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**Pionul și tabla de șah
- Germania între Statele Unite ale Americii și
Federația Rusă –
Rezumat**

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Key words: national and international security, strategy, cooperation, realism, constructivism

"The new German foreign policy will not be unhistorical. But I think we showed in the last 50 years that there is no reason to isolate the Germans, only for fear of Teutonicus furum ... My generation and of those who follow are European because we want to be, and not because it has to be. That makes us freer in our relationships with others." ¹

September 1998 brought a new generation at the helm of Germany's policy born and raised amid protest movements. It is a generation that knows how to deal with conflicts and how to resolve them in a democratic manner. A new generation in cultural terms who has undergone an intense process of Europeanization and Americanization.

It is that generation who wants to be and has to be a guarantor of European stability and fruitful transatlantic cooperation. That political generation that brought a new kind of Europeanism and transatlantism based on the central concept of a relationship of cooperation between equal, mature and prosper democracies.

The end of the short twentieth century, the century of extremes as Hobsbawm named it in 1994, a century that has witnessed two world wars and the Holocaust², followed by the creation of a stable peace in Western Europe, was the right time to reflect on changes in the international society, as well as within the system of security and international relations. A century that has been dominated by the German question (die deutsche Frage), which marked the beginning of a new era of European and world order.

1 *Comment & Analysis: Germany's modernizer*, Financial Times interview with Gerhard Schröder, 10 May 1998 apud Alister John Miskimmon, *Recasting the security bargains: Germany, European security policy and the transatlantic relationship*, in *German Politics*, Volume 10, Number 1, April 2001, Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group, p. 10: "*The new German foreign policy won't be unhistorical. But I believe we have shown in the past 50 years that there is no reason to tie down the Germans, out of fear of the furum teutonicus... My generation and those following are Europeans because we want to be, not because we must be. That makes us freer in dealing with others*"

2 Adrian Hyde - Price, *Germany and European Order. Enlarging NATO and the EU*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2000, p.2

Since 1998, the European Union began to make significant progress in the field of foreign and security policy in terms of increasingly reluctant United States, refusing to invest more and more resources in European security, and especially to continue the role of balancer and defender of its European allies.

For Germany, this meant taking new responsibilities from the U.S., crisis management and confronting new challenges within the European security cooperation. The new role assumed by Germany that of a leader of cooperation in foreign policy and European security raised a series of questions within the German political elite. How will Germany translate its national interests in the field of European policy through the coordination and negotiation with the rest of the European countries?

Economic problems have become an issue, “securitized” and the “pursuit of foreign economic priorities actually translates in terms of power design.”³

One of the questions of the paper focuses on the potential role of the XXIst century Germany as a promoter of economic security and / or military in Europe, and as an economic and social model for Europe.

Moreover, in the terms of a changing geopolitical dynamics of the European continent my research raises a second question: does Germany play the role of a balance keeper between the security interests of Russia and America on the European continent?

To find the answer, the paper examines Germany's European policy agenda in terms of its relations with the two major associated beneficiaries, Russia and the United States both in terms of security policy and economic perspective.

Although Germany is no longer a problem in the traditional sense of the German question, it continues to raise numerous questions and concerns. Considering the role of the new united Germany within Europe, its neighbors and partners had considered two possible dangers.

On the one hand we are dealing with an exaggeration of German strength and its ability to influence progress outside its borders. Germany, although one of EU's main pillar and the main European power that can make claims and even influence the course of a process, it is not a European superpower, as the EU is not Germany's toy. Moreover, the Germans are not

³ Marcel Vietor, *Russian Foreign Policy between security and Economics. Exporting Gas and Arms to Belarus and China 1990-2008*, LIT Verlag, Forschungsberichte Internationale Politik, 2009, Munster, p.11

aggressive, do not suffer from anxiety, selfishness, inferiority complex, but, as described by Richard von Weizsacker , "are quite normal people . Just like everyone else. "4

On the other hand, there are voices that claim that German unification has no impact on the Federal Republic of Germany, and Germany is just like any other country in Europe.

Opinion that it is not entitled, Germany is not a simple European state as my paper intends to demonstrate: "is the dominant structural power in Europe, with a tumultuous past, a capable economy, sophisticate diplomatic skills and significant potential in shaping Central and Eastern Europe, especially the historical heartland of Mitteleuropa ".5

Questions regarding the new German state gravitated to the same ideas: the new Federal Republic was a construction born of the ashes of the Third Reich firmly anchored in Western structures and advocate of multilateralism in foreign policy, security and defense, with a significant orientation towards Western culture and models. The former Republic of Bonn has matured rapidly into a free democratic, stable, with a strong market economy and a flourishing civil society. "An economic giant but a political dwarf" with a political culture marked by modesty and reserve (*Bescheidenheit* and *Zurückhaltung*)6, turning it into the civil power it represents today.

Germany's unification practically changed the geo coordinates the former Republic of Bonn was familiar with: from a divided state in the center of a divided continent Germany is a unified state, strong, in the heart of Europe growing together with other states.

A significant role in shaping Germany's foreign and defense policy plays the eastern border of the transatlantic security community and its proximity to the former Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe.

In Hyde Price's view, the unification of the German states and the Cold War turned Germany into Europe's central power (*Zentralmacht Europas*) , raising more problems and priorities regarding its national identity : " After the Cold War, every state in Europe began to wonder what kind of power are we? What we want to be? What are our national interests? What are our priorities? But nowhere were these questions more difficult than in Germany." 7

4 A.Hyde-Price, *op.cit*, p.3

5 *ibidem*

6 *Idem*, p.5

7 *ibidem*

The conflict in Kosovo in 1999 was an impetus to strengthen European cooperation in foreign and security policy field. Germany's commitment to European integration has been emphasized repeatedly ever since the beginning by Germany's former Chancellor G. Schröder: "The integration of Germany into the Western community of states is part of the German Staatsräson .We do not seek a German Sonderweg."

G.Hellman observed in his paper , *Beyond Weltpolitik , Self - containment and Civilian Power : United Germany 's Normalising Ambitions* , the change in Germany's policy towards European integration as well as in its discourse about national interest , going " from a supranational position and " inhibition " ... based on both the enthusiasm of postwar Germany to European integration and its legacy before the Second World War a Machtpolitik (political power) to a more self-focused , assertive and national position. "8

However, the public support for a reinforced EU presence in terms of security and accountability of Germany in the European project remains high.

Germany must be able to fulfill military obligations deriving from its quality of membership within NATO and to continue to take more responsibility in the military operations.

The new developments in the field of European security put Germany in front of two important choices : first , the direction it would like the European Union's foreign policy to follow and its limits , and secondly the option for its future role within the EU.

Civil Power (Zivilmacht) , as it was called , Germany proposes and supports military means only as a last resort, being more reluctant to involvement in various multilateral commitments , while remaining aware of its responsibilities within the EU or NATO.

Germany's former Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, promoted the image of the European Union - Civil Power, the development of a European security and defense capability did not mean the militarization of Europe, but rather the transformation of the EU into a power " efficient and peaceful, which is capable, as seen in the case of Kosovo, to bolster law and the right to renounce violence and thus consign the war as a political tool in the old Europe. "9

8 G. Hellmann, 'Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and Civilian Power: United Germany's Normalising Ambitions', Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 99/10 (University of Birmingham, 1999), p.53 Idem, p.11:"from a position of supranationalism and "inhibitedness"...based on both Germany's post-war enthusiasm for European integration and its pre-Second World War legacy of Machtpolitik to a more self centred, assertive and more national position"

9 Alister John Miskimon, *op.cit*, p.12

The Stability Pact is a clear example of Germany's mark on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Fischer's vision of the non- military aspects of European security, suggesting as means of defense of stability and democratic values , the economic development and respect for humanity.

On the other hand we have the Eastern Partnership, which Germany wants to use more as a tool to approach economically and not politically the partner states of the EU.

Germany has opted for strengthening of the economic cooperation with partner countries by signing agreements on free trade areas and harmonizing some of their legislation with the *acquis communautaire*. The relationship with Russia is of great importance from the point of view of Germany, so that Berlin does not want this partnership to become an instrument for pre - accession, an initiative that gives the partner the possibility of membership, thus antagonizing Russia. 10

The purpose of this partnership is mainly strengthening economic relations with these countries, preferred by German exporters and investors due to their potential for growth, cheap labor, geographical proximity and cultural ties. Furthermore, bilateral agreements with partner states allow expansion of the European legal framework and other sectors of great interest for Germany and the EU such as foreign trade , energy , environment , transport and internal security , given that we dealing with an area known for political instability or frozen conflicts . This bilateral cooperation brings in Germany's view more political than economic benefits and multilateral cooperation: direct contact with state government, a better understanding of local systems of government easier access to these markets for German companies, and enhancing its image in these countries.

The close connection between Germany and Russia transpires in the principle Russia first, that guides Germany. Although supporting and promoting greater involvement of the EU in terms of economic and bilateral relations in the eastern neighborhood, Germany proposes EaP members the model of a "common neighborhood "11, to enable cooperation and reconciliation of economic interests and not to endanger the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU and its relations with Russia.

10 Justyna Gotkowska, *Germany and the Eastern Partnership*, in *OSW Commentary*, Issue 37, 17.06.2010, Center for European Studies, p.1

11 *Idem*, p.2

In conclusion, on the political agenda of Germany the maintenance of the balance between the relations with its European neighbors and partners, and the relations with the U.S. and Russia remains priority number 1.

Taking into account Russia's pragmatism and America's strategic interests, which will ensure its presence in European security affairs, Germany continues to make her voice heard within the negotiations on Security Policy with its key partners, in order to promote and defend its own interests and to ensure its active role in the CFSP. For Germany, facing the consequences of a strengthened transatlantic partnership and assuming the responsibility for coordination and European cooperation in the field of security and foreign policy, means a more active role in military operations and internal consensus on the militarization of its European foreign and Security policy.

**Germany – Europe's pawn between the U.S. and Russia:
The relevance of the research**

This paper proposes an analysis of German politics and German diplomacy in terms of implications for European security and the CFSP, but also an insight on German interests in its relations with the main centers of power, the U.S. and Russia, articulating their economic and security interests regarding the European continent.

Although it could be said that they should be regarded as part of the foreign policy of a state, in my work these elements are treated as a matter of foreign policy, due to their strategic nature and role of tools, means of it. In the context of increased tensions between the U.S. and Europe, both on economic and especially security issues, due to the lack of European capabilities, an autonomous European security structures and homogeneous, and the destabilizing impact of Russia on Central and Eastern Europe, on the entire continent, which has led to increased cooperation and the creation of more transparent relationships with the Russian Federation, Germany's attitudes and policies will have a considerable influence on the future development of European and transatlantic relations.

For this reason I consider the identification and analysis of the factors determining Germany's European policy and transatlantic of a high practical relevance.

The literature review will follow a unique case, that of Germany and its relations with the U.S. and Russia the two actors on the issue of security in Europe, analyzed on two levels: the first level of analysis aims at ensuring compliance with reality, respecting it and gathering relevant details to support the individual cases of America and Russia, and their security policies, while the second level involves cross- system analysis, approaches and policies of the three actors.

This paper is a continuation of my interest in the German question and Germany's role in Europe and in the world, based on its spectacular development and miraculous history.

The academic research on this topic was started through my dissertation Thesis, *The European Union: A German Europe or a European Germany?* , which aimed to analyze the role of the German state and its mark on the European process and later within the European Union. The Master Thesis *The key to European security and Euro-transatlantic balance - Germany*, motivated by the close historical security relationship and cooperation with two other German states with a historical and miraculous evolution, Russia and USA.

I consider my research useful from a theoretical point of view, because of the comparison between two theoretical perspectives, apparently antithetical. I propose to examine the principles of two traditional schools of international relations theory, realism and liberalism and their application to the subject analyzed, showing that each approach, although divergent , antithetical in theory, in practice it cannot deny the results of the first , but rather to complement them , building a comprehensive overview of the dimensions of security and cooperation between the three countries.

The empirical testing of the three perspectives will allow me to identify additional issues and will raise new questions and new hypotheses that will encourage further research on Germany's European and transatlantic policy. Therefore, the research questions of this study have both practical relevance, explaining the role of Germany and the future of European and transatlantic cooperation in terms of the German actor and theoretical relevance, trying to combine the three theoretical approaches antithetical in a constructive and explanatory manner.

The introduction of the analysis will identify the problems and areas of interest, the general trends that have been published on the subject considering various materials analyzed , the conflicts between theory, methodology , and the novelty of the research , its limitations , and applicability of the proposed result.

The content will follow the summary of the various research sources and literature used.

Chapter 1 examines the economic outlook of the paper, presenting the economic relations, partnerships and agreements that underpin the cooperation between the three countries, Germany, Russia and the USA. In this chapter the premises will be developed as well as Germany's condition of European prosperity and security guarantor, identifying elements that transforms in a socio-economic model of Europe and Europe's leading economic power, its engine along Union France.

If the economic integration wore, and the European economic integration still wears Germany's print, this chapter will continue this idea, demonstrating Germany's implications and impact on the global economic scene from the point of view of its economic relations with the two partners, Russia and USA. The "Monnet " method of supranational integration has shaped Germany's behavior in a multilateral way, making its transition from a national to an European identity.

The German unification came as a reaction to the rejection of the traditions of the Great Powers to change its borders and exclude any attempt of revisionism. After the radical changes in Eastern Europe, Germany has proven to be the main winner with great voice on the international stage. Still deeply rooted in the Euro -Atlantic structures Germany made its influence felt throughout the process of enlargement to the East.

In conclusion, analyzing the economic and political situation of Europe, they both proved to be profitable for Germany in terms of the Common Market, the Euro and EU enlargement, its central position in the largest single market in the world explaining its progress worldwide. In terms of orientation towards its East Central European neighbors , Germany's economic relations aligned to the integration rules within each of these markets, becoming thus the main and biggest economic partner of these countries, while the German industry is the most important investor.

Influence that, as seen above, comes not from its military power, rather from its economic and technological innovation, its internal stability and dynamism.

The second Chapter, *Germany from European security to international cooperation*, will detail the role of Germany within the EU, on the one hand in terms of policies pursued vis a vis Europe, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) , the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), identifying its security interests in Europe and second in terms of its relations with Russia and the U.S.

It will make a comparison between the security interests of the three actors based on the analysis of their strategies and security policies, highlighting the difference in understanding the concept of security, and defining threats and enemies.

The Schäuble - Lamers Paper, *Considerations on European Policy*, introduced on 1 September 1999 by the delegation CDU / CSU highlighted Germany's fundamental interest in expanding and strengthening the European Union and encouraged the creation of a central voice in the field of common European foreign and defense policy, clarifying the consequences for the future of the transatlantic relationship: " Prospectively , that means the transformation of NATO into a balanced alliance between the U.S. , Canada and Europe as a workable unit"¹². The former red-green government, Schröder / Fischer, although had announced that Germany's objective was to continue the pro -American and pro -European policies, only managed to isolate Germany from the US and the rest of the nuclear powers by proposing amendment excluding the use of NATO strategy and nuclear capabilities. However, in terms of new challenges and threats, and the paradox in the transatlantic relationship, the U.S. should act either as a balancing factor between the great powers, or against Germany, to prevent its domination and the creation of a German sphere of influence in Central Europe and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 3 analyses the relationship of the three actors by presenting the history of their cooperation, the areas of their cooperation and the partnerships they are involved in. These three actors deserve being analyzed especially in terms of their traditional relations: if the Russo-German relations have been increasingly close, based on geographical proximity, common interests sometimes opposite towards the European continent, the Russian-American relations, although with tensions and diverging in some aspect the XXIst century challenges are a common factor, while the German-American relations have developed due to Germany's opportunity development, while the Westerners were a excellent way against Russian expansionism and impeding its recovery in Europe. Americans have pursued the rapid economic recovery of Germany in order to reduce costs to maintain areas of occupation, but also to impose some control over Germany, following the creation of a future economic prosperity, a key element in their policy to crack down communism in this region. For Germany, however, is a way to regain

¹² Werner Link, *Continuities and discontinuities in euro-atlantic relations*, in Susanne Baier-Allen (coord), *The future of Euro-Atlantic Relations*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2000, p.25

its status of leading actor on the European stage, NATO becoming an alliance that would bring it on par with its conquerors.

U.S. continues to be regarded by its politicians, and especially by Europe, as a guarantor of the European continent, and is expected to continue to take the role of “geopolitics equalizer and benign arbiter, a strategic watchdog to channel Germany’s power towards a German-American strategic partnership in order to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe.”¹³

Considering an America eager to maintain its supremacy over Europe and a Germany determined to promote their own interests and those of the European states, one can say that between the U.S. and Europe, the partnership tends to become forced and sometimes to embody disguised rivalry.

Moreover, Russia is back on track, trying to rebuild its sphere of influence under the guise of historical fraternity and soft power policy and great power status. Putin’s Russia assumed that economic power translates into political power, and Moscow has managed to turn this event into a political lesson through Gazprom, which has become a state within a state.

The foreign policy pursued by President Vladimir Putin came to contrast with Russia’s former Prime Minister Andrej Kozyrev in 1992, focusing more on Russia’s international posture on interests and balance of powers.

While Kozyrev 's strategy recommended the integration of Russia among Western powers after common principles and ideals, Putin’s vision referred to Russia's great power status recovery, taking into account the integration goal, but a different integration for which interests and balance power between the big countries play a major role : "The interest has been the basic principle in the international arena and in relations between states throughout history. But when these relationships have become more civilized, has become increasingly clear that their interests should be weighed against the interests of other countries."¹⁴

¹³ Idem, p.27

¹⁴ Eugene B.Rumer, *Russian foreign policy beyond Putin*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, IISS, Adelphi Paper 390, 2007, p.22: “*Interest has been the main principle in the international arena and in relations between states throughout history. But as these relations became more civilized, it became more and more clear that one’s own interests should be compared with the interests of other countries*”

The Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin¹⁵, said that only two powers will contribute significantly to the future structure of Europe, Germany and Russia, the relationship between the two great European countries, as Yeltsin considered them, would decide Europe's remodeling after the radical changes in Eastern Europe and will lead to a full European partnership and interdependence, or create new borders and dividing lines.

An interesting approach, if we consider the fact that both countries are relatively new states that are still trying to determine their position in a Europe that is becoming more consistent: on the one hand, Germany, facing the East by transforming the East Europe and on the other side, Russia that tries to define relations with Europe after the dissolution of the USSR. Germany had a special interest in the success of the reform process in Russia unwilling to assist in isolating the Russian state and its removal from the construction of new European security architecture. Russia would certainly have a concern if Germany should adopt an attitude of indifference towards it, or if it attempts to join the West in order to isolate Russia, due to its imperialist ambitions.

Chapter 4 provides general theoretical conclusions and policy implications of the cooperation between the three countries and Germany's role in Europe. The conclusions will summarize the major, meaningful contributions and evaluate methods and theories used throughout the research, thereby providing a panoramic overview of the subject, the validity of assumptions and variables, and applicability of the results.

The theoretical and methodological framework

Theory is intended to bring order and meaning, sense to some phenomena without which it would remain misunderstood and with no relevance as Morgenthau said¹⁶. Theory provides researchers a range of appropriate analytical tools for their research as well as different features and specifications of the main actors in international relations: how these actors rank their preferences, how to they interact, what influences and shapes the capabilities to obtain their

¹⁵ Hans Hermann Hohmann, Christian Meier, Heinz Timmermann , *Russia and Germany in Europe. Recent Trends of Political and Economical Relations*, in *Berichte des Bundesintituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studium*, 38/1997, p.7

¹⁶ A.Hyde Price, *op.cit*, p.16

national objectives, helping to understand complex realities works. Theory acts as a tool to classify, analyze and use information optimally.¹⁷

The purpose of this paper is the formulation of valid and applicable answers to the questions regarding Germany's role as a promoter of economic and military security in Europe and as balance keeper between the interests of the two countries in Europe. The research will undertake two perspectives - an economic one and a security perspective, starting from the traditional principles of international relations theory, varying only in terms of the level of analysis and variables with which it operates.

The security perspective shall be justified based on the allegations of the realistic theory of the state, highlighting the interstate relations of power and considering the state policy as determined by the security rationale for pursuing own interest, as the actors behave rationally and selfishly. It will be later completed by the constructivist principles, of social interaction which results in security structures that facilitate cooperation and the fulfillment of its own security interests and strengthens the national security.

On the other hand, the economical perspective is explained by the liberal approach, which gives the state authority and a limited exercise of power, a delimitation of its own sphere of influence and action that the state ought not to infringe.

The variables and assumptions

This paper aims to justify Germany's condition as a guarantor of stability and prosperity in Europe, a significant milestone with interests on the international scene, one of the major economies of Europe and a significant voice in relations with the U.S. and Russia , whose role is the dependent variable of my research project .

The indicators of the empirical analysis of this variable will be the European and international political agenda of Germany, with special focus on two cases: the European Neighborhood Policy of the European continent and the issue of Iraq, considering the transatlantic partnership and the relationship with Russia, as well as the analysis of the principles of security policies, the interests of national security, both European and global. Its status as a point of reference and interest will be measured by the political views of the different European

¹⁷ *ibidem*

countries and the situation of Germany in Europe and on the international stage, its relationships with Russia and the USA. From the relationship between these variables, the dependent and independent ones, derived hypotheses that will be empirically tested through the analysis of the security and economic dimensions of cooperation between Germany, Russia and the U.S., and the special cases that define these relationships.

The economic approach of the research will be explained by the independent variable of the degree of Germany's economic development, underlying its economic cooperation with the U.S. and Russia.

To assess the degree of economic development, indicators such as income per capita , purchasing power will be used along with information on bilateral or multilateral agreements , partnerships highlighting the economic cooperation between the three countries.

Thus, the first hypothesis outlined the economic relationship between the three states from a logical reasoning: the higher the economic index is and as Germany represents a significant economic power, the greater the influence on the rest of the European countries is, but also on the European policies and affairs, shaping them in the desired direction, and the greater its attraction to other economic powers. Germany is a reliable partner, a profitable and stable investment market with a strong voice in economic policy.

On the other hand, the security perspective will be validated through two independent variables related to Foreign and Security policy agendas of states.

The second independent variable of the research will identify and explain the security interests of states on the basis of their security policies and strategies, highlighting the growing role of security organizations, the participation of Germany, Russia and the U.S. in these organizations and their adaptation to new global challenges of security and international relations. Indicators for this variable are official documents, such as security strategies, agreements and security partnerships and the data resulting from the comparison of the security policies and security interests of the three powers in Europe.

They will draw relevant conclusions for a better understanding of the concept of security, for defining threats and identifying enemies.

In terms of system security challenges and new global threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), each state seeks to ensure their security and existence, its own security interests.

This secondary hypothesis assumes that the stronger the state is, the more exposed at risk is and threats and its security must be strengthened even more, looking for cooperation with other states or security organizations to face challenges together. The hypothesis will make the link to the last hypothesis of the research, highlighting the common point of the two opposing theoretical frameworks: realist and constructivist.

Considering the need for international cooperation to ensure the survival of the state and its security, the third independent variable finds practical functionality describing Germany's foreign relations with Russia and the U.S. through the history of their cooperation and by analyzing the difference between their approaches of the concept of security and vision of the international system and new threats.

The history of cooperation between the three countries is a good indicator of interstate harmony and will be operationalized through the analysis of agreements or partnerships, identifying common interests and areas where cooperation is high on the foreign policy agenda of every state. Other indicators for the empirical analysis of this variable will be inter alia the official documents of the three state, officials' texts and speeches talking about foreign policy interests, the objectives and their means.

As already mentioned, the second hypothesis is closely related to the last hypothesis of the paper, translated in terms of a much closer and strengthened cooperation amid a long and close shared past. Thus, the states have experienced a long history, with common interests and close cooperation, the stronger this cooperation has been the closer will be the future relations and partnerships, and their mutual interests will have priority on the political agenda of these countries.

Theories and levels of analysis - the theory

Germany's European and transatlantic policy will be analyzed from a somewhat different perspective: instead of a purely realistic explanation of the concepts of interest and power and how these states interact and relate in an anarchic system of international relations, I will address the social dimension of interaction between the three actors, emphasizing the constructivist perspective as a determinant of cooperation between states. Historical background and close

cooperation as an incentive and determinant of the current policy of the three countries to each other serve the constructivist purpose, emphasizing the social construction that the states made.

Therefore, seeking fulfillment of their interests they created the conditions to enhance the social interaction within their relationship.

For realists, states are the main actors in global politics and only interstate relations are relevant, paying little attention to domestic policy as part of international relations. For the state, power is the only currency in international relations, and their goal is to maximize their power to increase security, and as a result, states, "concerned with power and security pursue a foreign policy in this direction." 18

So, on the one hand we have Kenneth Waltz, who considers the state a key condition of anarchy, restricting the behavior of other states and on the other hand, is Alexander Wendt, who believes that relations between states evolve in time and many states have learned to live with each other, as a result of a historical process and of the interactions between them.

Taking into account the principles of classic *realpolitik*, Germany is no longer the voice par excellence of political realism, as will become apparent from the analysis of the case of Iraq, which basically confirmed its civilian power status and stated. Despite the collective historical memory and image of warrior state, inspiring fear to neighbors, we are now dealing with a Germany pacifist state that has learned fast and good its lesson: war is not the best solution and should not become a frequent tool of power politics.

On the other hand constructivists come and highlight the social dimension of interaction between actors, using relationships and past history of the state as evidence of social construction that states built. By pursuing their own national interests, states interact socially and create the social preconditions for strengthening the links between them.

Power distribution as understood by realist contains a element of socialization: the effects of the structure are the result of social interaction between states and of the competition between them.

Although constructivists recognize that interests are significant, these, are in their conception closely linked to the identity of the actors, considering the fact that the subjects of

18 Marcel Vietor, *op.cit*, p.15

international relations are neither selfish nor universally rational, but have their own identities , shaped by cultural, social and political facts.

The Liberal theory will play a role as important in the theoretical structure of the research as the other theoretical approaches, given the major influence it had and still has on German politics and diplomacy. The first thing that comes to support my approach is also the first principle of the liberal theory of the state: the state is not superior to any institution; on the contrary, in the areas of competence of those institutions the state is inferior. Feature that can easily be identified in Germany's behavior towards Europe and within the EU, namely the strict guidance, acceptance and application of the subsidiarity principle.

Moreover, internally, Germany has assumed the democratic accountability to its own citizens , but also to the EU , making the step from national to European identity .

The influence of the liberal economic principles is also reflected in the economic development of Germany, as the analysis of the first chapter of the book will highlight. Germany is a country that respects the demands of the market economy and the right of law, a balancer of economic interests of European states and a regulator of European economy. The balance of power that Germany aims to achieve is not realistic in itself, but is complemented by the ambition of stability, not only of the climate between states but also within them.

The three theoretical perspectives applied to my research will address different levels of analysis: the analysis of the security and foreign policy perspective will focus on the security of the state and interstate relations, on security interests and foreign policy and security agenda of states. Economic issues, economic relations between states will be addressed in terms of the most important principle of liberal theory, a similar principle of subsidiarity, according to which the state is not superior to other institutions, but rather in those areas of competence of other institutions the state is inferior. Moreover, the sub-state level plays a decisive role in the formulation of the foreign policy. Therefore my analysis will focus on the sub -state actors , who hold or have their own interests in economic matters , such as the power both as object of trade, and as a means of foreign policy.

The current debate in Europe gravitates around major themes as political union, defining its borders , the junction between enlargement and deepening , topics that have created in Germany's eyes of a coherent , comprehensive and uniform Europe, that should define once and for all its objectives and boundaries.

On the other hand , Germany has attracted attention to another important and necessary issue for whose success is responsible, namely redefining European relations with the U.S. and Russia , the two " external laboratories where European ideas were tested through communism (in the past) and capitalism." Two traditional rivals that met in Europe and need now to find their place in Europe with a foreign policy based on European principles. Germany will revise its attitude towards the two actors, adopting a position of balance and compromise, given that the authorities in Berlin consider two basic elements to be significant for the future of Europe: EU's energy and defense policy demanding both geo-strategic repositioning and future projects on the ENP and the relationship with Russia.

In my opinion, we are dealing with a Germany strongly anchored in the Western structures, fully integrated in the European construction and actively involved in the process of EU integration and enlargement , shaping EU after its views and beliefs , becoming in some cases the voice and stimulus of the European Union.

Germany promoted its objectives individually depending on the interests and history of cooperation with those countries, but has never neglected the European dimension of its foreign and security policy, and never gave up its European identity in favor of the national one.

A new question arises: although Germany's evolution and course cannot exist outside Europe and Germany cannot fulfill its goals and interests outside the cooperation with European countries, as the EU its future, how long will Germany be willing to invest in Europe without receiving so much back, how long will this feeling of moral responsibility last and motivate Germany to be Europe's savior?

Yet, "We should not ask what the words mean / as if they contained secrets /, but what they do / as they embody as actions." ¹⁹

19 A.Leithner, *op.cit*, p.12

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