### BABEŞ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA

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## DOCTORAL SCHOOL IN LINGUISTIC AND LITERARY STUDIES

# CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN, BRITISH AND ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE EXAMINATION: THE 2013 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

**Summary of doctoral thesis** 

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**Key words**: persuasion, listening rhetorics, audience, attitude, relevance theory, co-operative principle, principle of politeness, speech-act theory, irony, ambiguity, discourse strategy, discourse analysis, communication, power relations, soft power, language and culture, negative labeling, horse meat scandal, joke, negotiation, Wikileaks, Korean war, disarmament, nuclear test, non-proliferation treaty, Nobel Peace Prize, war on terrorism, missile defense facility, inflamed rhetoric, media rhetrickery.

#### Summary

Our dissertation addresses the American, British and Romanian diplomatic language in the 2013 North Korean nuclear test threats and inflamed rhetoric, in an attempt to both gain and offer insight into a very topical situation for today's diplomacy. On the one hand, the United States of America and their allies are still determined to fight the war against terrorism of which North Korea is a target as being a constituent part on the "axis of evil" as former President George W. Bush declared in the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 and, on the other hand, North Korea still considers itself at war with the United States since the Korean War in the '50s ended only with a truce. Moreover, North Korea seems determined not to comply with the multiple resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, to disregard the international community's expressed concern and demands on the matter to put an end to threats and pursue the path to peacefully developing diplomatic relations in accordance with the international laws in effect.

We have started our journey towards analyzing the contemporary American, British and Romanian diplomatic language in the case of the 2013 North Korean nuclear test by quoting Euripides: "the language of truth is simple." We have looked into the theory and practice of eloquence, rhetoric and in doing so we have started with persuasion as it could clue us in on understanding how beliefs are shaped and how consensus is reached through dialogue, the key to our chosen subject of examination. We have moved on to audience, as what one does or says has consequences that go beyond the safe perimeter of the individual and is, at the same time, central to framing strategies. We continued our journey by depicting the attitudinal choices the speakers make and the attitude induced to the audience through persuasion by means of employing, in a passionate manner, the strongest, most effective arguments. After considering some rhetoric features that help framing the mindset of a trained speaker regarding the speech he or she is about to deliver and the knowledge needed to do that in a convincing manner, we focused our attention on how to go from thoughts to words and actions. We acknowledged the cooperative principle introduced by Grice, the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson, Leech's principle of politeness, the speech-act theory. Without leaving aside culture and identity in building a discourse, irony, ambiguity, vagueness were addressed, as well as the appropriateness of joking or not in a given discursive context. From this, it followed logically to move on to discourse and conversation analysis, looking into some of their features. We focused on some of the most relevant parameters for the topic that will bring us to our second and third chapter of the present work. In the light of these, we agree to the words of Euripides assessing that the language of truth is simple: the highest virtue that ought to be sought, the truth, needs no embellishment to maintain its validity. At the same time however, he was wrong: in the public sphere, the language of truth faces barriers that, in the attempt to overcome them, reveal undeniable, inevitable, connective realities. Sensitive matters and audience's perceived attitude... accompanied by linguistic barriers, cultural barriers, historical barriers, psychological barriers – no matter their type, by acknowledging them, as we have briefly attempted to do, we are one step closer to dealing with them in the most suitable manner at hand, to overcoming them and to persistently start looking for bridges instead of being stopped by blockers.

For this reason, our second chapter aims at connecting theory and practice and, in doing so, in its opening pages we established the etymology of the word 'diplomacy' refers to the action of duplicating a document, of which one was given as a mandate to the messenger, while the other was archived, the carrier of these documents being the diplomat. In their role as messengers and promoters of national interests, we established the use of language in diplomacy is the central element, be it in written or spoken form. It is for this reason that ambassador Stanko Nick considered<sup>1</sup> "one should use many languages to be properly understood," as we have shown in section II.2., and the diplomat needs to observe this particularity of their job. This leads us to our next sections, focusing on negotiation and adequate communication in diplomacy, while learning the rules of the power game the others are playing. Looking into the dimensions and hidden faces of power, then measuring it, we moved on to the less tackled forms of power,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Stanko, Nick (2001), "Use of Language in Diplomacy" in Kurbalija, Jovan and Hannah Slavik (eds.) (2001), *Language and Diplomacy*. Malta: DiploProjects. Mediteranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies. 39.

acknowledging comparative influence techniques available. We sought to draw attention onto some different angles an analysis can be made under, moving forward to recent diplomatic issues of 2013. Again, *new* types of diplomacy were presented and controversial topics recalled, reiterating the importance of avoiding negative labelling in tackling a linguistic diplomatic media scandal, leaving for the end of the chapter the difficult question of how to deal with the problems disclosed by the new leaks on the National Security Agency. Not haphazardly our second chapter begins with a quote stating that "diplomacy is the brain of a nation" and ends with former intelligence employee's act of publicly answering his own moral dilemmas by trying to 'right a wrong' he had experienced firsthand.

By the end of the third chapter, we have made an incursion into the historical landmarks of the North Korean War, have dealt with the communist propaganda in Romanian newspapers of the '50s, found our way on the path to disarmament by signing the NPT, SALT I and II, START I and II, MBRF and INF, only to come to the real test of the 2013 diplomacy: leaving behind the treaties and facing the North Korean nuclear threat on a different path, towards military and verbal confrontation of egos. We have reached the officials and sought comfort in their stands in front of the threat, learning that "together we stand, divided we fall," as "security cooperation implies relying on other states for national survival."<sup>2</sup> And because "what we do matters," the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for 2013, which, in turn, acts as a reminder and an argument to always know and show 'where we stand, what we stand for,' the symbolism of this award winner at this particularly moment in time pointing to the direction believed to be the right one to be followed.

#### Motivation

From the early stages of our research at the undergraduate level we have come across the following European Commission's words: "the more languages you know, the more of a person you are" – words that have been my incentive for inquiries ever since. As a student and an alumnus of the Faculty of Letters, our proneness to linguistic studies has been constant, our interest commencing with words, their power and the how's, the why's, the when's behind

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Müller, Herald (2013), "Security Cooperation." in Carlsnaes, Walter (2013), *Handbook of International Relations*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE. 607.

choosing one over another. Moreover, having a background of cultural studies as well, considering at the same time the inseparability between identity, language and culture that Michael Agar summarized by coining the concept of "languaculture,"<sup>3</sup> our interest in how other cultures conceptualize the world grew bigger. Agreeing that being able to communicate in more languages opens more doors to further talks, our interest grew in the direction of not only national languages, but also political language, diplomatic language, body language, sign language and so on. As a student of Japanese language and culture, our interest went beyond the Romanized world, therefore when the situation broke out in North Korea in early February 2013 our attention was focused on following the events in the Korean Peninsula in an attempt to understand the motifs that triggered what the journalists called "the inflamed rhetoric" of the new supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea against the United States of America and, subsequently, their allies, as the imminence of a Third World War appeared at that moment to be undeniably real from the information offered by the media. Besides understanding the rationale behind the moments on the timeline of the events in the Korean Peninsula, our purpose is to offer insight on this situation as it may prove one day to be a piece that completes more puzzles.

#### The newness and relevance of this investigation

We embark upon this investigation because the 2013 North Korean nuclear test provided a new direction of inquiries in what diplomatic language is concerned and we consider it needs a good linguistic approach so as to understand and to predict the rhetorical tools used to inflame and then to cool off the problematic situation. We reorganize and interpret the theoretical resources available regarding rhetorics, persuasion, audience, attitude, fear appeal in propaganda derived from the four main appeals in advertising enumerated by Wallace Stegner,<sup>4</sup> media rhetrickery, political rhetrickery, language, culture and identity, irony and ambiguity, discourse analysis, use of language and negotiation in diplomacy; we hint at the role of Wikileaks' activities and Snowden's disclosure and warnings and, although we acknowledge the symbolism behind the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Agar, Michael (1994), Language Shock: Understanding the Culture of Conversation. New York: Morrow.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Stegner, Wallace E., E. H. Sauer and C.W. Sach (1965), *Modern Composition*. Book Six. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 224-225.

Nobel Peace Prize for 2013 being awarded to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons "for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons,"<sup>5</sup> we also make a case for the importance of negative labeling and avoiding the slippery path of stereotype that we might be inclined to take in developing potentially harmful (or useful) point of views.

Precisely due to the penury of systematic literature on the 2013 North Korean nuclear test we consider it is important for a number of steps to be taken in this direction of investigation. We believe it is important to start from somewhere and, being a topical situation that has not yet seen an end, our understanding on it comes "on the go." Being such a sensitive issue, we believe reading about it, analyzing it, understanding it and offering even the slightest insight on it is to be pursued not solely when the situation will be long gone, but even more so while it is still ongoing.

In our investigation we aim at setting the framework for the analysis that we embark upon, in a quest to understand the motifs that triggered what journalists called "the inflamed rhetoric," which can help predict further actions on either opposing side and thus help finding the right path to a future successful strategy to contribute to the elimination of the threat the nuclear tests have posed not only in the Korean Peninsula, but worldwide. At the same time, we aim at investigating how much Romania's position in international relations has changed, it having been a communist country itself: are Romanian officials keeping a discreet distance and a lower profile on the matter due to a former communist legacy? Or are they just as determined as their UN and NATO partners to condemn North Korea's actions? Moreover, is the United States willing to compromise, or its determination to fight the "war on terrorism" (of which North Korea is part of) is as strong as in 2002, right after 9-11? Furthermore, what is North Korea seeking with these threats?

We take notice, through hermeneutic studies, of what it is that North Korea is seeking through this test and repeated threats for further one, wishes that have not even been declined by the opposing party, the United States, but ignored altogether in the public manifestations of the US taking a stand on the situation. This issue, we consider, is essential in any attempt to defuse the conflict provided a member of the international community will take notice and responsible

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Nobel Media AB (2013), "The Nobel Peace Prize 2013 – press Release." October 11, 2013. Accessed October 15, 2013. <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/press.html">http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/press.html</a>

action, to which our contribution shows one direction to be taken towards settling the Korean War truce after a long sixty years' dormant wait for the volcano to erupt.

We reinforce the importance of having strong allies to win power over a problem, while looking into comparative influence techniques, hidden faces of power and the challenges of measuring power. We disclose the lengths that the spy and intelligence agencies go to and their activities' role in defusing an inflamed rhetoric and calling one side's bluff.

We offer an inter- and trans-disciplinary perspective, the selected literature in the theoretical chapters setting the framework for further hermeneutic analysis of further words, accompanied by actions, thrown in the power game we are witnessing ourselves in its development.

Each chapter ends with a section titled "End of chapter thoughts" which aims at making the transition from what we learned from the previous chapter and where we are headed next in our investigation.

Furthermore, the Introduction, the three chapters and the Conclusions each have their own motto summarizing the content to be presented. Therefore, for the Introduction: "The more languages you know, the more of a person you are" (The European Commission) – referring to the diplomatic language; Chapter I: "the language of truth is simple" (Euripides) – alluding to rhetorics, either inflamed or not; Chapter II: "diplomacy is the brain of a nation" (Venetia de Blocq van Kuffeler, Editor of the *Diplomat Magazine*, London, UK, 2012) – referring to the strategies used, particularly those pertaining to diplomatic language and to the case of Wikileaks and Edward Snowden; Chapter III: "Where we stand, what we stand for" – referring to North Korea's repeated non-compliance with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; Conclusions: the same motto – referring to the ongoing nature of the problematic situation in the Korean Peninsula.

Moreover, the short overview in quotes at the end of our research also proves useful.

#### The investigation methods

Throughout our research, the methods used are the observational method, experimental methods and analysis through case studies (media coverage on the protests against cyanide mining in Transylvania, Romanian diplomacy's performance in the recent horse meat scandal in the United Kingdom, Julian Assange and Wikileaks' activities, former CIA employee Edward Joseph Snowden's disclosure of up to 200,000 secret documents to the press), historical method (the Korean War), modern hermeneutics and hermeneutic consistency as available so far being scrutinized to fulfill our main goals.

#### **Experienced problems**

The main problem experienced in the process of developing the present thesis was the penury of the literature focused specifically on the 2013 North Korean nuclear test threat, therefore our research focused on preparing in advance by selecting, analyzing and understanding the most useful theoretical tools to smooth the path to gathering as much relevant information as possible on the realities in the Korean Peninsula of the 2013. Following this road, the online and offline media proved to be our eyes and ears in the Peninsula, the understanding of both their visible and non-visible accounts being a process that involved an incursion into more than the philology domain.

#### **Outline of the investigation**

Chapter I offers a general and systematic presentation of the theoretical aspects to be taken into consideration when embarking upon investigating the diplomatic language in use in the case of a high-level verbal exchange and the actions that accompany it, focusing in particular to those aspects relevant to the problematic situation we present in Chapter III. Considering the repeated reference made by the world-wide media as to an "inflamed rhetoric from Pyongyang," a natural first step into this investigation is starting off by looking into rhetorics and useful rhetorical devices. In our attempt at conceptualizing rhetoric, "the theory and practice of eloquence, whether spoken or written, the whole art of using language to persuade others" as Wayne Booth defines it,<sup>6</sup> a flowering and resourceful field of study, appears to have distinct definitions that scholars have not yet chosen the most adequate one from. It appears however that the many

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Booth, Wayne (2004), *The Rhetoric of Rhetorics. The Quest for Effective Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. x.

definitions available range from those focusing on a 'good' part of rhetoric, i.e. persuasion to those considering manipulation as being the core of the further possible discussions on the topic. Both are to be considered in the case of the 2013 North Korean nuclear test reactions from Washington and Pyongyang. As in one way or another persuasion presupposes influencing the audience's perception of reality or thoughts, which later transform into actions, we first looked into persuasion and then moved on to analyzing the role of the audience, without leaving aside the argumentative process.

We considered audience to be central to studying rhetoric, for a speech that has no audience is a failed speech to begin with or, as Lloyd Bitzer argues,<sup>7</sup> "rhetoric is never about discourse in the abstract," the key consensus in rhetorical studies showing that the discourse is best shaped and effective having in view the people it addresses to. In this sense, persuasion is as effective to the degree that rhetors are connected with their audiences and speak their language,<sup>8</sup> identifying themselves with their listeners, writers or followers or, as we will see later, to the degree that fear appeal, also used in media advertising, another type of persuasion, is great. This identification is easier done with audiences of oral speeches, for they are regarded as "stable entities that speakers can analyze, observe and accommodate,"<sup>9</sup> whereas audiences of written texts are perceived as much less predictable, as we ourselves are proving with the mere endeavor that we are undertaking with our thesis.

A different angle from which the audience is included in rhetorical studies is that offered by Edwin Black<sup>10</sup> who, instead of analyzing a speech for how well it moulds upon its anticipated audience, he does it in terms of who the intended audience might have been at the moment the speech was written, what audience is implied in the discourse. The language used, the references, the metaphors, the images created by the author, the depth of the arguments, the topic itself are some instances that can give an author away on who his intended audience has been. Philip Wander takes the analysis further, as the title of his article suggests as well,<sup>11</sup> by searching for those groups that are deliberately not a part of the intended audience or those who are purposely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Bitzer, Lloyd (1969), "The Rhetorical Situation" in *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1. 1-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Burke, Kenneth (1950), A Rhetoric of Motives. New York.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Sloane, Thomas O. (Ed.) (2001), *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*. Oxford University Press Inc: New York. 62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Black, Edwin (1970), "The Second Persona" in *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56. 109-119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Wander, Philip (1984), "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn I Rhetorical Theory" in *Central States Speech Journal* 35. 197-216.

excluded, negated, alienated through linguistic devices, discriminated or reduced to silence. He believes that rhetors have a moral responsibility towards these groups as well.

Taking this in mind when looking into the North Korea of today, we can explain past events and predict to a certain extent future ones. Following the death of his father Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-un was officially declared supreme leader after the state funeral on December 28, 2011. Although having held titles of the First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, the international public opinion considered him to be a very young, inexperienced state leader.<sup>12</sup> He was regarded rather as the beloved defunct Kim Jong-il's son than as a leader himself. He was still 27 when he became the supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and as such he was the world's youngest head of state! This position came with high responsibilities very soon and in dealing with them he first made sure to consolidate his position and to augment his credibility both inside and outside the borders of North Korea. As a consequence, deciding to affirm his capabilities as the leader of a country to be feared, one of his strategies, given the nuclear history of North Korea, was to schedule a rocket launch only four months after his ascension to the supreme leader position. In April 2012 therefore a rocket was launched from the North-West, but it flew only for a short time until it broke up and crashed in the waters of the Korean Peninsula. The embarrassment comes from the fact that what was designed to be a demonstration of power turned out to be a failure and, even more dramatically, it did so in the presence of all major press agencies, as they had been invited to witness and to write eulogistic accounts of the historic moment. On December 12, 2012 the young leader had his own revenge: North Korea successfully launched a rocket, boosting the avowals of its new leader and stepping up the threat the isolated and impoverished state posed to opponents.

In presenting arguments so as to persuade an audience attitude analysis cannot be excluded. We show that the way attitudes are formed and psychology are linked together in a one way dependence relation, idea supported by functional approaches to attitude, which suggest that attitudes can trigger various psychological roles, such as defending self-image, expressing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Salmon, Andrew (2011), "Youth, Inexperience of Kim Jong-il's Son Trigger Concern." December 21, 2011. Accessed on June 21, 2013. <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/youth-inexperience-of-kim-jong-ils-son-triggers-co/?page=all>">http://www.washi

personal beliefs and values, organizing knowledge and so on. A distinction made by functional approaches to attitudes is that between symbolic attitudes and instrumental or utilitarian attitudes, or between idealists or realists to a certain extent. It is not less true that many personality traits can either enhance or inhibit persuasion, on the one hand, while on the other hand receivers can be made reluctant or immune to external stimuli, skeptic to arguments and resistant to persuasion or tempted to give in.

Starting from a distinction made by E.H. Sauer and C.W. Sach, Wallace Stegner enumerates<sup>13</sup> four main appeals in advertising persuasion which can be associated to other types of persuasion as well and we show that fear appeal continues to be largely used in contemporary politics. Social psychological studies and communication specialists have been devoting more attention to the fear appeal component of rhetorics since the Second World War and, however debatable the manner of conceptualization chosen or the experimental methods used, the general conclusions are worth taking into consideration. One such conclusion states that "provided everything remains unchanged, the more frightened of the communicated message a person is, the more chances there are for them to adopt a positive attitude of prevention"<sup>14</sup> if, at the same time, the conditions for increasing the effectiveness of fear appeal are met. By continuously promoting its status as a nuclear power, North Korea creates a sense of threat in the audience, seeking to be convincing enough so as the audience to act the way it is presented to them as being the recommended course of action.

In this context, we appealed to Wayne Booth's concept of listening rhetorics which, when pushed to its fullest possibilities, creates the opportunity for "opponents in any controversy [to] listen to each other not only to persuade better, but also find the common ground behind the conflict."<sup>15</sup> As we will show later in Chapter III, this has not been the case for the situation we investigate, the US repeatedly having decided not to make any reference to the expressed wishes of North Korean leaders to discuss anew the truce signed at the end of the Korean War in the '50s, as well as to secure its status and rank as a nuclear power to be feared. As Booth further

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Stegner, Wallace E., E. H. Sauer and C.W. Sach (1965), *Modern Composition*. Book Six. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 224-225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson (2001), Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion. New York: Henry Holt &Co. in Herjeu, Radu, Tehnici de propagandă, manipulare și persuasiune în televiziune. 146.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Booth, Wayne (2004), *The Rhetoric of Rhetorics. The Quest for Effective Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 10.

argues, the United States are inclined rather to do the talking than to listen, to push their wishes to the front rather than to pull back and listen to others'.

As our thesis focuses on the media coverage as well as on the information available mostly online, we further consider what the same author calls "media rhetrickery" and "political rhetrickery," reinforcing once again the existence of a relation between the two and advocating for carefulness in ascribing truth validity to information presented by them. We point as well to the difficulty foreign citizens face when dealing with mass media from a country they are not yet familiar with, which requires even more effort to understand both what is being said and what is deliberately omitted from the public reports, thus our endeavor necessitates sound knowledge of the context, which is why we will begin Chapter III with an account of the Korean War and the implications for the relations between the South and the North, between the West and the East, between the US and DPRK ultimately.

From these theoretical aspects on rhetoric we move to the next subchapter that is devoted to how to go from thought to words and actions, and we begin with a short overview on structuralism, diachronic and synchronic linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, the influence of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim emphasizing the collective aspect of language, the distinction *langue / parole*, signifier / signified and functional sentence perspective introduced by the founder of the structuralist schools in Prague. We consider Roman Jakobson's functional approach to language as a means of communication, developed from the German psychologist Karl Bühler's assumption of three basic functions of language in communication - the representational, the expressive and the directive, to which he adds other three which, together, influence every communicative message: the expression of the speaker/writer's emotions (emotive function), the triggering of the hearer/reader's reactions (conative function), the reference to objects and states of affairs (referential function), the maintenance of contact through acoustic or visual channel used for conveying the message (phatic function), the special attention to the formulation of the message itself (poetic function) and the self-referential use of the sign system (metalingual function). All these can be observed in the verbal exchanges between Washington and its allies and Pyongyang in the case of the 2013 North Korean nuclear test that we try to shed light to.

The linguistic relativity hypothesis of Sapir and Whorf is also tackled in this subchapter, connecting it with the term advanced by Michael Agar of "languaculture,"<sup>16</sup> emphasizing once again the inseparability of language and cultural context so relevant for our thesis in understanding the unique identity that follows as a consequence. Connecting collectively shared language system and individuality and self, we consider Romanian linguist Eugenio Coşeriu's refining contribution to re-establish the importance of self in linguistic creativity, a view that contradicts Saussure's belief that the discourse of the individual language users (parole) is situated at the periphery of language proper (langue).

Natural language and logic is next under focus, showing that despite the connection between the two implying there are no divergences within, the negation works differently in logic than in natural languages. Whereas in logic if  $\neg p$  is true, then p is false and vice versa, in natural language there are situations when the same does not hold true and this distinction, as well as others that we briefly discuss, are important to be observed in scrutinizing diplomatic language. We move afterwards to investigate Grice's theory of conversation, from the distinction drawn from what is being said and what is conventionally implied, the British philosopher of language introducing the notion of *non-conventional implicature* so as to illustrate what is meant by implicature and to show that it is different from what is said. We consider the four maxims that are needed to comply with the *co-operative principle* that guarantees the connection of the utterances that make up rational talk exchanges and we investigate Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory and Geoffrey Leech's positive and negative principle of politeness so useful in diplomatic exchanges, white lies, interest principle, euphemism, expressivity principle, clarity principle and so on. The speech-act theory and Austin's "How To Do Things With Words," the main activity in the informal job description of a diplomat, end this sub-chapter on moving from thought to words and actions, as we discuss declarative, constatative and performative utterances, ascribing the *felicity conditions* for the latter to be 'happy.' We investigate speech by distinguishing between Austin's broad classes of acts that are simultaneously performed, namely the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary act, together with, respectively, the phonic, phatic and rhetic act, the promises, warnings, bettings, statings and the effects of persuading, surprising, convincing or misleading the audience. We also look into John Searle's account of utterances, considering useful for our endeavour the distinction he makes between the speaker's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Agar, M. (1994), op.cit.

meaning and the sentence meaning pointing to the *indirect speech-acts* such as hinting, insinuating, using metaphors or appealing to irony in discourse.

The next subchapter is dedicated to the complex relation between language, culture and identity, not merely an abstract or hidden mechanism, but a reality with significant implications for the question of identity and especially *identity-through-language*. As we aim at discussing the problematic situation that arose in early 2013 between the United States and North Korea with the launch of a third nuclear test, understanding the cultural dimension of language and that it is also a social phenomenon, as it emerges from Trudgill's argumentation,<sup>17</sup> should be taken into consideration in any attempt to look into the terminological corpus. Taking further the indirect speech-acts discussed in the pages before, we tackle "language etiquette, speech tact and other forms of adjusting an utterance to the hierarchical organisation of society"<sup>18</sup> and the issue of formalism, taking into account two trends concerning the study of language, namely individualistic subjectivism and abstract objectivism, we move forward to discussing irony as "a double-layered or two-storey phenomenon [where] [a]t the lower level is the situation either as it appears to the victim of irony (where there is a victim) or as it is deceptively presented by the ironist (where there is an ironist)... At the upper level is the situation as it appears to the observer or to the ironist."<sup>19</sup> With the distinction between verbal irony and situational irony, the issue of intentionality is brought to light and, as the author observes, verbal irony distinguishes itself from ironic observation of reality and description of ironic situation. The semantic dualism of irony is clarified by Kerbrat-Orrecchioni<sup>20</sup> using a non-factive verb and discussing lying (P(x)) says A, thinks non-A and wants A to be understood) versus irony (P(x) says A, thinks non-A and wants non-A to be understood). Degrees of irony, from subtle irony to mockery, parody, emotional vocabulary, exclamations, empty words or elements of phatic function, idiosyncratic vocabulary, stereotypical speech attributable to a character help express verbal irony and are discussed in this subchapter, having in view its applicability to scrutinize the verbal exchanges between the US and the DPRK in the 2013 conflict.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Trudgill, P. (1983), Sociolinguistics: An Introduction to Language and Society. London: Penguin. 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Volosinov, V. N. (1973), *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, translated by Ladislav Matejka & I. R. Titunik. New York: Harvard University Press. 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Muecke, Douglas C. (1969), *The Compas of Irony*. London: Methuen. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Catherine (1976), "Problemes de l'ironie" in *L'ironie: Travaux de centre de Recherches Linguistiques est Semiologiques de Lyon.* 10-46. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon.

The "paradox of substance" as Kenneth Burke sees it<sup>21</sup> changes the making of rhetorical meaning, the multitude of possibilities being attributed to *ambiguity*. As out next investigative focus, lexical/structural ambiguity and vagueness are discussed, as they provide ground for mediation, facilitating multiple, "competing interpretations of a perceived contingency of rhetorical exigence"<sup>22</sup> in studying diplomatic language. Leaving message recipient with less transparent usable kind of data, using ambiguities contradicts the primary use of language, that of transmitting information, but, at the same time, though not providing an informative account, it plays an important role in politeness. An intriguing point is made by Drazen Pehar, who argues<sup>23</sup> on the use of ambiguities in peace agreements, showing that in the case of two parties having strong contradictory interests, if neither party is willing to concede a part of its maximum demand and, moreover, negotiations are running short of time, the mediators will proceed to drafting a document open to at least two distinct interpretations, A and B, to gratify the interests of both opposing parties trying to reach an agreement. Such a document charts small steps towards the needed compromise, via negotiations between the conflicting parties.

From this strategy in harbouring diplomatic relations another creative language use is considered: joking. A national and, at the same time, a universal component, setting the frame for joking in an international environment, as diplomats are bound to be doing, is culture-based. Finesse and attention to nuances are among the specific (linguistic) skills needed, as we show that a joke may serve as a helpful ingredient in human interaction to catch the attention of the audience and to create a relaxed, collaborative atmosphere, the premises for efficient communication with positive results. Phonetical jokes, morphological jokes, lexico-semantico jokes are discussed, as well as situational jokes, ceremonial jokes and the ones to be avoided by diplomats on a mission. Our attention is drawn upon the "serious joke" that Peter Serracino-Inglott considers<sup>24</sup> to be the form of the diplomatic joke of the twenty-first century. As humour is an audience pleaser, it has long been considered an important communicative strategy.

In the next subchapter we investigate discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis or critical linguistics, discourse strategy, advocating that language is not solely a product of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Burke, Kenneth (1946), A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Blitzer, Lloyd F. (1968), "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric.* I. 1-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Pehar, Drazen (2001), "Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements." In Kurbalija, Jovan and Hannah Slavik (Eds.) (2001), *Language and Diplomacy*. Malta: DiploProjects. 168.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Serracino-Inglott, Peter (2001), *To Joke or Not To Joke: A Diplomatic Dilemma in the Age of Internet.* in Kurbalija, Jovan and Hannah Slavik (Eds.) (2001), *Language and Diplomacy*. Malta: DiploProjects. 27.

beliefs and values of the speakers that produce it, but it is at the same time the means of generating thought and beliefs by means of propaganda through discourse, persuasion, manipulation and so on. The tactics involved in planning a discourse are both linguistic and nonlinguistic, the combination of sounds, pronunciations, words and wording, grammatical functions, textual organization and so on with gestures, proximity, posture and even clothing make for a complex communication viewed as purposeful social activity. Aiming at a particular communicative goal that pertains to more parties has better chances to become successful through the instrumentality of as many of those targeted as possible, provided their contribution is kept within the right parameters and time frame. Having in view that planning a discourse strategy is similar to solving a problem and, thus, intentional and a conscious effort, it is likely for controversial viewpoints to arise, emphasizing thus again the role of diplomatic negotiations, even more so in a time of conflict as we have been witnessing in the Korean Peninsula in the past months. Cognitive approaches to discourse, conversation analysis, coherence and cohesion, the surface and the depths of texts are scrutinized, looking into recurrence, parallelism, paraphrase, proforms, ellipsis, causality relations, logical sequence relations and generalizations as well. With the help of accent, allusion, anacoluthon, hyperbole, metonymy, chiasmus, simile, synecdoche, zeugma and other stylistic devices, light is shed on shadowy meanings of discourses, following the simplified pattern of problem – solution.

Intonation and variables such as loudness and length simultaneously fluctuating together with other changing parameters play a part in our perception of meaning creation and, corroborated with grammar and syntax lead to a rather casual than causal relation, Dwight Bolinger argued. <sup>25</sup> Equally important communicative features that carry additional meaning besides the one(s) more or less openly expressed are paralinguistic elements such as body language and gestures, which we discuss together with sign language. Although non-verbal communication cannot be avoided, for historical reasons written and oral discourses have been more important than gestures until in recent times of the last thirty years attention was devoted and appreciation was given to all three codes of communication: writing, speech and gestures. A balanced receptive and productive control of the three should be the goal of any learner of foreign languages.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Bolinger, Dwight (1985), Intonation and Its Parts: Melody in Spoken English. London: Edward Arnold.

Connecting theory and practice to get closer to our investigation goal, in the progressive evolution of international relations, in Chapter II we scrutinize diplomacy and the use of language in diplomacy with their role in the advancement of international principles and harmonic growth in all four hemispheres and all four cardinal points. While one could assume that the various meanings that are attached to the notion of diplomacy are facets of the same entity, others could infer that its deeper meaning cannot be revealed even with the help of unveiling more of its sides; similarly, even though a Rubik cube has all the coloured elements exposed to view and has a limited number of colours and only six sides, we cannot see all the colours at the same time in its completed form, but rather scattered elements mixed together on the six faces of the cube. The very etymology of the word "diplomacy" is not given a singular perspective: either the Latin 'diploma' (carrying travel documents) or the Greek 'diplóô' (duplicity, double – duplicating documents, folding documents into two), both refer to the same notion. The use of language in diplomatic encounters is perhaps the most important weapon that the partners for dialogue have and, depending on how well it is mastered, it can prove an asset or a self-destructive mechanism, for, as Drazen Pehar outlines, "diplomacy is primarily words that prevent us from reaching for our swords."<sup>26</sup> In the past, there were times when one language had precedence over the others, being widely-used in inter-state communication. It is the cultural, economical, political, strategic reasons that placed these languages in the dominant position and will continue to do so as time goes by. At the same time, Kamel S. Abu Jaber believes that "a language of diplomacy should not be culture bound, but an attempt at transcending such boundaries to create a quasi neutral vehicle of exchange that conveys the message while appearing the least ego damaging."<sup>27</sup>

Given the requirement of linguistic proficiency in at least two international languages, the question arises: which language should a diplomat choose for a specific meeting on duty? The impulse is to go with the language that he or she speaks best. It sounds fairly logical. However, professionally it might not be the wisest choice. There are strategies to be considered for both oral and written diplomatic communication, which we discuss in this section. Language can be purposely chosen so as to make the interlocutor uncomfortable, to avoid undesirable political connotations and so on - in short, to set the tone of the exchange and increase the chances of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Pehar, Drazen (2001), op.cit.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Abu Jaber, Kamel S., (2001) "Language and Diplomacy" in Kurbalija, Jovan and Hannah Slavik (eds.) (2001),
*Language and Diplomacy*. Malta: DiploProjects. Mediteranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies. 51.

success. Communication channels, multilateral diplomacy, word choice, negotiating like a diplomat are next under investigation, noting one conclusion that Paul Sharp mentions,<sup>28</sup> the sense that the United States acts dictatorially at times, negotiating by following the principle "what's mine is mine; what is yours is negotiable." Corroborating this conclusion with Wayne Booth's inference that the US is not practicing listening-rhetorics, cooling off the inflamed rhetoric of North Korea's young leader Kim Jong-un requires a different approach, the weight of a peaceful end to the conflict falling all the more so on the international community's shoulders. Lack of maintaining adequate communication system enables the appearance of 'viruses' – in this case, that of international conflicts, leading as far as to integral collapse of the system. The communicative and representative roles of diplomacy are underlined as well, reiterating throughout the indissoluble relation between diplomacy and communication through "direct intergovernmental contact, where officials interact to communicate wishes and to fulfill their goals in the name of the states"<sup>29</sup> they represent.

The next subchapter is dedicated to the game of power states have been part of, a game whose underlying principle has shifted in concept. Roughly put, as the dictionary definition goes, Joseph Nye outlines,<sup>30</sup> power means an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. It no longer emphasizes the military force and conquest that marked earlier times. Rather, "it factors technology, education and economic growth," he continues, which are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important. Military power is more difficult to apply today than in the past, as the social and political practices changed in time. The changing nature of issues in world politics means problems should be approached from a different angle. The solution for many current issues of transnational interdependence will require collective action and international cooperation more than before. These include terrorism, the current threat worldwide that makes it more evident that cooperation is the key when facing a mutual 'enemy.'

There is a second aspect related to power, namely getting other countries to *want* what they want. This ability tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Sharp, Paul (2001), "Talking to Americans: Problems of Language and Diplomacy." In Kurbalija, Jovan and Hannah Slavik (eds.) (2001), *Language and Diplomacy*. Malta: DiploProjects. 97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Russett Bruce, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella (2009), "Relations Between States: Power and Influence" in *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. Cengage Learning. 123

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1990), "Soft Power" in *Foreign Policy*. No. 80. Washington Post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC.

ideology and institutions and it might be called co-optive or soft power, in contrast with the hard or command power of *ordering* others to do what it 'wants,' the author goes on. This new trend of soft power is just as important, complex and challenging. A state must be able to make its power seem legitimate in the 'eyes' of the other states lest it should encounter resistance along the way to achieve its national goals. Provided that its culture and ideology are attractive and open to new partisans, others will more willingly follow, renewing and strengthening thereafter its power. All these, however, as Joseph Nye remarks, are not new: neither the co-optive power of making others want what you want, nor the soft power resources that come in the form of cultural attractions, ideology, institutions and so on and so forth, in which the United States is abundant.

A multidimensional perspective on power is investigated, distinguished according to the referential standard, allowing for the possibility of power to increase in one dimension while simultaneously decrease in another one. The famous debate on the hidden faces of power<sup>31</sup> adds to this multidimensional perspective, decision making in international relations, suppression of some issues from being considered on the agenda of the decision makers, the ability of one country to make other countries to *want* what they are trying to persuade others to do being somewhat connected to Nye's notion of "soft power" and linked to intentions.

Measuring power and providing rankings requires an agreed-upon way of measuring: "power over whom? What kind of power?" – questions that lead us to the following subchapter, in which we scrutinize soft power as introduced by Joseph Nye in the international relations terminology, military force, positive sanctions and the comparative influence techniques. One distinguishable feature of soft power is that, as opposed to hard power, which is rooted in violence and is coercive in nature, soft power, as the name indicates, is just about anything else. As Ferguson explained, "soft power is merely the velvet glove concealing the iron hand."<sup>32</sup> The focus on force and coercive influence has alienated scholars from the similar, yet opposite approach of positive sanctions. The juxtaposition of these terms sounds oxymoronic at a first look; sanctions are commonly perceived as negative, yet actual or promised rewards are positive sanctions. Reinforcing positive behaviour and dismissing the unacceptable one can bring about more positive relations between states, by virtue of the pacifist values that are promoted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Baldwin, David (2013), "Power and International Relations" in Carlsnaes, Walter (2013), *Handbook of International Relations*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE. 276.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ferguson, Niall (2004), Colossus: The Price of America's Empire. New York: Penguin Press. 24.

worldwide. In the case of military power, the idea that every war end with a winner is deeply embedded in the literature on military force, Baldwin argues,<sup>33</sup> when, in reality, the winning comes with terrible losses as well. Even in today's societies, preoccupied with promoting human rights and advocating for peaceful conflict resolutions by getting international decision makers round the table, the idea that a military force is the ultimate barometer for power still lingers and is, somewhat encouraged. National days are celebrated to this day with a pompous public military parade, where thousands of people are expected to participate, to be captivated by the impressive display of military resources and applaud in content. We do not entirely dismiss such practices, but we call on this issue to be addressed to on a large scale.

The common approach to studying the instruments of power, David Baldwin writes,<sup>34</sup> is to consider each of these separately. There are economic instruments, diplomatic instruments, military instruments, symbolic instruments and so on, and they are tackled independently. Questions to be answered are concerned with the success rate of a given policy, in what situations it is advisable to be used, what costs the respective policy implies and how it differs from other instruments at hand. Such questions can only be answered after understanding available instruments both individually and collectively.

In the subchapter titled Diplomatic issues of the year 2013 a few rather uncommon features connected to international relations and diplomacy were investigated. While it does not intend to exhaust the plethora of diplomatic features, this section aims at broadening the horizon of studies and understanding of international relations, diplomacy and language. Most accounts of diplomacy focus on more traditional forms of diplomacy. We will not attempt to give a detailed description of each of these forms, but rather to mention and present their main characteristics, while at the same time pointing to other types of diplomacy that are used today, so as to enlarge the spectrum through which we look at international relations from now on.

We investigate cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, citizen diplomacy and regional diplomacy, moving then to secret diplomacy as "a crime in the international law,"<sup>35</sup> coercitive diplomacy and triumphalist diplomacy. Career diplomat in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international clerk within the United Nations Organization, Dr. Năstăsescu argues that Romania makes use of such a type of diplomacy by giving exagerated accounts of actions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Baldwin, David (2013), op.cit. 287.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibidem. 289.
<sup>35</sup> Năstăsescu, Ștefan (2012), *Politica externă românească. Însemnări*. Bucureşti: Niculescu. 39.

that take place abroad so as to portray to the public opinion an image of fast problem solving in favor of Romania, a misrepresentation of reality.

We continue to investigate the *handbag diplomacy* associated with Margaret Thatcher, who proposed a different approach to diplomacy during her tenure as prime minister to the United Kingdom. Margaret Thatcher's iconic images were her tough attitude that got her the nickname 'the Iron Lady' and her handbags. They came to signify both femininity and toughness. An apparently insignificant fashion item, her bags induced fear in her interlocutors. It was not so much the outside that mattered, but the mystery of what she would pull out from within: incriminating papers, embarrassing memorabilia. Her handbag proved a real fear factor for some ministers.

Jewelry-Box diplomacy is another unusual type of diplomacy that is associated with former Secretary of State and United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright, similar to that of Margaret Thatcher's. In an intense world of diplomacy, where seizing the gravity of the situation is of the essence, a diplomat with a sense of humor is a breath of fresh air. She combined the two assets in an eclectic collection of pins, which she strategically would wear to convey messages and mood to allies, enemies and media. In her book titled "Read My Pins. Stories From a Diplomat's Jewel Box"<sup>36</sup>she declared herself: "before long, and without intending it, I found that jewelry had become part of my personal diplomatic arsenal. Former President George W. Bush had been known for saying 'Read my lips.' I began urging colleagues and reporters to 'Read my pins.' It would never have happened if not for Saddam Hussein." When she criticized the dictator, the Iraqi state media published a poem calling the US ambassador to the United Nations an "unparalleled serpent;" when meeting with Iraqi officials after this incident she donned a gold pin in the shape of a serpent, with a small diamond dangling from its mouth.<sup>37</sup> Asked why she had worn it, she explained it was "just her way of sending a message," the same journalist notes. When she met South African President Nelson Mandela in 1997, Albright assembled on her left shoulder a veritable herd of zebra pins, intended to evoke the hope for Africa's future that Mandela represented – and the examples continue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Albright, Madeleine (2009), Read My Pins. Stories From a Diplomat's Jewel Box. New York: Melcher Media.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Cassey, Selix (2010), "Madeleine Albright's Penchant for Pins Leads to an Intriguing NYC Art Show." MinnPost. June 1, 2010. Accessed on Jule 1, 2013. <a href="http://www.minnpost.com/arts-arena/2010/01/madeleine-albrights-penchant-pins-leads-intriguing-nyc-art-show">http://www.minnpost.com/arts-arena/2010/01/madeleine-albrights-penchant-pins-leads-intriguing-nyc-art-show</a>

*Panda diplomacy*, unusual as it may sound, is a practice used as early as the seventh century when empress Wu Zetian sent a giant panda to the Japanese emperor, a practice revived by China from 1950 to 1984, who used them as a diplomatic gift to other countries. According to Mark Magnier in his article "Attack of the Pandas,"<sup>38</sup> referring to the Taiwan Solidarity Union Party's response to China's giant panda gift to Taiwan, "the pandas are a trick, just like the Trojan horse. [...] Pandas are cute, but they are meant to destroy Taiwan's psychological defenses." Increased awareness of the need for rare endangered wildlife protection, China has ceased making panda gifts as political statements, World Wide Fund for nature adopting the panda as their symbol and logo for the conservation movement as a whole. The pandas can now only be invited to other countries for scientific research purposes for a period of ten years and, despite the international protection that it benefits from, every panda transfer from one zoo to another alerts authorities.

*Facebook diplomacy* is a new form of diplomacy that takes place in the online medium through various social networks, not only Facebook. The term was coined during the US President Barack Obama's electoral campaign in 2008, when his staff put significant effort into communicating online with the voters. It has the potential of being understood as a soft power resource that can be created with the Internet social networking platforms to promote and enhance dialogue, to advocate for citizen's solidarity and involvement against repressive governmental groups or decisions and even to counter terrorism. This term is used together with others such as *digital diplomacy, twitter diplomacy, Google diplomacy* as communication facilitators engaging followers for response.

Under the pseudonym Daniel Schmitt, Domscheit-Berg shares with his readers from the first page of his book, a lesson he learned during his time spent at Wikileaks: "power and confidentiality corrupt in an imperceptible way,"<sup>39</sup> which is why even after having been part of the Wikileaks project with Julian Assange he dedicates his time to OpenLeaks, a website specialized on publishing secret documents, aiming at becoming even more transparent than WL. A short account is given to the WL organization's activity, mentioning at the same time the controversial figure of Edward Joseph Snowden, former CIA employee and NSA contractor who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Magnier, Mark (2006), "Attack of the Pandas." LA Times. March 21, 2006. Accessed on July 21, 2013. <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/21/world/fg-pandas21">http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/21/world/fg-pandas21</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Domscheit Berg, Daniel (2011), "Wikileaks: mărturisirile purtătorului de cuvânt al celui mai periculos website din lume." București: Pandora Publishing. 7.

disclosed up 200,000 secret documents to the press in 2013 and who is considered either a hero and patriot, or whistleblower and traitor in need of political asylum.

These labels lead us to our next subchapter, that tackles the importance of negative labeling and avoiding stereotype, and we begin with Professor Harry G. Frankfurt's words "On Bulshit." Professor of philosophy emeritus at Princeton University, he considers that "bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than are lies [...] [because] the bullshitter's sole concern is the advancement and advantage of his own agenda."<sup>40</sup> We look into Edwin Lemert's *labeling theory*, we discuss sociological implications of deviant roles as the source of negative stereotypes that Emile Durkheim tackles, we analyze *stigmatization* as a driving force towards actually *becoming* and not only being *perceived* as a member of a deviant group. The central idea for stigmatic labeling is the attribution of an inherent fault, which might not even be true, but is perceived by some as being out of the ordinary, which leads to discussing *discrimination*. In doing so, the case of Romanian diplomacy's performance in the 2013 horse meat scandal is analyzed.

After having set the theoretical framework and looked into the field of diplomacy from different angles, our Chapter III applies this knowledge to the analysis of the 2013 North Korean nuclear test and the international impact on diplomatic relations. To understand the position of Pyongyang, a short incursion into the most important recent historical moments of North Korea was made, focusing on the events that led to the separation between the North and the South Korea, as well as on the terminology used throughout media interventions and official positions to describe either opposing parties' actions and reactions. We discuss the harsh Japanese dominance and the steps taken to abolish the Korean language and culture, the mass deportation of Koreans during the Second World War, a weakening of the state that, after the attack on Japan on August 8, 1945, it ended with the USSR occupying North Korea, determining the American troops to occupy the South Korea, the demarcation line between the two being the 38 parallel. The Cold War put an end to plans of a common administration and, in this context, the Soviet and the Americans becoming hostile, they imposed their governing systems in the areas they controlled. The deterioration of the relations between the North and the South, the "unpredictable" American intervention, the intervention of the Chinese "volunteers" as a test to their loyalty to USSR are discussed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Frankfurt, Harry G. (2005), *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 61. Frankfurt, Harry G. (2005), *On Bullshit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 61.

Special attention is given to the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, the roll-back doctrine towards the communist bloc and the so-called 'containment' policy of the communist influence in the world, also known as the Truman Doctrine, formulated on the following arguments: "the path to follow so as to defeat the Soviet strategy was 'a firm containment policy, meant to confront the Russians with an unbreakable counterforce in every place they show signs of preparing to go against the interest of a peaceful, stable world."<sup>41</sup> According to Harry S. Truman, "the communism defied the United Nations Security Council's orders issued to protect peace and international security. [...] Going back to the rule of the strongest in international relations would have consequences that would go a long way. The United States of America will continue to support the rule of law."<sup>42</sup>As we show later on, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is still defying the UNSC's resolutions, which it considers "hostile." The essential message, Kissinger argues, was that America is defending a principle, not interests, not power. We show that the publicly declared aim changes, the terminology used by the Americans ranging from "rejecting the aggression" to "establishing peace and independence" under the UN mandate. After the Chinese counterattack, Truman issues a declaration through which, Kissinger notes, he was abandoning the unification as a war goal, "leaving it to subsequent negotiations."43Preventing a third world war has been the fundamental (declared) goal of the United States' decisions during the Korean War, as Truman's memoirs quoted by Kissinger show. However, the author continues, America failed to define the concepts it was operating with: stopping aggression, reestablishing peace. The Korean problem remained to this day unsolved; a truce is similar, but not the same as a peace and every now and then there are current flares, as we have seen in February 2013 as well.

We look into the communist, propagandistic Romanian newspaper "Scânteia" for mentions of the Korean situation of those times and we show that Romania has undergone the most drastic change of perspective of the four countries proposed for analysis (the US, the UK, the DPRK and Romania). The communist period terminology and the terminology of 2013 are antipodes reflected by the media through such distinctions as "American racists," "snake that is growing," "criminal war," "interventionists," "imperialists," "war pirates," "invaders,"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Kissinger, Henry (2007), *Diplomația*. Ediția a doua. București: All. 394. My transl.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Truman, Harry S., Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952. Memoirs. Second volume. 338-339. Qtd. in Kissinger, Henry (2003), op. cit. 418.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Kissinger, Henry (2007), *op.cit.* 422.

"monopolists" and so on versus "profound concern with the persistent lack of cooperation," "the Romanian authorities urges DPRK's authorities to resume, without preconditions, the Six-Party Talks, as proposed by the UNSC," "DPRK to comply with all UNSC resolutions," "firmly condemns nuclear test" and so on. We notice the differences between the reports given by London newspapers and Bucharest newspapers due to the difference between regimes, we mention the effect the possible defeat of the United States had on the New York Stock Market and look into the speeches given by the ministries of foreign affairs and Secretary of State concerning the Korean problem, indicating once again through diplomatic linguistic means the close relation between the United States and South Korea and the opposition manifested by the North, showing at the same time the USSR's disbelief in the motives behind the UNO Commission for "reconstruction and unification" of Korea as an auxiliary organ that camouflages the American intervention in Korea.

As the political regime in South Korea became more stable, at the end of the eighties the discussions on the unification between the two countries were recommenced. We show that the fulfillment of this goal was, however, impossible during Kim Il-sung's life. After his death, in 1994 and after the disaggregation of the USSR in 1991, controversy on the viability of North Korea's regime woken. Strangely, starting with 1995, this problem fostered instead of reducing tensions, because the North Korean government became even more vehement in its efforts to hide its own flaws. Jan Palmowski continues and writes that, in its desperate struggle to overcome the economic problems of the country, which gave rise to a severe food crisis and even famine, North Korea had to give up its pride and to accept the fact that it needed to import rice from South Korea. Despite this fact, the normalization of relations between the North and the South were far from being reached, at the end of the nineties circa 2 million people having been reported dead by starvation.<sup>44</sup> Jong-il continued to earmark significant financial resources to military equipment, and in 1999 North Korea successfully tested a short range missile in the Pacific Ocean. The military program was thenceforth used as a trading currency in the talks with South Korea and the United States of America, but after the election of George W. Bush, North Korea was confronted with a more than hostile attitude from the American side. In the case of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Palmowski, Jean (2005), *Dicționar Oxford de Istorie universală contemporană. De la 1900 până azi.* Vol. I, A-J. București: All. 226-227. My transl.

the ongoing Global War on Terrorism,<sup>45</sup> North Korea was included by the American president in the "axis of evil," together with Iraq and Iran. The US response to the 2013 North Korean nuclear test is a reaction that follows the rhetoric used on the ongoing global war against terrorism. In the "State of the Union Address" released on January 29, 2002 by the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House,<sup>46</sup> President Bush declared his determination to fight this war and outlines the plan he had designed, from shutting down terrorist camps and disrupting their plans, to bringing them to justice and prevent further terrorist attacks from "such states arming to threaten the peace of the world," states that "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger." We continue with the analysis on this document and move forward to analyze the designed path to disarmament and the treaties that standardize this effort. We discuss the Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I and II, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, to reach to the double examination: the nuclear test and the diplomatic trial.

In the post-9/11 world Washington has showed an unshaken rhetoric constantly reaffirming its determination to fight the war against terrorism and bring terrorists to justice. The problem of North Korea is addressed in the speech on the State of the Union in 2002 and the US position has remained firm in placing DPRK on the "axis of evil" together with Iraq and Afghanistan. The nuclear ambitions of North Korea have been known for a long time, the 2013 nuclear test being the third one that it had launched and multiple missiles having been launched so far: in May 1993 a missile test into the Sea of Japan, in August 1998 another one, in July 2006 two missile test were conducted, followed by another round in 2009 and then another one in 2013. After approved military and economic sanctions voted by the United Nations against North Korea, in 2007 Pyongyang officials agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor in return for aid and diplomatic concession, but the negotiations reached a dead end as North Korea accused its negotiating partners (the US, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) of having failed to meet the agreed obligation. As a consequence, having walked out of the international talks on its nuclear

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> A term commonly applied to the international military campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda and other militant organizations, a campain that started as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 9, 2001 (also known as The 9/11 or The September 11 Attacks), with ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq and North-West Pakistan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "President Delivers State of the Union Address." (January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2002). September 10<sup>th</sup>, 2013. <a href="http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html">http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html</a>

program, North Korea conducted a more powerful test in 2009 and the trend continues to this day. Drastic sanctions having been imposed, North Korea agreed to return to the negotiations and resume nuclear talks.

We discuss the implications of the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011 and his son's accession to the supreme leader position. Because he was only 27 years old when he became the leader of DPRK, his position was regarded with skepticism, and the high responsibilities that he soon had to face were seen as a challenge to prove his ability to continue the legacy of this defunct father and grandfather. Having been called to continue to Juche Idea, a political thesis elaborated by his grandfather in the spirit of "self-reliance," "independent stand" and "always putting the Korean things first," seeking approval and confirmation of his fearful position, deciding to affirm his capabilities as the leader of a country to be feared, one of his strategies, given the nuclear history of North Korea, was to schedule a rocket launch only four months after his ascension to the supreme leader position. In April 2012 therefore a rocket was launched from the North-West, but it flew only for a short time until it broke up and crashed in the waters of the Korean Peninsula. The embarrassment comes from the fact that what was designed to be a demonstration of power turned out to be a failure and, even more dramatically, it did so in the presence of all major press agencies, as they had been invited to witness and to write eulogistic accounts of the historic moment.

On December 12, 2012 the young leader had his own revenge: North Korea successfully launched a rocket, boosting the avowals of its new leader and stepping up the threat the isolated and impoverished state posed to opponents. On January 22, 2013 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution number 2087 after recalling a series of previous resolutions concerning North Korea, broadening the sanctions imposed on North Korea by them.

The UNSC demand "not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology"<sup>47</sup> and comply with previous resolutions "by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile program" and in this context to "re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches" was not received with good, however, and DPRK reacted "angrily."<sup>48</sup> North Korean response to the UN resolution was prompt and bitter, only hours after

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> United Nations Security Council (2013), "Resolution 2087. Non-Proliferation. DPRK." January 12, 2013. Accessed June 13, 2013. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087(2013)">http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087(2013)</a>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> NK News (2013), "North Korea Threatens to Build Up 'Nuclear Deterrence." North Korea Reacts Angrily to UN Resolution 2087." January 23, 2013. Accessed June 15, 2013.

the unanimous vote, pledging to strengthen both military and nuclear capabilities, rejecting what it believed to be a "hostile" policy.

In the light of these events we analyzed the US, UK and Romanian official positions, as well as the North Korean responses (offering a short overview in quotes as well) and reiterated Romania's secured position as a key member of NATO in the fight against such practices on nuclear tests, by it allowing for a missile defense facility to be built at Deveselu Military Base in Romania, marking at the same time the landmark in the diplomatic battle in the Korean Peninsula revolved around the Kaesong International Complex, the last symbol of the inter-Korean relations. The fact that the international community has, as we have seen, expressed, in its majority, the consensus on complying with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on disarmament, is an indication that the future will not be on North Korea's side. To end our research we chose to give the recognition and offer at the same time the hope for improvement, by acknowledging the significance of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2013 having been awarded to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons "for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons."<sup>49</sup>

#### Conclusions

Multiple conclusions have been drawn having embarked upon this investigation. The multiple dimensions of rhetoric highly used in the 2013 North Korean nuclear test on both opposing sides provided at the same times both answers and new questions, new leads to be further investigated. The audience is central to rhetoric and to DPRK in its quest to secure its position as a nuclear force, as we have seen from young Kim Jong-un's actions soon after his political ascension to the supreme leader position of the DPRK. In following their goals, North Korean officials make use of the fear appeal to persuade and inculcate a form of respect combined with fear, while, at the same time, the US is likely not to resort to listening rhetorics, but rather to speak "dictatorially," as we have shown. We have witnessed North Korea expressing its wishes for the North Korean War to finally reach a resolution (the 1953 truce placing North Korea and the United States "technically at war," as we have showed) and for its status of a fearful nuclear

<sup>&</sup>lt;http://www.nknews.org/2013/01/north-korea-threatens-to-build-up-nuclear-deterrence/>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Nobel Media AB (2013), "The Nobel Peace Prize 2013 – Press Release." October 11, 2013. Accessed October 15, 2013. <a href="http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/press.html">http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/press.html</a>

power not to be challenged by other states and diminished by international resolutions. At the same time, we noticed that the United States did not reject these wishes, but it turned a deaf ear, as if they had never even been openly stated. As the issue in the Korean Peninsula is ongoing and the literature on the 2013 case is limited, having relied mostly on the official internet sources available and media reports, we reaffirmed the importance of the media. We notice further that not much joking is used in the verbal exchanges between the leaders from Pyongyang and those from Washington, London, Bucharest or other UN states, and that the rhetoric remains bellicose on the Korean side, but equally firm on the American side, with its allies speaking the same language, keeping a unified position complying with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on nuclear tests. These positions were made clear both from the linguistic point of view, as our short overview shows as well, and from the non-verbal signals such as intonation, facial expression, body language and gestures observed in interviews available online. We take notice of the fact that North Korea is looking for assurance that its status as a nuclear power is not to be challenged and realize that in its drive to pursue this goal soft power and positive sanctions are not much in effect in the 2013 North Korean nuclear test problem. We reaffirmed the relevance of intelligence agencies in defusing an inflamed rhetoric and calling North Korea's bluff, however, we have pointed towards the direction of the disclosures in early 2013 once Edward Snowden's case became public as to the lengths that such intelligence agencies go in challenging privacy and private communication. Indicating that military power is more difficult to apply today than in the past and that conflict of interests is what diplomacy is fundamentally based on, we show that North Korea's quest for its status as a nuclear power not to be challenged is against the international trend of favoring soft power over military power and other forms of coercive power, and the non-compliance with the UNSC's resolutions on the non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons challenges itself further the success of diplomatic endeavors. The communist practices of defying UNSC's resolutions to protect peace and international security, as Truman notes, are now continued by the DPRK under Kim Jong-un's regime. However, having in view the consensus on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that the majority of the international community has reached to, the future we argue will not belong to the North Korean threats. The reaffirmed position on the path to disarmament to be followed and the Nobel Peace Prize for 2013 having been awarded to the OPCW stand as firm reminders of the commitment to fight against regimes that challenge international peace for, although we know world peace cannot be true, it is important to aim at it. In this sense, we notice that of the three countries chosen for our analysis, Romania has changed its position the most, from a former communist country resorting to propagandistic methods and harshly denouncing American intervention in the Korean Peninsula in the fifties, to a key member of NATO in the fight against terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons, the missile defense facility at the Deveselu Military Base proving this reality.

Last but not least, given that the situation in the Korean Peninsula is ongoing, this thesis constitutes a useful background for further research as it is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to systematically look into the 2013 North Korean nuclear test causes and international response, an investigation that we consider relevant to be made at the earliest possible stage.

#### **Domains**

The fields of study that are touched upon are those of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, communication, logic, sociology and history, international relations and diplomacy, our investigation being a inter- and intra-disciplinary endeavor.