granting system lead to a more acute fragmentation among the Moldovan population, fact that could be observed in the parliamentary elections results where “*the three pro-European parties are set to have 57-58 seats in Moldova's 101-seat parliament, while the two pro-Russian opposition parties are expected to hold 43-44 seats*”⁵⁴, thus the difference is not so large.

Regarding the Romanian national preferences that were uploaded at European level, the lack of sustained and constant efforts of these preferences and the adoption of a strategy based on mimesis did not prove to be efficient neither for Romanian state, nor for the security of Moldova or the Black Sea region.

Poland

After the Georgian war, Poland became an intense supporter of creating an European policy that is specially designed for the eastern part of Europe since this would ensure the stability of the region, thus the security of Poland. Soon it succeeded in uploading its national preferences and the Eastern Partnership was adopted at the EU’s level thus transforming Poland from a new relatively member state that was generally a receiver into a donor in terms of EU decisions.

After the Ukrainian crisis erupted we witnessed a change of paradigm for Poland regarding Russia. As previously mentioned, this state started to develop a more negative approach towards its Eastern neighbour⁵⁵. Regarding the EU internal decision making process and the inter-states bargaining process, Poland was again very active is trying to solve the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, if in the case of the Eastern Partnership the relationship between Russia and Poland was not very affected (partly due to the fact that EaP did not offer clear membership perspectives and the Ukraine was passing a relatively pro-Russian or balancing between the East and West strategy), in the case of the current Ukrainian crisis, the relationship between Warsaw and Moscow has deteriorated. At the EU’s level Poland changed its relatively moderated view to a more negative approach towards Russia. As a consequence,

⁵⁴ “Moldova election: Pro-EU parties edge pro-Russian rivals”, *BBC*, 1 December 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30265985> accessed on 10 December 2014

⁵⁵ Lally Weymouth, “Talking with Poland’s foreign minister about the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s next moves”, *Washington Post*, 18 April 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-with-polands-foreign-minister-about-the-ukraine-crisis-and-russias-next-moves/2014/04/17/f1811e84-c5ad-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html accessed on 2 May 2014

Poland was excluded from what was called the “Normandy format” (Russia, Germany, France, and Ukraine) that negotiated the second Minsk Agreement concerning the Ukrainian crisis, although it was the most active state in this issue⁵⁶. This exclusion changed this state’s status from a donor to a receiver in terms of European decisions and Germany took the leadership in these matters. One possible reason is the deficient strategy that Poland implied. It adopted a rather proactive condemning attitude approach vis-a-vis Russia and it expected the Union to do the same, fact that the EU was not ready to do, given the still too different approaches towards the Russian Federation. Taking into account Moravcsik’s words, “*bargaining power will depend on the intensity of preference at the margin. Where uncertainty exists about the breakdown of negotiations or time pressure, concessions tend to come disproportionately from governments for which the failure to reach agreement would be least attractive*”⁵⁷. Poland felt that it had the most to lose and a continuation of an European policy that was too moderated for the Ukrainian crisis too be settle was not acceptable for this state. At the same time a ceasefire failure was not an acceptable outcome for Germany, which was more inclined to make concessions but to sign it. Given the different strategies and the different bargaining power, we can say that Germany gained the bargaining.

In terms of preferences, the Polish public opinion is of great importance for the Polish authorities when referring to Poland’s foreign policy towards Ukraine. For example, before the Ukrainian crisis erupted, only 20-25 % of the polish citizens declared themselves not interested in foreign policy as a whole. Regarding Ukraine especially, the numbers are relatively higher, 30-45% of Poles declaring themselves not interested in whether Ukraine should enter the EU, or should Ukraine have visa requirements when traveling in Poland. Although the numbers are higher, comparing it with other topics regarding the Poland’s foreign policy, (for example, the adoption of the Constitutional treaty, when 61% of the Poles declared to be not interested in the issue) we can assume that the citizens’ interest for their eastern neighbour was relatively high⁵⁸ and it only increased after the Vilnius.

⁵⁶ Piotr Buras, “The Polish-German split: A storm in a teacup?”, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 14 April 2015 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_polish_german_split_a_storm_in_a_teacup311660 accessed on 3 May 2015

⁵⁷ Andrew Moravcsik “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4.pp.504-505

⁵⁸ Nathalien Copsy, “Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the 'New Europe': A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine (Post-Soviet Politics)”, Ashgate, 2009.p.22

Referring to the influence of the public opinion over the state's preferences, the research conducted by Nathalien Copsey revealed that the public opinion influences Poland's foreign policy, especially, regarding Ukraine, but the most influential political domestic actor remains the government, especially the president⁵⁹.

In terms of pertaining to the 5 defined groups by Nicu Popescu, ante Vilnius I would have placed Poland between Friendly Pragmatics and Frozen Pragmatics. After the Ukrainian crisis erupted this state is more close to the New Cold Warriors group given the high level of perceived threat coming from Russia and its needed opportunity to become a leader in EU's foreign policy regarding Moscow and Kiev.

Summing up all the chapter's highlighted arguments, we could say that the Eastern frontier states can become donors in terms of uploading their national preferences at the European and Trans-Atlantic level. Examples in this sense stand Romania with the Black Sea Synergy and Poland with the Eastern Partnership. But, at the same time I have noticed an inversely proportionality between their capacity of being donors and the level of intensity in their negative approach towards Russia. The more adverse they are regarding these states, less chances they have to become donors.

Regarding preferences' nature, these states have clearly political, strategically motivated and they are influenced by these states preference towards their eastern neighbours (Moldova in the case of Romania and Ukraine in Poland's case)

Additionally, although EU/NATO member states tend to cooperate more within when they perceive an external threat, they are still incapable of moving beyond the minimum common denominator. Given this aspect, when a too negative approach is emerging, the others tend to exclude it from the negotiating table.

⁵⁹ Nathalien Copsey, "Public Opinion and the Making of Foreign Policy in the 'New Europe': A Comparative Study of Poland and Ukraine (Post-Soviet Politics)", Ashgate, 2009. p.107

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