

**BABEŞ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY
CLUJ-NAPOCA
FACULTY OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY
DOCTORAL SCHOOL IN PHILOSOPHY**

Selfgenerating sense in art

PHD THESIS

SUMMARY

**Doctoral supervisor:
Prof. univ. dr. Veress Carol**

**PhD candidate:
Jakab András**

2013

Table of content

Introduction.....	5
1. Outline of the topic	5
2. On the phenomenological attitude.....	6
3. Approaching the problem	12
4. The basic question of the dissertation.....	15
5. The line of thought of the dissertation.....	20
1. The changing concept of phenomenon	27
1.1 Phenomenon as an object offered by perception.....	27
1.1.1 Kant’s concept of phenomenon	27
1.1.2 Duration of consciousness at Bergson	32
1.1.3 Differences of the Kantian and Bergsonian conception	40
1.2 Perception and memory	42
1.3 Intentionality	45
1.3.1 Brentano on intentionality	45
1.3.2 Noema and noesis	47
1.3.3 Husserl on consciousness and phenomenon	50
1.4 Genetic phenomenology.....	54
1.4.1 From the absolute consciousness of time to the affective dimension	54
1.4.2 From object consciousness to the dimension of genesis	57
1.5 The emotion	60
1.6 The imaging consciousness.....	62
2. Amodal perception as affectivity	72
2.1 Immanence and transcendence.....	72
2.2 Field and perception	79
2.3 Behaviour	86
2.3.1 Stimulus and reflex	86
2.3.2 The corporeal synthesis	90
2.3.3 The domain of perception.....	96
2.4 Affectivity and vitality.....	102
2.5 Jazz or the phenomenological gesture	110
3. The hypothesis of meaning formation	116
3.1 Meaning formation and identity	116
3.2 The work of the body.....	122
3.2.1 Corporeal conditions of meaning formation.....	122
3.2.2 On the ground of “primordial openness”	128
3.3 A philosopher’s perspective.....	132
3.3.1 The role of a genius in the act of creation	133
3.3.2 Nietzsche on the concept of genius	135

3.4 The painter's perspective	141
3.4.1 Temperament and realization.....	141
3.4.2 The paradox nature of the fine art	143
3.5 Attempt for the conceptual formulation of painting	144
3.5.1 The lived-world of painting	144
3.5.2 Lived-activity.....	148
3.5.3 Lived-experience.....	153
Summary, conclusions.....	157
Bibliography.....	164
Annexes	172

Keywords

phenomenon, duration (durée), intentionality, synthesis, passive synthesis, genesis, body, kinaesthesia, thetical, non-thetical, memory, meaning, affectivity, behaviour, meaning conveyance, meaning formation, perception, amodal perception, immanence, transcendence, lived-activity, lived-experience, lived-world, gesture.

Selfgenerating sense in art

Abstract

The subject of the dissertation relates to the question of meaning in modernity.

The epistemological question starts with the expression of the intuitive truth of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*. The *subject* as the starting point of Cartesian considerations becomes at Kant the condition for the possibility of meaning conveyance, grounded in the universality of human abilities. The limits of meaning in Kant's philosophy are the limits of cognition, which are regulated by *a priori* conditions such as the forms of sensory perception, the *space* and the *time*. In Hegel's case, meaning is in the first place the meaning of the world, and the self, the man is only an overarching link aiming at the self-recognition of meaning.

The Aristotelian concept of *intentionality* revived by Brentano and rethought by Husserl brings to the fore the searching, discovering nature of consciousness. Phenomenological analyses search for the meaning formed during the process of experience. In his early period, Husserl offered a reinterpretation of Kant's *a priori*, and presupposed the transparency and rationality of the revealed meaning. Later, in his genetic period, Husserl adopted the stance that one cannot speak of the self-enclosure of meaning, that is, the totality of cognition, with respect to either self, or time. Merleau-Ponty connects to this idea with the re-assessment of sensory experience. The answer of "new phenomenology" given to epistemological considerations is that it takes the problematic of transcendence over to the field of ontology. Ontological considerations however fail to take into account the specific situationality of various experiences, the particularities which, for instance in the case of artistic experience, pertain to the concrete experiences or *activity* of a given artist, and thus level this experience. In contrast, a different kind of concept of *activity* can be elaborated, one that allows the *formation* at work in variety to be grasped.

The central problem of the dissertation is connected to the question of *meaning formation*. The formulation of the problem refers to the fact that, in contrast with the traditionally conceived *happening of meaning*, *meaning formation* can be examined as a *differentiation* process going on in the *being-within* generated from the *nothing*. The “nothing” can be used here as a liminal concept, which describes the nature of meaning formation devoid of *a priori*, devoid of the *différance* of *a priori* and *a posteriori*. This process of *meaning formation* is achieved as a mode of interplay of *senses*, *emotions*, *perception* and *reason* from which no element can be singled out as fundamental. At the same time, meaning itself cannot be placed in the centre of its own manifestation, but in accordance with the principle of interplay, it can be found as meaning precisely in the process of its manifestation; its manifestation is always one, but never the final phase of the process of its articulation.

The question referring to *meaning formation* necessarily leads to the problem of art, since it is in this field that one can trace a variety of modes of formation. In a first approach, I defined the process of creation, breaking it down into abstract elements, as a *state* in which the creator finds him/herself or brings him/herself in, or one which he/she is always a part of, when, under the influence of an *impression*, he/she feels constrained to *express* it. This presumed state is important to highlight because, in my view, it cancels the usual, everyday attitude. By *impression*, I mean a kind of vibration raised in this case by a sight or not merely a sight, which serves as a guiding principle in the creative process. The subject of the impression is the painter, who takes its part in creation either individually, or as a partner in the given interplay of fields. The third factor is the work, which takes part in the creative process either as also an active partner, or merely as an object.

Problems in the dissertation are formulated and analyzed by the *phenomenological method*. This approach is justified because the problem itself derives from the field of phenomenology. Starting from the Husserlian concepts of reduction and habituality, and corroborating this with the reduction concept of Merleau-Ponty, I use two complementary methods of phenomenological experience analysis. At the description of the articulation methods of conscious structures, the Husserlian *remaining* meanings are a secondary round compared to the *formation* field at their basis, which is *differentiation*. The notion of phenomenon epitomizes the formation process which organizes the thoughts connected to that what appears, and allows a phenomenological description. The possibility of synthesis is founded by differentiation. At the same time, it also offers a ground for the interpretation or authentic approach of the artist’s work.

The first chapter, entitled *The changing notions of phenomenon*, delimits the notion of phenomenon in connection with the question posed. The line of thought starting from Kant sets out with an idea which emphasizes the integrative nature of *perception*. Kant discusses *a priori* formal determination as a precondition of experience with regard to *sensibility*, *imagination* and *reason*. Bergson's line of thought is a critique of Kant's concept of *sensibility*, and it also introduces another aspect of the relation of the world and the I. To Kant's quantitative side he opposes the qualitative side, which is characterized by a kind of *indeterminacy*. Bergson introduces this qualitative side in connection with art. He defines this indeterminacy as a *tendency* which emerges from *virtuality* and is articulated by *memory*. Husserl continues to rethink the problem formulated by Kant in connection with the concept of phenomenon. Holding the thesis of the *thing-in-itself* untenable, Husserl uses the dichotomy of *noema* and *noesis* to replace the Kantian standpoint based on the dichotomy of *noumena* and *phenomena*. By this, he sends back the *thing-in-itself* to the realm of *immanence*. *Intentionality*, which for Husserl means that the consciousness is originally object-oriented, recognizes no *thing-in-itself*, only meanings created within the *noema* – *noesis* relation. For Husserl as well as for Bergson, there emerges the possibility lying in *duration*, which Husserl described in his static, that is, early period as the intentionality of the act extended in the trichotomy of *protension*, *retention* and *primal impression*. In opposition with Bergson, the question of the world for Husserl can be grasped through *phenomenality* and *meaning conveyance*. It should not be discussed as the Bergsonian *memory* which interferes with *real* perception. In Husserl's later period the objectual *unity formation* becomes questionable, which he connects primarily to the field of *affectivity*. The discovery of the affective field can be regarded as a result of genetic phenomenology in contrast to static phenomenology. The Heideggerian critique holds Husserl responsible for the exposedness to transcendence, that is, the thesis that the *object-intentionality* is connected to some kind of anonymous objectuality. In contrast, Heidegger emphasizes that we connect every object in the moment of its perception to some kind of *totalitariness*, that is, a way of use and its world. This way, in opposition with the theoretical orientation of the *act*, Heidegger draws attention to the primacy of an action directed to a certain *goal*. Sartre extends this Heideggerian viewpoint, including also the world-creating nature of the *imaging* consciousness, and the dimension of the allegation of the world by way of emotion. By this, it places the imagination into the original, world-creating mode of meaningfulness, that is, intentionality. At the same time, for him also *judgment* remains primary together with the difference between *thetical* and

non-thetical; that is to say, Sartre ultimately also approves of the thesis of self-enclosure of the consciousness.

The criticism formulated in the second chapter entitled *Amodal perception as affectivity* questions the sustainability of precisely this *judgment*-based consideration. For every such question leaves out that factor of *facticity* which would incorporate *indeterminacy* into the question so that it may remain inextricable.

I linked the question about the nature of *indeterminacy* to Merleau-Ponty's early analyses. In his *The Structure of Behaviour* and *Phenomenology of perception*, through the critique of *physiology*, *psychology* and *reflexive philosophy*, one may trace the role of the *body* and its meaningfulness. In these analyses Merleau-Ponty demolishes the ideal of *meaningfulness*, that is, the standpoints formulated as absolute determinacy. As he later emphasises – on the pages of *The Visible and the Invisible* – the critical reconsideration of the *perceptual faith* is a primary requirement, since its results are taken over unquestionably by researches of any philosophical conception or scientific theory. I have followed in these writings the outline of the dynamic relationship of *part* and *whole*. The endpoints of *mute* impression and *saturated*, determined impression encompass the level where *intentionality in operation* occurs in the mode of continuous transformation. *Perception* is thus an original way of connecting to the world in the process of which the seen and the visible are shaped together. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, in accord with Bergson, the idea of *metamorphosis*, the primacy of movement and dynamism in case of *perception*. Memory, which at Bergson appeared as an active principle, is found here as *atmosphere*. Judgment appears as a posterior product. The discussion of the concept of *form* shows that we are not dealing with the appearance of a previously created form, given in its totality. Rather, one can speak about a mode of articulation where the *temporal dissemination* or *rythmicity* is meaningful; that is, this meaning is formed in the *kinetic melodicy* of the articulation. The *form* cannot be included into the field of the *thing-in-itself*, but it is recognized as a substratum in which the relation between the *organism* and its *environment* is defined in a correlative way. This relation cannot be grasped in a mutual externality, but in the thesis that the elements *recognize each other dynamically*. The concept of *being-in-the-world* expresses a *pre-objective* field of this *productivity*. Productivity as *action*, as a continuous *work (activity)*, questions the thesis of the self-enclosing consciousness. In the process of understanding, *centripetal* and *centrifugal* movements are inseparable; in this approach to understand means to *live* the harmony between *intention* and *execution*. This unity can best be grasped by the concept of *bodily gesture*. The musician's example shows that the *gesture* appears not as the formation

of some kind of new physical series, but as a kind of *consecration* in the course of which *affective* vectors are stretched and an *expression space* is formed. The affective dimension is where the *reality* can be exhibited *for the body*.

While trying to explore and understand the affective dimension, I arrived to the researches of Daniel N. Stern. The concept of *amodal perception*, which I derived from Stern, serves to describe the field at the basis of the perception-unit. The transpositions that Stern has reached as the results of certain experiments link this formation of unity to *forms*, *intensities* and *temporal structures*. This is how I arrived, in relation to Stern, to the introduction of the concept of *vitality affects*, which is meant to extend the traditional concept of *physiognomy*. The book called *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* presents a range of affects within the wider field of *kinaesthesia* instead of *discrete affects*. A characteristic feature of *amodal perception*, the domain in which these urges occur, is *being-in-formation*. We find here initiatives which, in their unfolding, can take on the form of any kind of *discrete affects*. If we treat the isolated, fact-like affects as existential aspects derived from a *situation*, then we may find new possibilities of articulation in the relation of *expression* and *meaning*. That is, a *meaningfulness* which does not exist separately from the expression but occurs in its formation. Thus one can speak about an integrated articulation of expression and meaning, the *kinetic melodicy* of which comprises a multitude of motivational relations. This way the body appears in the gesture as an *expressive unit*. The impression is no longer mute, it is not a state, but a *turning to the world* or *away from the world* of the *embodied emotional being*. Quality must be understood as a *force*, which the body takes over and becomes the quality itself, but not by the principle of merging, but that of *tuning*, and thus it becomes *embodied essence*. *Essence* here does not mean a kind of closed *unity*, but the meaning emerging in the *experiment*, which occurs primarily because of its *affective* nature.

In the last part of the chapter I outline one meaning of this concept of *gesture* as occurring in jazz (music) with the help of Sundow.

Fine art, or in this case the creative methods of a painter, is the subject of the third part of the dissertation. The train of thought of the chapter entitled ***The hypothesis of meaning formation*** begins with the separation and contextualization of the concepts of *meaning formation* and *meaning conveyance*, as well as *meaning formation* and *meaning fixation*. This also raises the problem of identity, since the questions of *meaning fixation* depends on the presumed identity in relation to which the meaning can reveal itself. At the same time, the question about art also comprises the question about the subject of the creative process and its role in it. The terminological differentiation is made on the basis of the analyses of László

Tengelyi. In these analyses the dichotomy of *lived life story* and *narrated life story* reveals that neither can be reduced to the other, but one must relate to both of them together; they keep their difference and unity together in a *diacritical* approach. In my view, the importance of the diacritical approach, or rather of the model of differentiation lies in the reinterpretation of the Husserlian passive synthesis or even the concept of affinity. The basis of this possibility is formulated by Merleau-Ponty in his work notes published in *The Visible and the Invisible*. The formulation goes that the “beam directed backwards” of which Husserl speaks in *Ideen III*, the world-beam is “not a synthesis and not passive reception, but the result of separation, unfolding, differentiation, that is, it presupposes that we are already in the world or in being.” The world of the infant, that is, the exposition of the domain of *amodal perception* in Stern’s conception suggests that the transpositions or the system of *equivalences* that appears there provides a basis for *differentiation*. That is to say, we face, or stand within, a certain region of the principle of articulation, which is an original mode of the world. Articulation however cannot be grasped as the primacy of objectual aspects highlighted by the subject, but rather in the course of *temporal divisions*, as standing in the light of *intensity*, in which the primary aspect is *affectivity*. We find here a *kinaesthetic domain* which is shaped by the *différance* of *urges* and *initiatives*. This can be correlated to the concept-pair of *meaning formation* and *meaning fixation*, that Tengelyi takes over from Richir. This is a concept of meaning outlined here which renders as a criterion of meaning the *somethingness* of things different and disparate, and their somehow emerging *sameness*. From this comes the meaning fixating nature of the *gesture*, and its outstanding role in *meaning formation*. Here, *institution* – now in the field of painting – can be described as an empty but outlined intention towards the painter’s motif. I describe the corporeal condition of *meaning formation* as *projection* or *ecstasy* which is accompanied by a kind of strangeness, as a result of the fact that the *in-betweenness* of being-within offers a different kind of *meaning* than the opposition. Albeit differently, the thesis of strangeness can also be found in the writings of Kant and Nietzsche, both of whom also make reference to that uncontrollable factor at work in creation which I have considered the basis of *meaning creation*, and both call them conditions of the possibility of creation. In order to mingle these conceptions, I used the work of Nigel Wentworth, which presents creation with reference to the *lived-world*. I emphasized the ideas which are directed against the *fixed* factors – such as the omnipotence of the creator, the abstract aspects of quality, the abstract definitions of the instrument, the assumption of the work as a concrete empirical object. Thus I have used the concept of *lived-activity* to display those possibilities which correspond to a multitude of phenomenal formations. At the same

time, I have drawn attention to the fact that these possibilities occurred in the process of phenomenalization as modes formed in reference to *lived-experience*, that is, the work is shaped in the context of *indeterminacy* emphasized with reference to the *perceptual faith*, by the *operation* of the tuning and harmonization factors guided by *empty intention*. In this shaping process one may follow the *formation* of the *operation* of the creative act. The *end-product* defined by *operation*, that is, the work of art itself will be nothing else than a certain mode of *fixation*, which fits into the attempt to shape the *style of the gesture* or *express* a certain way of experience. The stations that one particular work means in this context can be equally defined as a certain mirroring of the whole, and as a kind of wholeness in denouement of the part; the meeting point of the two tendencies is precisely the given *work*.

I formulated the following *Conclusions*:

1) The fixed versions of the concept of *meaning* offered by theories grouped around the concepts of *attention* and *judgment* neglect that dimension or domain of meaning which moves within the limits of *indeterminacy*, but as *différance* it offers a basis for fixed aspects, or rather it can be rendered together with these. Thus we get a wider concept of meaning, which is organized along certain tendencies, and these tendencies can always be assumed as articulation stages of an affective ground.

2) In contrast to the autocracy of painting, the train of thought connected to corporeal conditions leads to the insight that the painter him/herself emerges from this shaping mode, from the shaping of this *gesture-based style* appearing in lived-activity, as a result of the interplay between the concepts described above. In other words, giving way to *indeterminacy*, the tendency for the *formation* of an existential attitude *shaping* in the process of determination is at work in the creative act.

In connection with these two problems, the triad of phenomenon, perception and meaning circumscribe a field in which the play of the dimensions, in a constant pulsation, marked by these three concepts, serves as the ground of art in certain modes of fixation. Any of the said dimensions can come to the forefront in a situational aspect by the affective modality, but none can keep its primacy except on a temporary basis.

Bibliography

Primary bibliography

BERGSON, Henri:

1911 *Matter and Memory*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

1923 *Idő és szabadság*. In *Filozófiai Írók Tára*. Ford. Dr. Dienes Valéria. Franklin-Társulat, Budapest.

BOEHM, Gottfried:

2005 *Paul Cézanne: Montagne Sainte-Victorie*. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest.

BRENTANO, Franz:

1995 *Psychology from an empirical standpoint*. Angolra ford. Antos C Rancurello, D. B. Terrell és Linda L. McAlister. Routledge, New York és Canada.

DIENES Valéria:

1924 *Bergson lélektana* (Die Psychologie von Bergson), Budapest.

DELEUZE, Gilles:

1991 *Bergsonism*. Angolra ford. Hugh Tomlinson és Barbara Habberjam. Zone Books, New York.

HEIDEGGER, Martin:

1988 *A műalkotás eredete*. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest.

2001 *Lét és idő*. Osiris, Budapest.

HUSSERL, Edmund:

1891 *Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen*. Pfeffer, Halle.

1901 *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. Niemeyer, Halle.

1980 *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy III. Studies into the phenomenology of constitution*. Angolra ford. Ted E. Klein és William E. Pohl. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London.

1983 *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy I*. Angolra ford. F. Kersten Martinus. Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague / Boston / Lancaster.

1984 *Tapasztalat és ítélet. Részlet*. In *A fenomenológia a társadalomtudományban*. Gondolat, Budapest.

- 1997 Fantázia, képtudat, emlékezet. Részletek. In Bacsó Béla (szerk.): *Kép, fenomen, valóság*. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest. 9–47.
- 1998 *Az európai tudományok válsága I*. Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest.
- 1998 *Az európai tudományok válsága II*. Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest.
- 2000 *Karteziánus elmékedések*. Bevezetés a fenomenológiába. Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest.
- 2001 *Logichen untersuchungen I*. Angolra ford. J. N. Findley. Routledge, London.
- 2002 *Előadások az időről*. Atlantisz Kiadó, Budapest.
- 2002 *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy II*. Angolra ford. Richard Rojcewicz és André Schuwer. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
- 2008 *Introduction to logic and theory of knowlegde* (lectures 1906/7). Springer, Dordrecht.
- KANT, Immanuel:
- 1994-1995 *A tiszta ész kritikája*. Ictus.
- 2003 Az érzékelhető és az értelemmel felfogható világ formájáról és elveiről. In *Prekritikai írások*. Osiris/Gond-Cura Alapítvány, Budapest.
- 2003 *Az ítélőerő kritikája*. Osiris/Gond-Cura Alapítvány, Budapest.
- MACANN, Christopher:
- 2005 *Four phenomenological philosophies*. Taylor and Francis e-Library.
- MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice:
- 1964 *Signes*. Northwestern University Press, Evanstone.
- 1967 *The structure of behavior*. Beacon Press, Boston.
- 1973 *The prose of the world*. Northwestern University Press, Evanstone.
- 1973 *Sense and Non-sense*. Northwestern University Press, Evanstone.
- 1996 Cézanne kételye. *Enigma* 1996/3. 76–90 (részlet a „Le doute de Cézanne” c. írásból. *Sens et non-sens*. 15–51)
- 2002 A szem és a szellem. In *Fenomén és mű*. Szerk. Bacsó Béla. Kijárat Kiadó, Budapest.
- 2004 *The world of perception*. Routledge, New York.
- 2005 *A filozófia dicsérete*. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest.
- 2005 *Phenomenology of perception*. Taylor and Francis e-Library.
- 2006 *A látható és a láthatatlan*. L’Harmattan Kiadó–Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Budapest.
- MORAN, Dermot:
- 2000 Heidegger's Critique Of Husserl's And Brentano's Accounts Of Intentionality. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Volume 43, Issue 1.
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich:

- 1998 *Az értékek átértékelése*. Holnap Kiadó, Budapest.
- 2003 *A tragédia születése*. Magvető, Budapest.
- 2003 *A vidám tudomány*. Szukits Könyvkiadó, Szeged.
- 2003 *Ecce homo*. Göncöl Kiadó, Budapest.
- OLAY Csaba – ULLMANN Tamás:
- 2011 *Kontinentális filozófia a XX. században*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.
- REWALD, John:
- 1971 *Paul Cézanne levelei*. Corvina Kiadó, Budapest.
- SARTRE, Jean-Paul:
- 1962 *Ésquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (Sketch for a theory of emotions). Angolra ford. Philip Mairet. Mathuen & co ltd. London.
- 2004 *L'imaginaire*. (The imaginary: A Phenomenological psychology of the imagination). Angolra ford. Jonathan Webber. Routledge, London.
- 2006 *A lét és a semmi*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.
- STERN, Daniel N.:
- 1998 *The interpersonal world of the infant*. A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. Karnak Books, London.
- 2002 *A csecsemő személyközi világa*. Ford. dr. Balázs-Piri Tamás. Animula Kiadó, Budapest.
- SUNDOW, David:
- 2001 *Ways of the hand*. MIT Press, London.
- TENGELYI László:
- 1998 *Élettörténet és sorsesemény*. Atlantisz, Budapest.
- ULLMANN, Tamás:
- 2010 *A láthatatlan forma*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.
- WENTWORTH, Nigel:
- 2004 *The phenomenology of painting*. Cambridge University Press.

Complementary bibliography

- BENJAMIN, Walter:
- 1969 *A műalkotás a technikai reprodukálhatóság korában*.
<http://www.intermedia.c3.hu/mszovgy1/benjamin.htm>
- BIGNA, Lenggenhager, TEJ Tadi, THOMAS Metzinger, OLAF Blanke:
- 2007 Video ergo sum; Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. *Sciencemag*. Vol. 317.

www.sciencemag.org

BLOOM, Lois:

1993 *The transition from infancy to language*. Acquiring the power of expression. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

CHAGALL, Marc:

1970 *Életem*. Gondolat, Budapest.

COLLINGWOOD, Robin G.:

1938 *The Principles of art*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

DALI, Salvador:

2006 *Egy zseni naplója*. Cartaphilus Kiadó, Budapest.

DÁVID Katalin (szerk.):

1964 *Van Gogh válogatott levelei*. Háttér Kiadó, Budapest.

DILTHEY, W.:

1965 *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften*. Bd. VII, Teubner-Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Stuttgart/Göttingen.

DERRIDA, Jaques:

1987 *The truth in painting*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

DRYFUS, Hubert L.:

1995 *Being-in-the-world*. A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (division I). MIT Press, London, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

DUFRENNE, Mikel:

1973 *The phenomenology of aesthetic experience*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.

ELENA del Rio:

2008 *Deleuze and the cinemas of performance*. Powers of affection. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

ELIAS, Willem:

1997 *Signs of the time*. GA, Amsterdam-Atlanta.

ESCOUBAS, Eliane:

2008 Merleau-Ponty: The body of the work and the principle of utopia. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 39, No. 1.

FOUCAULT, Michel:

1990 *Felügyelet és büntetés*. Ford. Fázsy Anikó, Gondolat, Budapest.

1999 *A szexualitás története I*. Atlantisz, Budapest.

2000 *A klinikai orvoslás születése*. Corvina Kiadó, Budapest.

2011 *A szexualitás története II.* Atlantisz, Budapest.

FREUD, Sigmund:

1978 Studies on Hysteria. In. *The complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud.* Volume 2. Hogarth, London.

2006 *Bevezetés a pszichoanalízisbe.* Gabó Kiadó, Budapest.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg:

2004 *Igazság és módszer.* Osiris, Budapest.

GOMBRICH, Ernst H.:

1972 *Művészet és illúzió.* Gondolat, Budapest.

HEGEL, G. W. F:

1950 *Enciklopédia I. A filozófiai tudományok enciklopédiájának alapvonalai.* Ford. Szemere Samu. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

1979 A logika tudománya (I rész). Ford. Szemere Samu. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

1979 A szellem fenomenológiája. Ford. Szemere Samu. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

HENRY, Michel:

1975 *Philosophy and phenomenology of the body.* Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague.

HUME, David:

2006 *Értekezés az emberi természetről.* Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.

IHDE, Don:

2007 *Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of sound.* State University of New York Press, Albany.

JACHEC, Nancy:

2011 *Jackson Pollock: Works, Writings, Interviews.* Poligrafia Kiadó, Barcelona.

KOEHLER, Wolfgang:

1920 *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand.* Kiadta Braunschweig. Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, Erlangen.

KUHNS, Richard:

1983 *Psychoanalytic theory of art.* Columbia University Press, New York.

LACAN, Jacques:

1994 *The four fundamental concepts of psycho-analysis.* Penguin Books, London.

LOCKE, John:

2003 *Értekezés az emberi természetről.* Osiris Kiadó, Budapest.

LOSONCZ, Alpár:

2010 Merleau-Ponty filozófiája. Attraktor Kiadó, Gödöllő.

LOTZ, Christian:

2007 *From affectivity to subjectivity*. Husserl's phenomenology revisited. Pilgrave Macmillan, New York.

MACINTYRE, Alasdair:

1987 *After Virtue. A study in moral theory*. Duckworth, London.

2004 *The unconscious. A conceptual analysis*. Routledge, New York és London.

MEZEI Balázs:

1998 A tiszta ész krízise. Edmund Husserl kései munkájáról. Utószó. Edmund Husserl: *Az európai tudományok válsága. I-II*. Atlantisz, Budapest.

MOHOLY-NAGY László:

1979 *A festéktől a fényig*. Kriterion Kiadó, Bukarest.

PANOFSKY, Erwin:

2011 *A jelentés a vizuális művészetekben*. ELTE BTK Művészettörténeti Intézet, Budapest.

PIAGET, Jean:

1952 *The origins of intelligence in children*. International Universities Press, New York.

1954 *The construction of reality in the child* Ford. M. Cook. Basic Books, New York.

PIPPER, David:

1999 *A műalkotás élvezete*. Helikon Kiadó kft., Debrecen.

PLESSNER, Helmuth:

1995 *Az érzékek antropológiája*. In Bacsó Béla (szerk): *Az esztétika vége – vagy se vége, se hossza?* Ikon, Budapest.

REYNER, Alice:

1995 *To act, to do, to perform*. The University of Michigan Press, USA.

RICHIR, Marc:

2004 A fenomenológia értelme a *Látható és láthatatlanban*. Ford. Takács Ádám. *Vulgo*, 5. évf. 1.

RICOEUR, Paul:

1966 *Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary*. Northwestern University Press, Evanstone.

1977 The question of proof in Freud's psychoanalytic writings. *Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association*, 25.

1988 L'identité narrative. *Esprit*, Nr. 7-8.

ROBINSON, Jenefer:

2005 *Deeper than reason*. Emotion, and it's role in literature, music and art. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de:

1967 *Bevezetés az általános nyelvészetbe*. Gondolat, Budapest.

SHEETS-JOHNSTON, Maxine:

2009 *The corporeal turn*. An interdisciplinary reader. Imprint Academic, UK.

SOLTRA Elemér:

2003 *A rajz tanítása*. Nemzedékek Tudása Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest.

SZABÓ, Zsigmond:

2005 *A keletkezés ontológiája. A végtelen fenomenológiája*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.

SZÁNTÓ György:

1982 *Fekete éveim, öt fekete holló*. Kriterion Kiadó, Bukarest.

SZIGETI Attila:

2011 *A testet öltött másik*. Pro Philosophia, Kolozsvár.

TYMIENIECKA, Anna-Teresa:

2002 *Phenomenology: corporeity and intersubjectivity in Husserl*. In *Phenomenology worldwide, foundations, expanding dynamisms, life-engagements: a guide for research and study*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Bodmin, Cornwall. 532–553.

VARGA Péter András – ZUH Deodáth (szerk):

2011 *Az új Husserl*. Szemelvények az életmű ismeretlen fejezeteiből. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest.

VERESS Károly:

2003 *Az értelem értelméről*. Mentor Kiadó, Marosvásárhely.

VERMES, Katalin:

2006 *A test éthosza*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Párizs.

WALDENFELS, Bernhard:

1999 *Felelet arra, ami idegen*. Egy reszponzív fenomenológia vázlata. Ford. Tengelyi László. *Gond*, 20. sz.

2007 *The question of the other*. Suny Press, New York.

WERNER, Heinz:

1948 *The comparative psychology of mental developemamt*. International Universities Press, New York.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig:

2004 *Logikai-filozófiai értekezés*. Atlantisz, Budapest.

WOLLHEIM, Richard:

1987 *Painting as an art*. Harvard University Press, Washington DC.